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Abstract
This  research  examines  common  claims  about  how  personal  data  is  used  in  political
communication, focusing on civil society organisations (CSOs). Two ethnographic case studies
are  carried  out  to  investigate  the  differences  between  a  traditional  membership-run  CSO,
Amnesty International, and a grant-funded CSO, Tactical Technology Collective. The findings
are  threefold.  Firstly,  new  civil  society  organisations,  such  as  Avaaz,  38  Degrees  and
Change.org, assert that data-driven technologies support their audience-led models. However,
both organisations in this research engage in data-driven practices to persuade the audience to
support the strategy set by organisational staff, corroborating the critical claims that data-driven
practices reinforce expert-led models. Secondly, rhetoric around the uptake of new data-driven
practices  has  been based on the  assumption  that  distinct  data-driven  ways  of  working  have
become normalised. The findings show, however, that these two CSOs still rely on deliebration,
personal  judgement,  and  relationships  to  make  strategic  decisions.  Finally,  decision-making
surrounding data-driven practices can be influenced by the opaque role of data scientists and data
technologies. The findings show how placing these agents outside of strategic decision-making
affects  the  organisation’s  ability  to  manage  personal  data  consistently  across  projects.  The
research is significant in understanding the complexity and nuance in the adoption, and rejection,
of new data-driven practices. Further, the research makes a case for practitioners and researchers
alike to be cautious about claims that data-driven practices support audience-led models, and to
be open to the benefits of expert-led models.
5
Contents
List of Tables 9
List of Figures 10
Chapter 1. Data-Driven Campaigns: Success Stories and Scandals 11
1.1 More Than A Tool: Data Logic 12
1.2 Acceptable and Unacceptable Engagement with Data Logic 22
1.3 The Research Problem, Aim and Questions 32
1.4 Thesis Plan 44
Chapter 2. Data Logic, Political Communication and Agency 47
2.1 Data Logic: An Ideal Type of Data Practices 48
2.2 Political Communication and Data: The Trustee and Delegate
Models 70
2.2.1 Data Justice in Political Communication 71
2.2.2 The Trustee and Delegate Models and  Responsive
Leadership 79
2.3 A Framework for Examining Data Justice in CSOs 85
2.3.1 Delegates and Data Logic 88
2.3.2 Trustees and Data Logic 93
2.3.4 Summary: Data Logic and Political Representation 97
2.4 Agency and Decision-Making in Data Logic 98
2.4.1 Technocrats 99
2.4.2 Software 102
2.4.3 The Data Double 104
2.5 Conclusion 111
6
Chapter 3. Methodology: Two Ethnographic Case Studies 112
3.1 The Research Questions 112
3.2 The Advantages of an Ethnographic Approach 114
3.3 Limitations, Risks and Mitigation Strategies 119
3.4 Case Studies: A Comparison of Two Ethnographies 122
3.5 Indicators 126
3.6 The Method 130
3.7 Summary 141
Chapter 4. Data Logic and Political Representation 143
4.1 The Internal Balance Between the Trustee and Delegate Models 146
4.2 Data Logic Absent in the Delegate Model 151
4.3 Data Logic Absent from the Trustee Model 160
4.4 Data Logic Supports the Trustees Model 168
4.5 Concerns of Using Data Logic to Support Representation 183
4.6 Summary 204
Chapter 5. The Principles of Data Logic 206
5.1 Contexts in which Data Logic is Apparent 208
5.1.1 Communications Through Digital Platforms, Events
and Traditional Media 209
5.1.2 Fundraising 212
5.1.3 Data Logic for Abstract Growth Goals 215
5.1.4 Presenting Information to Others 217
5.1.5 Summary 221
5.2 Context in which Data Logic is Rejected 222
5.2.1 Long-Term Goals and Short-Term Data 223
7
5.2.2 Technical Standardised Processes Lead to False Data 225
5.2.3 Context-Free Data 229
5.2.4 Conclusion 234
5.3 Summary 235
Chapter 6. The Technocrats, Software and Data Doubles 237
6.1 Technocrats: Integrated or Isolated 238
6.1.1 Isolated Skills of Technocrats 239
6.1.2 Expertise Integrated into Teams and Roles 246
6.1.3 Technocrats and Logics That Do and Do Not Match 249
6.2 Software Choices Managed by Logic 253
6.3 Data double: False but Useful 257
Chapter 7. Conclusion 264
7.1 Trustee and Delegate Models and Data logic 269
7.2 The Adoption of Data Logic and Alternatives 274
7.3 Limitations and Further Research 281






Table 1.1: The four principles of data logic..................................................................................21
Table 2.1: Different terms for centralised and decentralised structures of decision-making in 
political communication................................................................................................................48
Table 4.1: The priority criteria used by Amnesty to guide decisions presented in a conference to 
other CSOs and academics .........................................................................................................167
9
List of Figures
Figure 1.1: Framework for the Use of Personal Data in Political Communication......................40
Figure 1.2 Traditional Decision-Making Roles in the Trustee and Delegate Models..................41
Figure 1.3 Decision-Making Roles which have been Disrupted by Data Logic in the Trustee and
Delegate Models...........................................................................................................................42
Figure 2.1: Avaaz’s website homepage shows the use of quantified metrics in order to represent
themselves (Avaaz, 2019).............................................................................................................63
Figure 2.2: The current use of data-driven methods in CSOs which will be investigated in this
research.........................................................................................................................................86
Figure 2.3: The campaign planning cycle from the website of the National Council for Voluntary
Organisations (Brennan, 2017).....................................................................................................87
Figure 2.4: Arnstein’s Ladder of Participation (1969)..................................................................88
Figure 3.1 Timeline of research method carried out at Amnesty................................................132
Figure 3.2 Timeline of research method carried out at Tactical Tech.........................................133
Figure 4.1 The Flower of Participation from Amnesty’s Toolkit for Youth Strategies outlines the
possible levels of involvement of youth-constituents in decision-making..................................156
Figure 4.2: Amnesty’s Theory of Change (ToC) for Goal 5 (G5) (2016)...................................177
Figure 4.3: This image was taken from a PowerPoint slide presented at an internal conference, by
fundraising expert describing the necessary factors for human rights change to happen............179
10
Chapter 1. Data-Driven Campaigns: Success Stories and Scandals
I  began  my journey  towards  writing  this  thesis  in  2013  when  I  started  the  role  of  Digital
Activism  Coordinator  at  the  International  Secretariat  of  Amnesty  International  (Amnesty).
Amnesty is a civil society organisation (CSO) and their vision is to create “a world where human
rights are enjoyed by all” (Amnesty, 2019). To achieve this, Amnesty runs campaigns on a range
of topics using different tactics. For example, Amnesty lobbies to abolish death penalty laws runs
public education programs on sexual and reproductive rights, and petitions to free prisoners of
conscience.  The role of  Digital  Activism Coordinator  was created  to  encourage and support
campaigners to use social media, mobile applications (apps) and other digital technologies to
engage with their  audience.  At the time,  stories were emerging from the wider campaigning
sector about their successful use of data-driven technologies to support their work. The main
protagonists of these success stories were recently founded CSOs, such as Avaaz, MoveOn and
Change.org. These CSOs attracted attention due to their unique model as digital membership
organisations consisting of fast-moving large-scale membership,  participation and fundraising
(Horstink, 2017). To achieve this model, the organisations’ tactics are reliant on both technology
and personal data. Staff collect and host email addresses, create profiles on individuals or groups
to target them with personalised messages and track how many people engage with their web or
email content to optimise their communication tactics. Digital membership organisations claim
to use these data-driven tools to support audience-led models of decision-making. David Karpf
(2017) creates the term analytic activism to describe this specific data-driven approach to engage
a large-scale public audience in decision-making within CSOs. Amnesty introduced the role of
Digital Activism Coordinator because they wanted to engage in analytic activism too. 
In the same year of the creation of the Digital Activism Coordinator role, Amnesty also
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established a team to campaign on the topic of technology and human rights. One of the team’s
first  major  campaigns  was  created  in  response  to  Edward  Snowden’s  revelations  of  mass
surveillance.  Snowden  exposed  the  data-driven  surveillance  programs  being  carried  out  by
government security bodies across the world including the NSA in the US, GCHQ in the UK and
the ASD in Australia. In the name of national security, the surveillance programs can and do
collect  the content of people’s unencrypted emails,  text messages and video calls  as well  as
metadata such as what time calls took place and to whom the messages were sent. The agencies
not  only search through past messages  to investigate  crimes,  but  also analyse data to create
profiles of who is likely to be involved in criminal activity, and find patterns in the data to predict
the likelihood of where future crimes may take place (Lyon, 2015). Amnesty’s campaign, framed
by the organisation’s focus on human rights, argued that the activities were in breach of the right
to privacy and the right to freedom of expression (Amnesty International, 2014). Furthermore,
Amnesty  criticised  government  surveillance  for  being  ineffective  which  violates  one  of  the
components of privacy laws that any data collected must be necessary and proportionate to the
aim.
My role as digital activism coordinator involved analysing and profiling people’s online
behaviours  and  constituted  a  “systematic  and  routine  attention  to  personal  details,  whether
specific or aggregate, for a defined purpose” (Lyon, 2015, p. 13) - the definition of surveillance.
This crossover between surveillance and analytics made me feel uneasy in my role. There are
some clear differences between Amnesty’s data practices and those of national security agencies.
Amnesty’s reasons for engaging with the data is  to communicate campaigns,  rather than for
national security. If either Amnesty or the national security agency wanted to use the data for
reprehensible  purposes,  the  national  security  agencies  have  more  authority  and resources  to
achieve these goals. However, the criticisms levied at surveillance were not levied at the goal of
security,  or the national  security  bodies resources,  but rather  at  the violation  of privacy and
freedom of expression created by the constant monitoring of activities. It was not clear whether
my work could be distinguished as respectable analytics, rather than immoral surveillance
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I was not the only one feeling concerned about the overlap between analytics activism
and surveillance. In 2015, when I began the scoping phase for this research project, I attended a
digital campaigning conference for practitioners called the e-campaigning forum (ECF). Most of
the agenda is open, created on the first morning by the attendees through a discussion of current
ideas, problems and questions they have around digital campaigning. One attendee proposed a
session titled “creepy or crafty” to discuss whether it  was creepy for them to be monitoring
people’s activities and behaviours online, or a crafty way for them to improve their campaigns.
The  session  was  well  attended,  and various  topics  were  covered  ranging  from personalised
commercial  adverts,  the  difficulty  of  writing  easy-to-understand  privacy  policies,  and  the
effectiveness of measuring human rights impact from email open rates.  No one left with a clear
answer on which practices were creepy, and which were crafty. There was also little connection
between how participants felt affected personally by advertising campaigns of private companies
and how they, as campaigners, use data to improve their organisation’s communication with their
audiences.  They were missing questions that could bridge the critical  views they had in one
instance to their optimism for the role of data in their communication practices in the other.
This  research  aims  to  present  a  framework  to  help  distinguish  which  data-driven
techniques are acceptable, such as those proposed to listen to large-scale audiences in analytic
activism,  or  unacceptable,  such  as  those  used  to  monitor  and  control  populations  in  mass
surveillance.  The framework builds  from the  theory  of  data  justice  (Dencik  et  al.,  2016)  to
evaluate and proscribe how CSOs can take into account the impact of data-driven practices on
the shape and functioning of society.  I examine the specific context of the values which are
deemed acceptable within political communication practices to understand the impact of data-
driven tactics. Drawing on perspectives around critical data studies, political communication and
CSOs’ representation models, I consider the impact of data-driven tactics on a CSO’s ability to
effectively  carry  out  decision-making either  through an audience-led  model  or  an expert-led
model. 
I build on the framework through an ethnography of two CSOs, Amnesty and Tactical
13
Technology Collective (Tactical Tech), which are audience-led and expert-led respectively. The
findings show that while those engaging with analytic activism claim to be using data to try to
improve their audience-led campaigns, these two organisations engage with data practices rarely,
and when they do, almost solely when running expert-led campaigns. The organisations still run
supporter-led campaigns but without engaging data-driven methods. The engagement with data-
driven practices is also only associated with situations where the logic already overlaps, such as
in fundraising or when working with online platforms. However, data is not as prevalent as is
proposed in previous literature, as both organisations are concerned with the impacts of data-
driven approaches on both audience-led and expert-led models. 
The findings demonstrate a need for more research into the distinct nature and utility of 
both  data-driven  practices,  and  alternatives  to  data-driven  practices,  such  as  qualitative,
deliberative and subjective judgement based approaches. This will help build a better picture of
both how we can conceptualise data-driven practices, and how to understand, and limit, the sense
of their inevitable and prevailing use, in order to present a more comprehensive framework for
when and how to engage with them. The findings also demonstrate how the attributes of contexts
in which data-driven practices are used for expert-led models, correlating with the attributes of
surveillance in which the political representative monitors and manages the public. This not only
raises questions of how digital membership organisations achieve their model in practice but also
brings to light the benefits of expert-led models for CSOs, which the staff demonstrate support
for,  whether  supported  by  data-driven  methods  or  not.  Finally,  the  organisations  maintain
consistency  and  control  over  their  engagement  with  data  if  they  integrate  the  expertise  of
technology into roles, rather than classifying certain groups as technocrats. 
1.1 More Than A Tool: Data Logic
Analytic activism and mass surveillance are paradigmatic of a set of ways of working which have
become pervasive across society in the last fifty years. These practices involve using technology
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and  information  in  a  distinct  manner  and  range  across  different  sectors  including  data-led
criminal investigations, insurance systems reliant on data representing people’s shopping habits,
and computerised hiring systems that analyse data to narrow down large numbers of CVs to a
few candidates for in-person interviews (O’Neil, 2016; Sánchez-Monedero, 2019). Data-driven
tools  are also found in our personal lives  including wearable technology such as Fitbit,  that
tracks our steps during the day, smart home systems that monitor our electricity use, and apps
that help track and manage our sleeping patterns.
These new data-driven practices have been researched extensively across sectors.  For
example,  Bollier (2010) collates research on how health care organisations have used data to
track the spread of illnesses (see also Lazer et al., 2014), and how data has become informative
when assessing cost and quality of different care options based on personal needs and tracking
the development and utility of drugs. Dyche (2012) describes how a retail chain improves their
knowledge of customer’s purchasing habits and consequently increases their profits through data
collection  and  analysis  on  customer  behaviours.  Bronson  and  Knezevic  (2016)  review  and
demonstrate  how the analysis  of large data sets  has changed operations  within the food and
agricultural  sector.  Statistics  are  increasingly  used  by  governments  to  provide  evidence  for
policy and regulation (Rieder and Simon 2016). The research sector has changed their operations
to adapt to include these new data-driven practices, both in deciding the priorities of what to
research and how the research itself is being conducted in universities; data scholarship was first
framed as “data-intensive research” in policy initiatives that began early in the 2000s, including
eScience, eSocial Science, eHumanities, and eInfrastructure (Borgman, 2015).
Most relevant  to this  thesis is the ubiquitous use of data in communication practices.
Communication professionals collect and analyse data on people’s demographics, behaviours,
and interests, in order to create personalised and targeted messages so as to persuade people to
carry  out  a  desired  outcome  such  as  buying  a  product  or  voting  for  a  specific  political
representative in an upcoming election (Kreiss and Howard, 2010; Anderson, 2011; Nielsen,
2012; Chadwick, 2013; Hersh, 2015; Kreiss, 2016). This project specifically focuses on CSOs,
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where data is being used in organisations for knowledge and research, the management of people
(Hall,  2019), as well as political communication as documented by Karpf (2017) and Dennis
(2018).
Across all of these sectors, data-driven practices have developed since the 1960s due to a
substantial increase in the quantity, variety and accessibility of computer and internet capacities
which have made the collection, hosting and analysis of data faster, easier to carry out and more
affordable.  The  technologies  used  to  create  and analyse  data  have  three  notable  capabilities
which are important to understanding the distinct nature of how they have been adopted across
sectors.  Firstly,  technology  has  been developed  that  can  extract  or  create  data  from objects
through sensors, for example, when a button is pressed, a thermometer registers the temperature,
or when a person clicks on a link to open a website in their browser. This is commonly termed
datafication:  actions  and  reactions  are  represented  as  data  which  is  held  in  a  computerised
database (Cukier and Mayer-Schöenberger, 2013). Secondly, databases and servers can host an
increasing variety and quantity of data with much more precision and speed. To give a sense of
the scale, in 2014 Axciom, a database marketing company, held over 3000 data points per person
for 97% of the 320 million citizens of the US population (Federal Trade Commission, 2014).
Finally, technologies have developed to connect large databases and use analysis techniques for
finding patterns and predicting new data points from those already collected (Lyon, 2015). For
example, one important new technique is the use of algorithms to predict future data points, such
as using how a certain geographic region voted in previous elections to predict how they, or
other similar regions, will vote in a future election.
The type of data that underpins this work, and which is referred to in this thesis, can  be
represented in “units of any size, whether pixels,  photons, characters,  strokes, letters,  words”
(Borgman, 2015) and other individual units which can be saved in databases or spreadsheets.
This thesis focuses on personal data. Personal data is a representation of any aspect of a person
or  persons,  including  their  demographics,  behaviours  or  attitudes  and  has  traditionally,  and
legally, been reserved for data associated with an identified individual such as linked to a name
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or email address. However, now due to the scale of data, types of data, and ability to connect the
data, the personal data driving the practices outlined in this thesis, and forming the object of
inquiry, includes anonymised statistics about groups of people such as website traffic, migration
statistics or event attendance numbers. Personal data is defined as a collection of any number of
single data points that  represent  any aspect  of a person or a group of people in a  machine-
readable format.  Data-driven practices will  refer to the computerised collection,  analysis  and
hosting of this type of data, the details of which are outlined and discussed throughout the thesis. 
However, these data-driven practices are not just defined by the format of information or
the tools used. Across different fields of study, there have been various attempts to analyse and
document the approach to data practices as more than a single method but as a distinct cultural
phenomenon. To define data practices as more than a method, scholars have compared them to
various other socially significant concepts. Toonders et al (2013) compare the vast quantities of
data and their value with the economic value of oil (Toonders et al, 2013) and Lessig likens the
effect of the algorithms that process the data to the power of law (Lessig, 1999). Martin and
Norman (1970, p. 24) poetically write “The gothic spires [of churches] have been replaced with
monuments to electronics” as tall radio masts and towers appeared on skylines and took cultural
significance in the late 1960s. Nick Couldry (2014, p. 887), describes the new engagement with
data technologies as the myth of big data, writing that big data is  “now increasingly influencing
science, corporate and governmental agendas” and adds that “its domain is simply: everything -
the  entire  extent  of  the  data  we generate  as  we live  and interact”.  From oil  to  religion,  to
mythology, data-driven practices have been weighted with great importance to the functioning of
society. 
Different fields of study have also identified values which shape engagement with data-
driven processes. Critical data studies scholars, boyd and Crawford (2012, p. 663) define the
popular term Big Data, not just as large data sets but also as a “widespread belief that large data
sets  offer  a  higher  form of  intelligence  and knowledge that  can  generate  insights  that  were
previously  impossible,  with  the  aura  of  truth,  objectivity,  and  accuracy.”  Another  area  of
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literature which conceptualises data practices is surveillance studies. Shoshana Zuboff (2019)
describes,  in  her  book  The Age of  Surveillance  Capitalism, the behaviours  surrounding data
practices in the context of well-established economic values and practices. Values around data
practices are based on how profit can be made, in particular, how data in vast quantities can be
created by managing the behaviours of customers and collected in exchange for free products
such  as  functions  of  Facebook  and  Google.  The  data  is  considered  important  because  it  is
believed to support the ability to manage people’s actions, to encourage them to buy a product or
to engage with a service.
The final area of literature which this research draws from is political communication
which has considered the role of data practices within a growing interaction with science and
technology studies. In the introduction, I described Analytic Activism, Karpf’s term for the use of
data  by  CSOs  to  engage  with  their  different  audiences  whether  they  are  members  of  the
organisation, campaigners or the general public. Analytic activism, as Karpf (2017, p. 4) writes,
also goes beyond data-driven tools to “new tactics and strategies, new organizational learning
routines, and new avenues for mass political engagement”. Zynup Tufecki (2014, p. 2) describes
data  practices  in  electoral  campaigning,  which  she  terms  Computational  Politics, as  the
application of “computational  methods to large datasets  derived from online and offline data
sources  for  conducting  outreach,  persuasion  and  mobilization  in  the  service  of  electing,
furthering or opposing a candidate, a policy or legislation”. Tufecki’s and Karpf’s definitions
uphold the idea that the current use of data does not simply involve new technologies assisting
previous ways of working, but that the technologies have changed the modus operandi of the
CSOs’  campaigns  and  political  campaigns.  In  both  cases,  the  scholars  present  that  within
campaigning, the behaviours are different, the activities are different, the staff are different, and
all of this due to the new distinct values placed on the role of data. 
Whether  the  phenomenon  is  called  ‘analytics  activism’,  ‘computational  politics’,
‘surveillance capitalism’ or ‘big data’, the terms aim to capture something that is consistently
and distinctly more than just the new technologies of data practice. However, the terms also fall
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short in various ways. The use of the term big data is limited because big data came from a very
specific use in technical discourse as a quantity of data that has to be processed by more than one
computer (Kitchin, 2014). Even boyd and Crawford (2012, p. 663) recognise some of the data
encompassed by their use of the term Big Data “are not nearly as large as earlier data sets that
were not considered Big Data (e.g. census data).” On top of this, big data is also a term that has
been widely used as a catch-all term for any new data-driven practice, unrelated to the necessary
condition of two computers, and without referencing explicitly the shift in reasoning or cultural
behaviours  and habits.  Analytic  Activism and Computational  Politics  are limited by framing
them within a specific discipline, either activism or election campaigning respectively. This does
not account for the pervasiveness of common data-driven practices across sectors. There needs to
be a unique term that  can not only overcome the ambiguity  and the limited  nature of these
definitions but can also support the understanding, and critical review, of a cross-disciplinary
phenomenon. 
I propose an ideal type, which I term data logic, to understand the phenomenon. An ideal
type, defined by Weber (1949, p,90) is “the one-side accentuation of one or more points of view
and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally
absent,  concrete  individual  phenomena,  which  are  arranged  according  to  those  one-sidedly
emphasized  viewpoints  into  a  unified  analytical  construct.”  In  this  case,  data  logic  is  a
consolidated set of one-sided principles that can determine what is consistent across data-driven
practices. An ideal type cannot be found as a single entity in reality, but allows for the systematic
characterization of instances in that reality, and therefore enables researchers to scrutinise the
specific elements that make up a phenomenon, in this case, new data practices. 
In chapter 2, I describe in detail the ideal type of data logic. In particular, I show how the
principles of data logic influence what types of information and outputs are created and accepted
by groups engaging with data-driven technologies. This description includes how the term logic
is used based on previous political communication and organisational theories that use the term:
“institutional logic”, “logic of collective action” and “media logic”. Logic is used across these
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theories to describe a common and recognisable approach to the validation of behaviours and
knowledge shared by a group who engage with them and subsequently can be used to identify
the group’s distinct way of working. Logic, importantly, can be codified as a set of principles, as
an ideal type can, to identify, and if desired, to perform, the behaviours which will be accepted
within the group.
The principles which determine the shape of data practices are already well documented
by scholars across critical data studies, surveillance studies and political communication. In some
cases, scholars have already collated explicit lists of principles. For example, Karpf defines three
principles  of  Analytic  Activism that  shape the values  and behaviours  which  distinguish  this
approach from alternative and older campaigning approaches: a culture of ‘testing’ everything
from email subject lines to larger strategies; using digital tools to ‘listen’ to a public audience;
and aiming for a large and broad supporter base of ‘scale’ over a narrow expert group (Karpf,
2017, p. 4). In another case, Tufecki (2014) describes six dynamics given the titles: big data,
computational methods, modelling, behavioural science, experimental science and the power of
platforms and algorithms. I synthesise the relevant conceptual developments of the rise of data
practices into four principles, which can be seen in table 1.1. Data logic is the ideal type that
comprises all these four principles.
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Table 1.1: The four principles of data logic
Principle Belief Behaviour
Quantification It is possible to representanything in numbers
Using numerical targets as goals,
databases of members or audiences to
represent audiences, and metrics for
evaluation
Scale The more data the better
Always seeking to collect more data





involving technology are the
best way to achieve results
Technology experts, databases and




Outputs can be controlled
through rule sets
Modelling and testing, adjusting 
inputs and processes to arrive at
desired outputs
CSOs have been using personal data before the elements of data logic were adopted. For
example, voluntary groups organised during World War I and World War II (Skocpol, 2013)
traditionally hosted members’ contact details, identifying membership numbers, and the history
of  the  members’  relationships  with  the  organisation.  Fundraising  organisations  have  used
personal financial data from individuals for processing donations. Humanitarian organisations,
such as the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, founded in 1919,
have collected and analysed personal data relating to people’s movements and behaviours to
determine where their work will be most effective. The development of the data technologies,
and accompanying logic, has increased the quantity and variety of data and subsequently the
number of contexts within CSOs within which personal data can now be used.
CSOs can use data-driven technologies to optimise and personalise communicating their
messages. For example,  they can track what content and format of emails  generate  the most
click-throughs,  when someone clicks  on a link that  takes  them to another  webpage,  to their
website. They can target individuals directly through their  email  address, and personalise the
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content based on any personal data they have gathered on them, such as demographic details or
their previous interactions with them on social media or email. They can also use tools to track
and analyse what people are saying on social media to try to understand public opinions which
can then be used to shape the organisation’s strategies.
The data logic present in analytic activism is valued so highly some newer organisations
define themselves  by their  reliance  on new data-driven technologies.  MoveOn defines itself,
amongst other principles by its reliance on “rigorous data science and testing” (MoveOn, 2011).
Care2, an online petition website, is helping CSOs reach new audiences by being able to use
personal  identifying  data  to  “behaviourally  target  your  audience”  (Care2,  2018).  Avaaz,  an
internet-based campaigning CSO, is reliant on contact and survey data as their strategy is created
by yearly all-member surveys and their “campaign ideas are polled and tested weekly to 10,000-
member random samples” (Avaaz, 2017). These revealing self-proclamations demonstrate that
CSOs not only use a wider variety and larger quantity of data but also define their work by the
integral value of the data. Data has always played an important role in decision-making but now
there is a data-driven way of working which involves a distinct and recognisable way in which
data is put at the centre of not only their operations but in the case of many of the new CSOs the
identity of the organisation itself. These practices will be unpacked in more detail in chapter 2. In
the case of this research, data logic, an ideal type of the phenomena of data practices, is the
object  -  central  to  mass  surveillance  or  analytic  activism  -  and  the  question  is:  how  can
campaigners  and  researchers  consider  when  the  elements  of  data  logic  are  acceptable  or
unacceptable? To do this, it is important to understand how we are evaluating what is acceptable
or not.
1.2 Acceptable and Unacceptable Engagement with Data Logic
In 2012, boyd and Crawford asked “Will  large scale search data help us create better  tools,
services, and public goods? Or will it usher in a new way of privacy incursions and invasive
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marketing?” (boyd and Crawford, 2012, p. 663). At the e-campaigning forum, the group session
examined the difference between ‘creepy’ ethics or ‘crafty’ tools. In addressing concerns of data-
driven practices there are often two elements: are data practices effective and are they ethical?
Sometimes, as in these two examples, these are pitted against each other resulting in a cognitive
dissonance in which practices are effective for audience-led models and at the same time violate
privacy in expert-led models. The subsuming of the issues in these questions make it difficult for
any  political  representative  attempting  to  evaluate  the  acceptability  of  data  practices.
Furthermore, the ability for anyone to investigate these practices is criticised due to the lack of
transparency  and ownership,  and consequently,  the  agency  over  data-practices.  Across  these
criticisms, there are three testing points which demonstrate the different ways in which data logic
is  considered  unacceptable,  and by contrast,  what  is  acceptable:  its  effectiveness  in  creating
knowledge, its impact on the relationship between the data collector and data subject, and the
agency  of  these  two  roles  in  decision-making  within  data  practices.  These  three  issues  are
introduced in the following paragraphs.
Data logic is a method for producing accurate information
Data  logic  defines  the  characteristics  of  the  ways  in  which  information  is  created  and
communicated by groups engaging with data-driven technologies. Critical data studies scholars
such as boyd and Crawford (2012), Raley (2013), and Kitchin (2014), argue that the principles
that  define  data  practices  are  flawed,  and  do  not  lead  to  accurate  information  or  effective
practices due to a variety of problems in the processes of creating and analysing data. This may
be because quantifying certain subjects in order to represent them is difficult or impossible, or
because there are errors or biases in the process, and subsequently the data.  One reason, for
example,  is  because easily  accessible  data,  created  by recent  data technologies,  may lead to
errors in information is because it has been collected in response to one question, but is being
used to answer a different one. For example, ‘how many Twitter accounts used a hashtag in their
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tweets in the last week?’ is very different to ‘how many people used a hashtag on Twitter in the
last week?’ as some of the Twitter accounts may be bots - automated accounts run by code rather
than under a person’s control. Furthermore, datasets from any social media platform are provided
by the company themselves, collected based on the set up of their platform and to represent the
aspects of people’s engagement which the platform company would like to measure. This is
likely  to  be  based  on  questions  of  how  the  company  can  produce  more  engagement  for
themselves or to gain profit - such as clicks on ads or time spent on the platform. These datasets
are then analysed by people using the platform to find answers to different questions, such as for
academic research or by a CSO’s communications team, but in neither case does the researcher
or communication professional get to set the questions that create and collect the data. As is
highlighted in research method studies: minor changes in the format and aim of the question can
change the results dramatically.
The decisions that affect data points can range from small to large and across various
parts of the process, such as what action from the user will create a data point and what the data
point  represents  about  the  user’s  intentions.  A  principle  of  data  logic  is  that  there  are
standardised universal processes that unearth the same universal information, but every process
to create data is unique. Raley (2013) emphasises this by calling the term raw data an oxymoron:
to get data it must have been in some way processed, and cannot be ‘raw’. The data is, by its
nature, a model of reality, and this model has to be created through a process. These issues can
lead to more substantial consequences than mistaking a few bots for people; for example, there
are cases of social profiling gone wrong leading to the arrests and investigations of innocent
people.
Inaccurate information is also created due to personal biases, as opposed to statistical
bias, in the people setting the parameters to collect and analyse the data, covered particularly in
studies  of  algorithmic  decision  making  (Sánchez-Monedero  et  al,  2019).  Kitchin  (2014)
describes how, within a group of technical experts, each would tackle a problem differently.
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Some of these differences in approaches can be based on the biases towards the type of code the
programmer likes to use, the approach to problem-solving the programmer takes, or the software
the programmer uses to write the code. On top of that, people’s backgrounds and experiences
influence their decisions too. As boyd and Crawford (2012, p. 673) draw attention to, technology
and  management  staff  are  still,  for  the  majority,  from a  same  demographic  group  and  “as
feminist historians and philosophers of science have demonstrated, who is asking the questions
determines which questions are asked.” People’s backgrounds, different approaches to problem-
solving, the code and software they use, and other factors can lead to the same questions being
addressed with different processes, algorithms, and producing different datasets.  Any specific
datasets cannot be considered to be a universal, standardised result.
CSOs are engaging with data from social media, website traffic, and using other large
scale personal data to improve their communications without any of the questions or caveats of
quantitative methods research, such as ensuring a focused sample group or ensuring the question
they want asked of the data is the one that framed the data. Critical data scholars argue that when
data logic is the approach taken, the information it generates replaces those which are created
through more traditional approaches, such as qualitative and intuitive approaches. However, the
information created through data logic is not always superior as it is not representative of what it
claims  to  represent,  and  can  be  inadequate  or  even  harmful  when  contributing  to  the
organisational knowledge - tacit or codified. These criticisms target not the principles of data
logic such as trusting the technologies to carry out standardised processes, to create accurate
information, through mostly quantified metrics.
The balance of decision-making power between the data collector and the data subject
The most  common criticism of  the  collection  and analysis  of  personal  data  practices  is  the
violation  of  the  right  to  privacy  between  the  data  collector  and  the  data  subject.  The  data
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collector in this case is the CSO. The data subject is the person who the data represents. Two
scandals, brought to light by whistleblowers, have highlighted this issue to the wider public:
Edward Snowden’s revelations of mass surveillance being conducted by several governments
worldwide and Christopher Wylie’s exposé of Cambridge Analytica’s use of personal data to
support  political  campaigns.  The  former  was  discussed  in  the  introductory  paragraphs.  The
revelations prompted public engagement with the issues of the right to privacy and the right to
freedom of expression violated by the government’s  non-consensual collection of data of all
citizens - whether innocent or guilty. The scandal raised concern about how much power is held
not just by security agencies, but also by communication companies. The companies behind the
communication technologies creating and hosting personal data can learn a lot about the people
using the technologies and can pass that information on to whoever they like.
The  second  scandal  happened  in  2018  after  Christopher  Wylie  brought  forward
information about the digital campaigning firm he worked at, Cambridge Analytica. The now
insolvent firm was investigated for their nefarious use of data to profile and target citizens during
contentious and polarising political campaigns. The practices were nefarious both in the eyes of
the law, due to the alleged illegal collection and retention of data from a Facebook app, and in
terms of what  is  socially  acceptable:  media reports,  and campaigners  condemned the use of
psychometric profiling to target people during contentious political campaigns. The firm used
psychometric profiling which involves grouping people by their personality types, in this case
using  the  OCEAN  model  which  defines  people  by  their  openness,  conscientiousness,
extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism. This profiling technique differs from other types of
profiling  such  as  demographic  profiles  or  location-based  profiles.  To  target  people  with
information  based  on  their  personalities,  a  sensitive  and  debatable  aspect  of  personal
information,  during  a  political  campaign,  was  received  with  a  lot  more  controversy  than
demographic or location-based profiling techniques being used to personalise advertisements for
commercial products and services.
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The Cambridge Analytica scandal sparked some of the first government-led, worldwide
investigations into how personal data is being used in political campaigns, what impact this use
might have, and consequently whether the practices should be regulated further (Digital, Culture,
Media  and  Sport  Committee,  2018).  The  scandal  amplified  the  efforts  of  academics  and
practitioners already attempting to answer these questions. In particular, issues of mass collection
of personal data have been covered substantially in the field of surveillance studies. In 1988,
Clarke  coined  the  term  ‘dataveillance’,  subsuming  the  term  surveillance,  associated  with
criticisms of privacy violations and inappropriate levels of control and management from the
data collector, with the specific practices surrounding data technologies. Dataveillance is a term
often used by scholars describing mass data collection practices in surveillance literature (Espoti,
2014;  van  Dijck,  2014;  Lyon  2015;  Lupton  and  Michael,  2017).  The  association  of  data
collection and analysis, as a form of surveillance, and therefore raising issues of monitoring and
control of people's behaviours, opinions and activities, remains one of the most talked about.
From these approaches, the right to privacy and the right to freedom of expression are the
two political rights most commonly brought up in the face of mass data collection and analysis.
These  are  key  in  campaigns  on  the  topic  of  big  data  and  surveillance,  such  as  Amnesty’s
campaign mentioned in the introductory paragraphs. The right to privacy can be broadly defined
as the right to space,  communication,  experiences,  and thoughts free from interference  from
others (Westin, 1968). The right is inherently wrapped up in the right to freedom of expression.
As Snowden (2014) expresses the importance of his own revelations, “under observation, we act
less free, which means we effectively are less free”. If our right to privacy is violated, and we are
monitored in all our behaviours and activities, by consequence our right to freedom of expression
is violated too.
These rights are an important part of our political rights, embedded in both national and
international human rights laws, which makes it more pertinent that they are being violated by
governmental or political bodies, which is at the foundation of the criticisms from surveillance
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studies scholars. The problem is not just the right violated, but who is violating that right and for
what reason. The most well interrogated of these relationships are those between the government
security bodies and citizens;  between commercial organisations and customers (Martin, 2012);
or between commercial organisations and citizens (Zuboff, 2015). Scholars have examined the
relationship  between institutions  such as  Facebook,  rely  on the  relationship  with  their  users
(Oboler et al., 2012) or how data brokers rely on producing economic values from the personal
data (Crawford and Shultz, 2014). The issue is also raised in the critical literature on the use of
data in political communication. The Cambridge Analytica scandal exemplifies aspects of this
issue as people focused questions on the ethics of profiling and targeting people for political
gain,  with  ambiguous  consent.  Tufecki  (2014)  describes  the  practices  of  data  in  political
communication in terms of personalisation and targeting people to create palatable propaganda to
generate consent-engineering. The issue is who is using the data - a group who would wish to
politically represent citizens - and how - to target them to win votes, rather than to represent
them. The criticism targets the imbalance of power between the data collector and data subject,
arguing that the actions of the data collector are often to centralise power, to the detriment of the
people they are meant to represent. The target of the critiques from surveillance studies is not
necessarily  the  violated  rights,  but  the  trust  in  the  data  collector,  transparency  of  the  data
collector’s actions, consent from the data subject, and whose interests the data collection is in.
These criticisms bring into question the social contract between citizens and government:
the citizens agree to the actions of the government, but only if they accept that these actions are
in the best interest of the citizens. Literature focusing on government surveillance concentrates
on  the  balance  between  privacy  and  national  security.  The  mass  collection  of  data  without
consent is argued by the government, and proponents of their approach, to be in the best interest
of the people they represent for national security. However, campaigners and critical surveillance
scholars argue that the violation of privacy, and the management and control of people, are not
worth  the  gain.  There  is  no  transparency,  no  consent,  and the  interests  seem to  benefit  the
28
government over the individual’s rights to privacy. There is an argument for a balance between
the  data  collector  and  data  subject.  In  terms  of  political  communication  or  commercial
organisation, there is an argument they should also be thinking responsibly about the rights of the
data  subjects  they  work  with.  This  may  not  be  for  national  security,  but  in  the  case  of
commercial firms, that they would provide products the data subjects want, or in the case of
CSOs or political parties, that they will represent the wants of the data subjects.
The decision-making agency of the data collector and the data subject.
The final concern regarding data practices that I address in this thesis is the agency over decision
making surrounding data practices. Agency is our ability to control how we make sense of what
is happening around us and to us, so we can have the ability to have control over how we act. As
Couldry describes agency is about “making sense of the world so as to act within” (Couldry,
2014, p. 891)”. Gamson et al., (1992) uses the phrase meaning work to describe how agency is
the ability to generate meaning for ourselves. Milan writes about agency is the process in which
people make sense of the world around them, and adds that “agency is not one and given, nor is
it static; rather, it is the ability of social actors to variably engage with and react to the context in
which they are embedded that empowers them to change their  relation to structure.” (Milan,
2018, p. 152). Agency data subjects or data collectors to understand how decisions have been
made, their capacity to change them, and to have control over that change.
Data-driven processes have three components  which take away agency from the data
subjects and data collectors: the technocrats, the software, and the data double. These terms are
all explored further in the second chapter.  The technocrats are the technical experts who are
given the power to use the tools. The term originates from the term technocracy, used by Smyth
(1921) to define a system in which politicians’ decisions are no longer made by policymakers or
lawyers but by scientists and technologists. The term is used to describe those working with data
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technologies  working  alongside  politicians  or  on  services  which  facilitate  the  way  society
functions,  such as public  debate on social  media,  or economically through bitcoin and other
fintech solutions (Sadowski and Selinger, 2014; Pencheva et al., 2018). Technocrats can refer to
either those who support this form of governance or, as is taken for this project, the experts in the
roles making the decisions. The technocrats working within or alongside CSOs range from roles
with the expertise to write the code, such as programmers, to roles working directly with  the
data, such as data scientists, or roles handling the software, such as social media managers. All
make decisions at different stages of the process about how data will be created, analysed, and
presented to others.
Software is the term for any program or operating system used by computers. Software is
a broad term, which in this research covers a program which may collect, host or analyse data.
The concept of agency for software usually focuses on algorithms - and algorithmic decision
making  (Kitchin,  2014),  described  further  in  chapter  2.  Decision-making  power  might  be
delegated by allowing an algorithm in a piece of software to analyse data to generate profiles on
people,  or  the  data-driven  algorithms  running  which  content  is  promoted  on  social  media
platforms to choose what content to present or engage with. I broaden this term to ‘software’ as
the trust might not just be in the algorithm but in a computer program. This is most commonly a
database,  for example,  and decisions about what data to collect or how to analyse it  will be
entrusted to what the database can handle or deliver.
The data double is  a representation of a person or a group as data to be hosted in a
computer  database.  This  may  be  created  and  gathered  from organisations  recording  certain
actions of individuals, such as what someone posts on Facebook, what news articles they read, or
what they purchase in a grocery shop (Hedenus et al., 2017). These can either be connected to
individuals at the point of collection,  or they may be gathered anonymously,  to create likely
profiles of different people grouped by different characteristics such as gender or location, and
then the anonymised profile  is  attached to  an individual  and becomes their  data  double.  As
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described by Haggery and Ericson (2000) there is a surveillant  assemblage in which various
practices are used to gather data by surveilling people’s activities and reassembled to create the
data double. Sometimes the term data shadow is used to describe the same collection of data
traces of an individual such as by Howard (2010) or Kitchin (2014). The same data double may
be created of large group activities, for example, 100,000 web visits may be used to represent the
website’s audience without being connected to any specific individual. I use the term data double
to refer to the representation of an audience or constituent in a database which may be made up
of information collected directly from the individual, information that has been inferred from
them and others who share some of the same data points such as demographics or commonly
carried out activities. This is explored further in chapter 2.
The main focus of these criticisms so far from scholars has been on the data subject’s
agency. As Milan (2018, p. 508) focuses on the user’s experience, or the activists, in how they
can gain back agency in and able to create their own “self-directed action - real or perceived”.
When it comes to data, agency entails subjects' ability to understand how decisions have been
made, their capacity to change them and to have control over that change. For those engaging
with data logic, there is a trust in the technical processes in which important decisions - on what
data to collect and how - are delegated to technical experts, and at times even to the software,
they trust in. For example, social media platforms have both defined what a users experience
would look like online, and how the platforms are embedded into many other sites has driven
many others  to  make sure their  websites  can adapt  to  be a  platform or  to  incorporate  their
platforms,  a  platformization  according to  Helmond (2015,  p.  1).  In  each of  these  parts,  the
agency of the person engaging with a tool, such as with a platform, is removed from their own
agency, in place of that of the tool, technocrat or data double. 
This lack of agency is also relevant for data collectors as a person within an organisation
may trust the data double above their own instincts or ideas, or above the stated opinions of the
person it represents, and therefore delegate their agency to the data or the algorithms that create
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the  data.  For  example,  they  may  trust  the  data  to  represent  the  person who is  applying for
insurance,  or  whether  someone  should  be  stopped  and  checked  by  security,  rather  than  an
examination of them in person (O’Neil, 2016). The trust in the algorithm to have produced the
right data, and for the data to be superior to their own instincts or arguments, may take away
from their agency to make a decision.
Importantly,  there is a substantial  lack of transparency around these three agents,  the
processes they are involved in, and what decisions they make (Pariser, 2012; Tufecki,  2014;
Kitchin, 2014). Due to the lack of transparency, it is difficult for a data subject to understand
where another has made decisions on their behalf. It is also difficult for the data collector to be
able to understand where their own agency has been removed, as they trust black-box algorithms,
and delegate decisions to technical experts, to make decisions. This makes it difficult for either
group to understand if the data is effective, or representative, both important for the two issues
above. The lack of clarity affects the ability of those working with the data to be able to manage
the effectiveness of the data, and whether the data support their expert-led decisions or audience-
led decisions; and for the data subjects, as well as campaigners and researchers, to examine them
to  hold  them to  account  -  including  for  this  research  project  which  influences  the  research
questions, as outlined in the following sections.
1.3 The Research Problem, Aim and Questions
This research project aims to address how to assess which data-driven political communication
practices in CSOs are susceptible to the criticisms raised above. There are several theories which
aim to address concerns with data practices, namely data ethics, data protection, data activism,
and data justice. Data ethics examines the decisions around moral and ethical decisions about
how best to use data, in particular in the programming that creates, analyses, and presents the
data (Floridi and Taddeo, 2016). The approach of data ethics begins to address what questions to
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ask to understand if data practices are encroaching on unacceptable practices but do not present a
comprehensive framework for organisations to make decisions beyond the technical processes
themselves. Data protection is a legal framework which covers many of the technical aspects on
how  best  to  handle  data,  such  as  the  recent  European  General  Data  Protection  Regulation
(GDPR). The guidance relates to that which is within legally enforceable limits such as how to
gather consent and for how long to retain data after the initial collection. These legal frameworks
only  tackle  very  specific  issues,  and the  law has  often  not  caught  up  with  the  most  recent
technical developments and uses of the tools. Both data ethics and data protection focus on the
second criticism regarding the violation of privacy and other risks of security for data subjects.
Data activism begins to move away from specific technical aspects of regulation and the
violation of the right to privacy and includes the third criticism outlined above: how individuals
can reclaim their autonomy. As Milan (2018, p. 152) describes, data activism looks to ‘bring
democratic agency back”. There are two methods in particular for individuals to address this loss
of  autonomy,  either  they  can  turn  dataveillance  around and use  it  to  monitor  and track  the
behaviours  of  those  in  power,  or  they  can  take  ownership  of  their  own data  and retain  the
economic power and technological ownership of their data. Nonprofits and companies alike have
proposed technical systems that would allow people to own their own data and choose when they
share it, who with and what compensation they would receive. However, the technical solutions
proposed have yet to be easy enough to use or had enough economic value to be adopted.
The final, most recent proposal, to tackle concerns with the consequences of data-driven
practices is termed data justice. The aim of data justice is to provide a “conceptual foundation for
exploring  how data-driven surveillance  implicates  different  understandings  of  social  justice” 
(Dencik  et  al,  2016,  p.  9).  To  achieve  this  Dencik  et  al.  (2016,  p.  9)  describe  how  the
frameworks should take into account political agendas, interests and power relations within data-
driven cultures and the “is and ought to be organized in relation to digital infrastructures – on
social,  political,  economic,  cultural and ecological terms – that can consider and develop the
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meaning of justice in this context.” Data justice provides a more comprehensive approach to the
issues of data-driven practices combining those associated with surveillance with the democratic
consequences for political and economic rights (Dencik et al, 2016; Heeks, 2017; Taylor, 2017).
This  research builds  from the approach of data justice and develops the theory.  This
research will look at the use of data in political communication, and bring questions of ethics and
justice to the area of the use of data in communications and the structural model organisations
have  with  their  audiences.  I  will  examine  the  concept  of  is  and  ought of  justice  through
separately  addressing  the  effectiveness  of  practices  and  their  consequence  on  the  political
communications model. This thesis also develops a framework to examine data practices from
the perspective of the data collector, the CSO, rather than from the data subject or an outsider
critical approach.
The Problem and The Framework
In  1970,  Martin  and Norman (1970)  had already begun to  raise  concerns  about  data-driven
practices  in  their  book  Computerised  Society.  The  pair  highlighted  many  of  the  criticisms
outlined above, including the ineffectiveness of the logic in automating and quantifying complex
objects such as language and the dangers of omnipresent surveillance, writing that The National
Data Center  is “one of the most dangerous ideas ever to come from the bureaucratic  mind”
(Martin and Norman, 1970, P. 303). Fifty years later, these same problems are still being raised,
and yet the data-driven technologies are still increasingly being used, necessitating a continued
interrogation of data practices. This continued use of data practices is an important characteristic
of the problems.
The increasing development of data technologies has been deemed, by critical scholars,
an unquestioned and unavoidable engagement with data logic. An  inevitable prevalence of data
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practices is integral to many of the criticisms listed above, as the issue is not just that these
practices  lead  to  ineffective  practices  but  that  they  are  adopted  without  questioning  their
effectiveness. boyd and Crawford (2012), Kitchin (2014), and Couldry (2014) do not just point
out the flaws in the principles of data logic but emphasise how the principles of the logic are
faithfully  followed without  interrogation.  Dencik and Cable (2017) use the term surveillance
realism to highlight how the adoption of data-driven practices are accepted as an inevitable social
order. This idea is also presented by Zuboff’s (2015) concept of surveillance capitalism which
accredits the inevitable progression of the use of these tools to their economic value. This thesis
puts  this  perspective  at  its  foundation:  the  question  is  not  just  whether  the  practices  are
acceptable  or  not,  but  given the sense of  inevitable  adoption,  how can an  organisation  take
agency  over  the  decisions  they  make  with  data.  Furthermore,  in  both  of  these  theories,  the
assumption is not only that people are engaging with the data-driven tools as if it is unavoidable,
but also that use of the tools is  synonymous with the values which guide surveillance.  This
research also addresses how this can co-exist with the praise for the use of these techniques in
audience-led decision-making models in digital membership organisations.
I present a framework which provides options that can help evaluate data-driven practices
based on the  different  contexts  that  exist  between and within organisations.  The aim of  the
framework is not to suggest when the practices are fundamentally wrong. Instead, the framework
aims to demonstrate the areas in which there may be correlation or gaps between CSOs values
and functions, and those of data logic. The framework allows an evaluation of where practices sit
in relation to the criticisms of data practices outlined above and the organisation’s purported
aims. This evaluation can demonstrate whether the organisation’s activities are actually in line
with their  aims and ultimately  increase the ability  for an organisation to take control  of the
choice to engage with data logic. To arrive at this point, it is first important to unpack a particular
dichotomy that makes addressing the question of what justice would look like for data practices
in political communication more difficult, and show how a theory from political representation
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and communication can address this problem.
Discussion  around  the  effects  of  mass  data  collection  has  regularly  focused  on
government surveillance. Justifications for why the data collection has taken place have largely
relied  on the  benefits  that  the collection  and analysis  of personal  data can hold for national
security. Those who advocate for privacy argue that the data collection is not legitimate not just
because  it  is  a  violation  of  privacy,  but  also  because  it  is  not  effective.  This  is  the  first
manifestation of the dichotomy presented in the literature: the argument on either side is founded
on whether the data collection is in the best interests of the data subject, but in one case the data
collector is the expert,  and in the other case the rights of the data subject take priority. This
approach reflects a ‘social contract’ approach, as initially put forward by political theorists such
as Hobbes (1651) and Locke (1689), in which we understand the role and relationship between
the government and the citizen. In one case, the data subject will trust the collector as an expert
to decide when and how to use their personal data, but in the other case, the data subject retains
decision-making over what happens to their data.
The social contract approach has also been applied to commercial settings to describes
how private firms have to make decisions about what data to collect ethically, based on what
they are promising, and form an invisible, social, contract with their audiences based on the trust
it will be used to benefit the product or customer (Martin, 2012). Martin (2012) connects this
approach of the social contract of data practices to Nissenbaum’s (2009) concept of contextual
privacy: there are contexts in which a person may accept someone collecting their personal data
based on what they believe it is for, what they will  receive in turn, and how much the data
subject  trusts  the  data  collector.  Therefore,  it  is  important  to  evaluate  not  just  what  the
organisation will do with the data, but whether they can effectively achieve this; only when we
know what our responsibilities are can we also know how to fulfil them effectively.
The relationship between the data collector and data subject and their agreement is the
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main concern of both critical and optimistic approaches to data in political communication. The
main approach of critical perspectives, such as in the case of Cambridge Analytica, has presented
the actions as parts of a dystopia in which political representatives can use data to support their
expert-led model, by ignoring, manipulating or pacifying the citizens they claim to represent.
However, research on the use of technology by CSOs has often focused on how effectively CSOs
can decentralise  power to those they represent,  and whether  they have been effective or not
(Karpf, 2017; Dennis, 2018).
Returning the concept of data justice from Dencik et al., (2016), and to understand the “is
and ought to be” of the role a CSO performs with their audience, it is important to understand
what the data collector’s responsibility and role is, in the case of this research, in regards to
political  communication.  The  data  collector  is  the  political  representative.  Political
representatives  speak,  advocate,  and act  on  behalf  of  their  constituents  whose  opinions  and
perspectives they represent. The data subject is their constituents (Pitkin, 1967). A CSO is an
organised  association  of  paid  staff  and/or  volunteers,  typically  considered  separate  from
government and state,  who represent a group of people’s interests.  There are many different
categorisations within this definition such as depending on different relationships with the state
(against  or  supportive),  different  arrangements  and  structures  (more  paid  staff  or  more
volunteers,  country-wide  or  locally  based),  different  funding  (through  membership,  or
volunteered time, or funded by the state or for-profit organisations), or different ways of securing
the desired interests including through campaigns, advocacy or services (Cohen and Arato, 1994;
Edwards,  2014).  Whatever  structure the organisation takes,  the CSOs will  represent  a set of
people’s  interests.  To perform their  role  in  this  representation  they  must  undertake  political
communication to both listen to people’s needs and interests, and communicate back to people,
both inside and outside the representation group, in order to achieve their goals (McNair, 2003).
How  the  CSOs  go  about  political  communication  is  fundamental  to  how  they  approach
representation and their function as an organisation.
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By drawing on the traditional political theory, the trustee and delegate models (Wahlke et
al., 1962), it is possible to address how data can be used in both the contexts of expert-led and
audience-led decision-making. Trustees are political representatives that work on the premise of
expert-led  decision  making,  and  the  subsequent  management  of  constituents.  Delegates  are
political representatives that work on the premise of audience-led decision making, which they
facilitate  and  implement.  The  theory  of  these  models  presents  that  responsible  leadership
involves political representatives carrying out a mix of both trustee and delegate depending on
the  context  (Wahlke  et  al.,  1962).  The  trustee  and  delegate  models,  while  for  political
representatives, also translate to how CSOs function, given the function for a CSO to represent
the interests of their constituents, and, as will be shown in chapter 2, also balance these two roles
in their organisations.
A contemporary structure for representing people’s interests has developed in the form of
digital  membership organisations.  As described in the introduction,  these digital  membership
organisations use data-driven technologies to represent as many people as possible. The online
progressive engagement network (OPEN) is a network of these organisations and is paradigmatic
of the development of new CSOs. On their website, they present their significant shared values
and use the term “people-powered” which they define as “large scale participation” (OPEN,
2018). The organisations’ usually have a membership who set the agenda, and in many cases,
anyone from a public audience can implement their own campaigns. Change is believed to be
created through this collective and public-led activity. This is the audience-led delegate model.
The delegate model is also seen in traditional membership organisations, which also run on a
member-led model, though without the reliance on technology. In the delegate model, the CSO
listens to the audience to understand what changes they would like to create and how they would
like them to be implemented and facilitate this happening.
This is in contrast to organisations which rely on staff-led structures (Skocpol,  2003).
These  organisations  rely  on  political  representatives  within  the  organisation  working  with
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experts in other organisations to create change. This is the expert-led trustee model. In the trustee
model, a specialist manages a topic within an organisation, either by skill (a fundraiser decides
what to do and carries this out) or by topic (a Sri Lankan policy expert decides what to do and
carries this out). The staff listen to their audience to profile them either to understand their needs
or  to  understand  what  would  be  persuasive  to  engage  them  in  mobilisation  to  support  the
decisions made by experts.
Both models have limits and benefits. The trustee model can lead to an extreme where
experts manipulate people to support and engage with their decisions. The delegate model can
lead to decisions being led by a majority and popularity, and ignore minority rights or long-term
needs. By understanding how both models are valid at different times, the discussions about how
data can best be used can be more open. The question is not, are data practices used to centralise
decision making, and are therefore unacceptable, or decentralise, and therefore acceptable, but
instead,  what  context  are  they  being  used  to  deliver  either  and  is  it  the  model  which  the
organisation and their audience have agreed to?
To begin to  distinguish between which practices  support different  aims, and consider
their  effectiveness  in  achieving  that,  I  present  a  framework shown in  figure  1.1 below. The
framework allows practices to be placed against whether they support audience-led or expert-led
decision-making models, and whether they fall into the practices following data logic or not.
This framework does not dictate whether it is right or not to engage with data logic, but allows
practices to be mapped, from which the practices can be evaluated as to whether they were right
for the intended aim. The framework also allows organisations to decide where they would like
to be placed and work out what their practices should be or evaluate whether their practices line
up with their aims.
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Figure 1.1: Framework for the Use of Personal Data in Political Communication
This framework covers two areas of the criticisms: has data logic been applied, so as to
interrogate their effectiveness in creating knowledge, and are they being used to support a trustee
or delegate model. As described above, there is also the third layer of criticisms, targeting the
agency  that  anyone  has  to  make  decisions  with  how  to  use  and  engage  with  data.  When
examining this  using the approach taken within political  communication,  this  third strand of
criticisms impacts the process that defines a role as a trustee or delegate. This classical decision-
making model for political representation involves two actors, CSOs and the audience, see in
Figure 1.2 below.
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Figure 1.2 Traditional Decision-Making Roles in the Trustee and Delegate Models
There are three parts in the process which have an impact on decision-making outside of
the classic models which I will explain further in chapter 3: technocrats, software and the data
doubles, as shown in figure 1.3 below.
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Figure 1.3 Decision-Making Roles which have been Disrupted by Data Logic in the Trustee and
Delegate Models
Even if the organisation is not actively following the logic, the organisations must engage
with these parts of the process, risking handing over agency to the technocrat, the software and
the data double. These agents are not bias or error-free, and influence decisions and their impact
beyond the effect of a ‘neutral’ process. Research into data practices so far highlights that it is
particularly difficult to assess practices due to their opaque nature, meaning much of the practices
remain  a mystery (Pariser,  2012;  Kitchin,  2014;  Kreiss  and Howard,  2010).  Therefore,  it  is
difficult  to  understand  how these  three  agents  interact  with,  or  disrupt,  the  decision-making
processes. The agents can affect the ability of the management of the organisation to achieve




This research aims to build on concepts of data justice to understand what is an acceptable use of
data by CSOs. The different options available to a CSO are presented in the framework set out
above. The aim of carrying out empirical research is to build on this framework. The first two
research questions deal with the first two sets of criticisms, and two axes of the Framework,
regarding the impact of the data described in the framework: whether it is effective, and what is
used  for,  to  centralise  or  decentralise  decision-making.  The  third  question  deals  with  the
criticisms  regarding  the  lack  of  agency  created  by  the  practices  and  values  impacts  the
implementation of decision-making.
1. Are both the expert-led and the audience-led models in CSOs supported by
data-driven practices?
2. What are the main factors that guide the decisions made by CSOs regarding
their  engagement  with  data  practices  to  support  either  the  expert-led  or
audience-led models?
3. Is decision-making regarding data practices devolved to agents other than the
staff or constituents within either the expert-led or audience-led models?
By answering all three questions, it is possible to build on the theory of data justice in
political  communication  for  CSO organisation.  Through two ethnographies,  it  is  possible  to
consider what practices the CSOs undertake, for what reasons, and for what purpose to test and
shape a practice-based framework. Two cases are chosen in relation to the first two questions.
The first justification for the two organisations chosen based on their representation model, one
of which is expert-led and the other of which is audience-led. Secondly, the two cases are chosen
due to their potential for aversion to data practices which can help test the points in which data
practices have this inevitable prevalence and help examine, in particular, the question regarding
the agency to choose to engage with the practices.
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1.4 Thesis Plan
In chapter 1, I introduce the increasing capacities of data technologies which are accompanied by
a sense of the inevitability and necessity of their use in campaigning. I describe the phenomena
of these pervasive ways of working as an ideal type, which I term data logic. I also introduced
the criticisms of the trust in data to develop knowledge, the use of data within different models of
representation, and the agency political representatives and constituents retain, or lose, in data-
driven processes. I described how there are few frameworks in the current debate, and those that
exist have not yet provided a solution for navigating the contradictory nature of the practices. I
have presented a case for a framework building from the perspective of data justice to evaluate
the practices of CSOs which is at the basis of the questions for empirical research.
In chapter 2, I examine what is already known about the use of data practices. The review
of the literature draws on other political  organisations  which utilise  data for communication,
namely media outlets and political parties. I develop further the theory of the ideal type of data
logic to understand the influence of data-driven practices. In particular, I examine the advantages
and disadvantages of the rise of the nature of data practices and their impact on organisational
knowledge. Secondly, I present the application of a political communication theory, the trustee
and delegate models,  to understand how to navigate the issues associated with data use and
political representation and communication. I go on to describe the details of how data practices
manifest  in  organisations  under  these  two  models.  Finally,  I  explore  the  criticism  that  the
obscurity of data practices disguises the decision-making role of agents I describe as technocrats,
software and the data double. I show how these three agents are a particular issue for the field of
this research, political communication, which is based on the premise of a relationship between
the CSO and the audience, whether as trustee or delegate. Decisions made by either the CSO or
the audience can be disrupted by the role of the three agents. There is little understanding of how
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to involve the agents, or how they are already involved. They are part  of what appear to be
opaque systems and examination into their role is required.
In  chapter  3,  I  introduce  the  methodology  for  testing  the  framework.  I  present  a
justification for the ethnographies  based on the need to examine both values and behaviours
combined for the development of theory. I also present the limitations and mitigations of the
approach. I justify the choice of two case studies based on the two strands of the framework:
firstly, a CSO critical of technology with an expert-led structure and a traditional CSOs with a
member-led structure. This way, through two case studies, the inevitable uptake of data logic and
the support for the two different models can be examined.
In chapter 4, I describe the findings regarding how the organisations engage with their
audiences, acting either as a delegate or a trustee, and how their use of data relates to these. The
findings show that despite the claims of new CSOs that the use of data-driven tactics supports
their delegate roles, the delegate organisation rejects the use of data for this role based on its
negative impact for a delegate model. There are a few cases in which data practices are engaged
with at Amnesty but which are associated for the most part with the trustee role. The trustee
organisation, however, also rejects data for the dominant role based on the negative impact of
data-driven practices for their role as a trustee and their relationship with their audience.
Chapter 5 addresses how data is not prevalent or widespread and is engaged with as a
logic only in a few consistent circumstances. The tools, combined with the principles, are only
seen in  use  with  online  platforms,  fundraising,  and when it  is  perceived to  be  important  to
external authorities. In the first cases, data logic is complementary to how these spaces function
and in the latter case, there is a perception others would like to be presented with information
created through methods of data logic. The chapter also outlines the reasons data logic is rejected
and how qualitative, intuitive and deliberative methods, as well as important relationships, are
seen  as  necessary  for  navigating  complex  opinions.  Further,  intuition  and  relationships  are
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trusted for complex strategic decision-making. Such decisions are far from data-led.
At the end of  these  first  two empirical  chapters,  it  is  clear  there  is  still  a  difference
between the two organisations in which one engages in data logic far less than the other. In
chapter 6, the relationship with each agent, the technocrats, the software and the data double is
described. The findings show the integration of the technocrats impacts the use of the software.
The knowledge of the newer organisation allows them to navigate how to integrate the concept
of  technocrat  into  their  other  staff  roles,  therefore  incorporating  them into  decision-making
leading  to  a  consistent  rejection  of  data  logic.  The  older  organisation,  however,  does  not
integrate the agents into decision-making in clear ways either giving them no control or full
control over decisions which leads to a situation where data logic is adopted in certain teams and
completely rejected in others, based on the values of those teams.
In chapter 7, I present how the findings relate to each other and how they contribute to
our  current  knowledge.  The  research  question  as  to  which  roles  in  representation  can  data
practices support is answered by showing how they are associated with either trustee or delegate
role, but the principles of how they are carried out are associated with the risks of each style of
representation: the potential for manipulative techniques of trustees and the populist and reactive
extreme of delegates. The second research question as to what factors influence the data practices
to show that the staff member’s pre-formed values guide the decisions, and only those whose
logic  would  already  align  with  data  logic  engage with  the  logic.  Finally,  the  third  research
question regarding how decision-making can take place is addressed by the findings which show
the separation of the concept of a technocrat at Amnesty leads to a separation of knowledge and
ownership over decision-making which is not apparent at Tactical Tech, who retain a consistent
control of their use of data.
46
Chapter 2. Data Logic, Political Communication and Agency
In this chapter, I will analyse and synthesise previous literature on the use of personal data in
organisations, in particular in political communication. I will describe how data has been used in
political  communication,  by  drawing  particularly  on  research  about  the  use  of  data-driven
technologies in news organisations and political parties, as well as the little that is known on
CSOs. From this, I will develop a framework to analyse the use of data in CSOs. I will also draw
on  the  descriptions  and  analysis  of  new  large-scale  data-driven  methods  to  examine  and
demonstrate the elements that distinguish new computer-reliant data practices from other data
practices. I will demonstrate how an ideal type, a consolidated set of principles which capture a
consistent  phenomenon  which  may  manifest  differently  across  contexts,  is  a  useful  way  to
conceptualise the elements that make the practices distinct (Weber, 1949). I term the ideal type
data logic, using the word logic to highlight the influence of new data practices on organisational
knowledge. I use the ideal type of data logic in my research to understand what elements make
up the new and distinct data practices in CSOs.
In the second half of the chapter, I will examine how these tools are praised or criticised
based on the models of political communication they support. On the one hand, the data-driven
methods have been praised for supporting the broadening of reach of political communication to
involve more people in a decision-making process - an audience-led model. On the other hand,
criticisms are levied at the same methods due to the capacity for a political representative to use
data-driven methods to circumvent the scrutiny of those they represent - an expert-led model. I
propose this theory as a framework for examining data practices which can help us understand
what data justice looks like for the strategy and operations of CSOs. For this, I will demonstrate
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how a political communication theory, the trustee and delegate model, can help show the benefits
and  consequences  of  both  the  audience-  and  expert-led  models,  and  build  a  more  nuanced
version  of  them  for  researchers.  Importantly,  the  theory  allows  an  examination  of  how
organisations  can  conceive  their  role  and  is,  therefore,  a  useful  perspective  to  take  when
examining the organisation’s decisions. 
I will combine the characteristics of data logic, and the behaviours that distinguish an
audience-led model  from an expert-led model  and I  show how these can be visualised on a
framework.  By placing CSO practices  in the framework it  becomes possible to examine the
consequences of these practices based on their engagement with data logic, and the model of
political  communication  the  practice  supports.  I  go  on  to  explore  the  consequences  of  the
delegation of the political representatives’ and constituents’ agency to technocrats, software and
the  data  double  within  data-driven  processes,  and  the  impact  this  may  have  for  political
communication. 
2.1 Data Logic: An Ideal Type of Data Practices
In the introduction, I presented how scholars across different fields have argued that the values
and behaviours of individuals and groups engaging with data practices are distinct. The theories
differ slightly across different disciplines and approaches,  and one of the contributions that I
make in this thesis is to generate from them an overarching concept that incorporates their key
elements. I propose that these different conceptualisations can be reconciled by creating an ideal
type: a set of simplified and comprehensive elements that represent the key characteristics of a
phenomenon, but that may not all be found at once within any single real-world context (Weber,
1949). I refer to the ideal type of how data practices have been adopted as data logic. In the first
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half of this chapter, I will describe the elements that constitute the ideal type of data logic.
I use the term logic to describe the ideal type to draw attention to how scholars from
different  disciplines  stress  the  importance  of  data  practices  in  informing  knowledge  in
organisations  or  fields  of  discipline.  In  their  conceptualization  of  data  practices,  boyd  and
Crawford (2012, p. 663) describe a “widespread belief that large data sets offer a higher form of
intelligence and knowledge that can generate insights that were previously impossible, with the
aura of truth, objectivity, and accuracy”. Hilbert (2016, p. 136) uses the analogy of a microscope
as a comparison to data practices because they both provide “an unprecedented level of fine-
grained detail” to any object of inquiry. Mayer-Schoenberger and Cukier (2013, p. 96) claim big
data is “a great infrastructure project” of information like Diderot’s 18th-century Encyclopaedia
and has led to “an essential enrichment in human comprehension”. Couldry (2014, pp. 887-888)
describes how data practices are “changing the terrain on which all large institutions (including
governments)  can claim to tell  us the way things  are” due to  “what  validates  new types  of
evidence and expertise”. These scholars highlight that individuals and organisations engage with
data  practices  because  they  believe  they  will  provide  accurate,  objective,  and  detailed
information, and subsequently knowledge, about the world around us and ourselves.
There are various ways of examining knowledge. The study of knowledge originates in
the field of philosophy, where there is a distinction between  episteme (scientific knowledge),
techne (art and craft),  phronesis (intuitive practical wisdom), and  praxis (theoretical practical
wisdom) (Aristotle, ca. 350 B.C.E./1999). Sociological studies also distinguish between types of
knowledge, instead often using the terms explicit and tacit knowledge. Explicit knowledge, also
known as codified knowledge, corresponds most closely with episteme, and can be explicitly
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written down and backed up by the scientific method. Tacit knowledge is much closer to techne,
the ‘know-how’ of an engineer or craft worker. Polanyi (1966) presented the concept of tacit
knowledge to highlight the importance of personal judgement, and as a necessary counterpart to
explicit  knowledge.  Rather  than  opposing  each  other,  these  two  types  of  knowledge  are
interlinked. Tacit knowledge plays an important role in the generation and application of explicit
and  codified  knowledge.  Latour  and  Woolfar  (1949),  for  example,  describe  how  scientists'
personal judgements, their tacit knowledge, influence their choices when deciding what research
to invest in and publish, and thus in the generation of explicit knowledge. Explicit knowledge
published and shared over time informs our experiences and evidence which consequently can
build up support for, or undermine belief in, our tacit knowledge, which this explicit knowledge
may also change. 
This thesis examines organisational knowledge. Tsoukas and Vladimirou (2001, p. 974)
write that organisational knowledge is tacit, in contrast with “a narrowly Cartesian understanding
of knowledge” which privileges “‘pure’ knowledge” or explicit knowledge. Instead, individual
know-how  and  social  interaction  are  important  for  defining  organisational  knowledge.  For
example,  ‘news values’ are not codified in newsrooms, yet most journalists working in news
organisations make fast decisions about what is and is not news. These decisions are largely
consistent across individuals working for the same news organisation because the news values
have been internalised (Galtung and Ruge, 1965; Harcup and O'Neill, 2001; Harcup and O’neill,
2017). While the focus of my thesis is primarily on values within the CSOs, and as such, tacit
knowledge, I will also find these values in the explicit knowledge which as mentioned above
both informs and is informed by tacit knowledge. For example, in the news organisations, their
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tacit knowledge regarding news values will manifest in explicit knowledge such as the news that
is published or in the evaluation reports they write for themselves or funders.
Across these types of knowledge, there are also different ways to understand what, within
any body of knowledge, will be considered valid or not. Different scholars have connected data
practices  with  different  parts  of  knowledge  validation.  Raley  (2013)  draws  on  the  term
ontological privilege to describe how knowledge formed from data practices, once created, is
often seen as superior to other types of knowledge. van Dijck (2014) describes the influence of
data practices in terms of a paradigm. A paradigm is a frame which validates the processes that
create  knowledge.  van  Dijck  highlights  that  there  has  been  a  “gradual  normalization  of
datafication as a new paradigm in science and society” (van Dijck, 2014, p. 198). Marres and
Weltevrede (2013) and Kitchin (2014) use the word epistemology to describe how data practices
have become a method of making sense of the world and constitute new processes of knowledge
production.  Lewis  and  Westlund  (2014)  also  describe  how  big  data  is  changing  the
epistemological  premises,  and  consequently  knowledge,  of  journalism.  Kitchin  (2014)  also
describes data practices as the “articulation of a new empiricism” drawing attention to how the
practices present a new method for measuring what we can sense and experience around us.
Across these conceptualisations, data methods have been connected to the creation of accepted
knowledge. 
 Instead of ontological privilege, paradigm, or epistemology, I draw on the term logic as
the concept to examine how organisational knowledge is considered valid. The term ‘logic’ has
several advantages all of which are outlined in the following paragraphs. Firstly, my use of the
term “logic” draws upon previous theories  of how knowledge is  embedded in organisational
51
practices  - in particular  in relation to tacit  knowledge. Secondly,  logic can be considered an
influential way of thinking, but one which interacts with other logics. Lastly, logic is defined by a
set of principles which can help understand the phenomenon as an ideal type which represents
the elements which make up the practices. I will draw on how the term has been used in three
influential approaches to political communication, political science, and organizational studies:
institutional logic, media logic, and logic of collective action.
This  concept  of  logic  helps  understand  the  connection  between  accepted  ways  of
working,  which  are demonstrated  in  studies  of  data practices,  and their  conceptualisation  in
relation  to  knowledge.  Logic  is  a  consistent  set  of  values  that  shape  tacit  knowledge  and
consequently patterns of behaviour and activities by individuals in a group, such as the news
values described above. Knowledge in organisations is commonly referred to as "institutional
logic”. The term is attributed to the work of Friedland and Alford (1991, p. 243), who define
institutional logic as:
patterns of activity by which individuals and organizations produce and reproduce their
material subsistence and organize time and space. They are also symbolic systems, ways
of ordering reality, thereby rendering experience of time and space meaningful.
Institutional  logic  is  the  set  of  accepted  methods  and  tools  for  ordering  reality  and  the
information  about  it  within  an  organisation.  The  patterns  of  behaviours  also  manifest  in
commonly accepted processes including distinct formats and channels of communication. Based
on this definition of institutional logic, the term logic has become a conventional term to describe
consistent  patterns  of  activity  which  are  distinct  within organisations  (Thornton and Ocasio,
2008). There can be different logics between different institutions and organisations, and there
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can be more than one logic within an organisation. 
The concept of institutional logic is appropriate for understanding the distinct nature of
data practices because they are commonly associated with the patterns of behaviours, formats of
information, channels of communication, and common activities within an organisation. Karpf
describes analytic activism (2017, p. 4) as a “change in organizational structure, processes, and
work  routines”.  Karpf  goes  on  to  highlight  a  consistent  and  recognisable  set  of  practices
associated with this change such as systematic testing of all communications and team structures
with technical expertise guiding campaign communications. Tufecki (2014, p. 2) describes a “set
of  practices”  surrounding  what  she  defines  as  “computational  politics”  which  also  includes
testing communications and their effect on people’s behaviours as well as the collection of large
quantities of data. Similar to institutional logic, data logic is a set of tacit values which allows
staff to decide whether a process, a behaviour, a communication or an output is valid within their
organisation. 
The term logic is also used to identify formats and methods for ensuring the validity of
information by political communication scholars Altheide and Snow (1991) who create the term
“media logic”.  Media logic is a distinct set of practices which have developed within media
organisations including the format and channel  of communicating  which implicitly  proscribe
which information is considered valid. As Altheide and Snow write (1991, p, 294) media logic is
“the rules or codes for defining, selecting, organizing, presenting, and recognizing information as
one thing rather than another (e.g., ‘the evening news‘ and not a ‘situation comedy‘, or a ‘parody
of news‘)”.  Media logic is the assumption that information will be valid when presented through
the common means of news organisations and journalists, based on the formats dictated by news
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values and other criteria by which media organisations assign value to different types of content.
Just as we can use the information formats privileged within news organisations to detect the
presence of media logic, by examining the formats of materials chosen and used by staff in an
organisation it is possible to understand how to measure data logic too, such as quantified metrics
or large quantities of testing of email subject lines. Similar to media logic, data logic entails a
way of thinking about organisational processes that require individuals to make decisions and
assign value to different practices, endeavours, and types of content.
Mancur Olson (1971) used the term logic in their  concept  of the “logic of collective
action” to capture the reasons why people take part in actions that would lead to the benefit of the
broader group they are part of. Here, logic entails the common reasoning that dictates when it is
beneficial to take part in collective action, and what contexts and situations lead to people taking
action based on group interests or individual interests. In the same way, the logic around data
practices entails the reasons and justifications that are given for taking part in data practices. The
term “logic” can help point not just to characteristics, but to justifications, such as those captured
by Dencik and Cable (2017) and Zuboff (2015) that frame the argument that data practices are
engaged with pervasively and inevitably. 
The concept  of  logic  is  also  useful  because  it  is  used  in  contexts  where  there  is  an
influence of one standard over others.  For example, van Dijck and Poell (2013) describe how the
principles of “social media logic” - programmability, popularity, connectivity, and datafication -
influence the processes and ways of working in a wide variety of areas including print news and
broadcasting,  as  well  as  more broadly  law and order,  social  activism,  and politics.  Schwarz
(2017)  creates  the  term  “platform  logic”  to  describe  the  consistent  patterns  of  how  online
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platforms  function  across  different  disciplines  -  information  systems  management,  design
studies, and critical political economy - and their influence on how other aspects of the web are
designed and used. Media logic, mentioned above, is shown by Altheide and Snow (1991) to
have  influenced  the  ways  in  which  politicians  have  changed their  production  processes  and
communication formats to fit those of the media. Hjarvard (2008, p. 113) defines mediatization
as “the process whereby society to an increasing degree is submitted to, or becomes dependent
on,  the  media  and their  logic”.  For  example,  politicians  host  press  events  or  produce  press
releases which are both formats that serve the needs of media organisations, and these kinds of
adaptation practices are evidence for the mediatization of politics (Esser and Strömbäck, 2014).
Karpf (2017) describes how activist  organisations interact with data based on “messy,
flawed, incomplete organisational logics”. In some cases, the characteristics and values of other
logics  may  be  complementary  and  in  other  cases  contrary  to  the  principles  of  data  logic.
Commentators have argued that in situations which they describe as “surveillance realism” or
“surveillance capitalism” that the principles of data logic will not be rejected, but will instead
alter or replace any competing logic (Zuboff, 2015; Dencik and Cable, 2017). To understand the
ways of working around data practices as a logic not only allows us to explore how the new data
technologies  interact  with  the other  logics  within an organisation,  but  how they might  have
changed or adapted  those other  logics  to incorporate  or  accommodate  the principles  of  data
logic. 
Finally, the term logic originates in analytic philosophy and mathematics in which it is
used to refer to a series of steps that can be taken to ensure the validity of an output. These
origins of the term are helpful to both understand how there are principles which guide the data
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practices, as well as how these principles make up the elements of the ideal type of data logic.
Some scholars  who have examined data practices  have already named some such principles
explicitly.  For  example,  Karpf  defines  three  principles  that  shape the  values  and behaviours
which  distinguish  analytic  activism  from  other  forms  of  activism:  a  culture  of  testing,
prioritization of listening and demand for scale (Karpf, 2017, p. 4). Tufecki (2014) describes six
principles  of  computational  politics  including  big  data,  computational  methods,  modelling,
behavioural science, experimental science and the power of platforms and algorithms. I have
taken the different relevant conceptual developments of the rise of data practices, mainly derived
from the political communication, critical data studies, and surveillance studies literature, and
synthesised them into four principles which together constitute the ideal type of data logic as
defined in this  thesis  (see  table  1.1 in  chapter  1)  These  principles  are:  quantification,  scale,
standardised processes and algorithmic reasoning.
I shall now describe these four principles in more detail. This description is accompanied
with the key criticisms of how these principles may skew the development of knowledge, at
times rendering the activities and knowledge produced from them ineffective or inaccurate. This
assessment shows not only how the principles change or affect the type of information that is
formed and used in organisations, but also how it alters our understanding of the effects this form
has, and why it is important to be cautious of these forms. From this exploration, we can identify




The first principle of the ideal type of data logic is that information can, and should, be expressed
in a quantified format. This principle is expressed in the collection of data in a numerical format
where possible. For example, by measuring someone’s fitness by collecting data from the action
of someone taking a footstep on their Fitbit as a single quantified count, which adds up to how
many ‘steps’ someone has taken in the day. The principle of quantification can also manifest as
phrases or words accompanied with unique identifiers which allow computer-based technology
to identify any data point. This allows the data to be separated from other data, counted and then
re-connected to other data points. This format is dictated by the technologies which collect, store
and  process  data.  For  example,  electoral  registers  can  use  a  unique  identifier  to  connect
someone’s name, with their address and whether they are registered to vote while also being able
to count any repeats, such as how many people are at the same address, and how many people
are registered to vote. 
This research project examines personal data and I will find the principle of quantification
visible in the use of databases of individuals and their personal information, or in statistics and
other  numerical  representations  of  individual’s  or  group’s  demographics,  behaviours,  and
attitudes. For example, political parties use databases to collect information about an individual’s
name, postcode, interest, and hobbies. Personal information can be collected and turned into an
appropriate  format in various ways.  The data may be created from traditional  forms of data
collection such as opinion polls and surveys. In these cases, the audience usually directly hand
over information about themselves willingly and through a transparent process in which they are
aware of the question. There are also indirect sources, known as latent or trace data, which is
generated by individuals as they go about other activities. This data is collected from various
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routine practices including but certainly not limited to, social media activity or website traffic, as
individuals navigate their way online, or location data and financial transactions as they navigate
their way offline.
The value behind these activities is the belief that machine-readable, and consequently
quantified, data can represent reality effectively and neutrally. Quantified information can appear
neat, which makes it appear accurate and objective (Kitchin, 2014; boyd and Crawford, 2012).
van Dijck (2014, p. 199) describes this value as an assumption of “a self-evident relationship
between data and people”: you can know about a person if you know the data that represents
them. This ‘knowing’ is a measurement of what people do, rather than why they do it. As editor-
in-chief of WIRED, Chris Anderson (2008) wrote:
Out  with  every  theory  of  human  behaviour,  from  linguistics  to  sociology.  Forget
taxonomy, ontology, and psychology. Who knows why people do what they do? The
point is they do it, and we can track and measure it with unprecedented fidelity. With
enough data, the numbers speak for themselves. 
Anderson  refers  to  fundamental  ideas  of  forming  knowledge  -  taxonomy,  ontology,  and
psychology - as is central to descriptions of the influence of data practices. Anderson also reflects
on  the  fidelity  of  numbers,  as  if  they  are  more  faithful  to  reality  than  other  forms  of
measurement. Kreiss (2016) demonstrates for political parties, the goal is to create a unified and
comprehensive overview of a person and how she can be expected to react to different types of
communications.
The principle of quantification has an effect on what evidence is and is not considered
valid when making arguments to persuade people to make a decision. This use of quantitative
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data  as  evidence  is  solidified  in  the  McNamara Fallacy  which  describes  the  phenomena  of
putting weight on quantitative evidence above all  others in decision-making. Nowotny et al.,
(2001) describe how there has been an increasing use of statistics as evidence to drive what
policies are adopted in areas such as healthcare, education or law enforcement. Rieder and Simon
(2016) also describe an increased interest from policymakers to use quantified metrics to support
any policy decision they make. News organisations review their success by counting how many
articles they publish, how many times the article is read online or how many unique visitors were
received, rather than a qualitative approach such as looking at comments or running before and
after focus groups (Anderson, 2011). CSOs use this principle to represent audience members by
their  identifying  data,  such  as  a  membership  number,  often  in  a  customer  relationship
management  system  (CRM),  a  database  that  by  connecting  different  bits  of  data  creates  a
representation of who an individual is: the number of emails they have opened and petitions they
have signed will be recorded, the topics they are interested in, their membership history, and so
forth. This data can also then be counted on its own so the organisation can evaluate how many
members are opening emails, or are in a certain age group, or are also donating.
However,  quantification  is  not  a  flawless  method  of  representing  information.  Many
aspects of reality are too complex and cannot be quantified (Kitchin, 2014; boyd and Crawford,
2012, p. 667). Moreover, data can contain errors which come about due to various reasons such
as technical malfunctions or due to the choices of the programmers collecting and analysing the
data.  Furthermore,  data is often collected from people’s online activities.  These activities are
based on a very specific context, and are also collected without the individual knowing, and as
they are going about a routine part of their day. The results of this data may differ from what
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someone would  express  if  asked what  they  want,  or  how they would behave  in  a  different
context. While some people believe that this is not an important criticism—for instance, Mark
Zuckerberg, co-founder of Facebook, said that to have a different image for work friends to co-
workers  shows  a  lack  of  integrity—others,  such  as  Eli  Pariser  (2012),  point  out  there  are
important differences between our current and aspirational personalities. The ‘what we do’ and
‘who we want  to  be’  are only  two of  many complex ways of  defining people.  The lack of
contextual nuances in data, which may be useful for measuring simple objects or breaking down
large objects into smaller parts, is a problem when it comes to measuring the complexities in
people.
These difficulties in breaking down complex concepts into distinct countable units are not
just  an  issue  when  the  goal  is  to  measure  and  predict  people’s  behaviour,  but  also  when
attempting to measure social change. As Karpf (2014, pp. 12-13) writes:
The Obama campaign...did not use analytics to ask its members to set its priorities. The
goal of an electoral campaign is simple and transparent: Win on Election Day. The goal
of a social movement organization is far more complex and fluid: Build power to create a
more just society.
The evaluation of the goals of CSOs – a safe environment for women for example - is not as
clear as a win or loss of an election, which can be measured as a numerical goal – the number of
votes. While there have been many attempts to quantify social change, there are many recognised
issues with these attempts: there are too many elements which contribute to whether something
has led to social change happening, and too many factors within any given moment to evaluate
whether it is now in an optimum situation. Karpf (2017) refers to this as the analytics frontier:
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the complexity of social change and the vision of long-term outcomes is currently too difficult to
formulate in questions and answers that can be represented in this form of data. The use of the
word frontier is Karpf’s way of presenting the issue optimistically suggesting that in the future,
through experimentation  and analysis,  new data  processes  can  become useful  for  measuring
public opinion for long-term change.
Principle Two: Scale
The second principle that underlies the ideal type of data logic is that more data is always better
than less data. This principle pertains to the collection of large quantities of data, analysis with
more data, and the presentation of success by demonstrating a high number of whatever action is
measured. The use of the term ‘big’ in the popular term,  big data, does not always technically
refer to a specifically large amount of data. Rather, the historical and technical use of the term is
defined in reference to the large-scale nature of data practices (Mayer-Schonberger and Cukier
2013; Schroeder, 2014). Several scholars also name scale or other ways to refer to the large
quantity of data, as a principle of data-practices. For example, Tufecki (2014) describes a draw
towards big data and activities that involve the collection and analysis of large quantities of data
as part of computational politics. Lyon (2015) describes the shift in the collection of individual
data to mass data as it is easier to monitor a population rather than a set of targeted individuals.
Karpf (2017) describes ‘growthiness’ which involves new tactics created for the sole purpose of
increasing  the  quantity  of  data  available  for  analysis.  Data  technologies  have  allowed  for
formulated rule sets, which can perform millions of automated operations per second, cutting
down on  the  time  and  resource  involved  in  collecting  and  analysing  data.  This  means  that
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technologies are able to generate, host and analyse large quantities of data (Lohr 2012; Kitchin,
2014). Borgman (2012, p,4) even goes as far as to say that “[f]or the first time, scholars can ask
questions of datasets where n = all”. Previously, this data would have either been impossible to
gather or incredibly resource-intensive.
The principle of scale has manifested in large centralised databases like that of Acxiom's
which  holds  over  3000 data  points  for  700 million  people,  including  96% of  the  American
population  (Federal  Trade  Commission,  2014).  The  profiles  are  connected  to  an  individual
through their name, email address or other identifying information which organisations usually
manage through the use of database programs such as CRMs. The principle of scale also results
in  the  development  of  mass  data  technologies  that  track  many  peoples’  actions  at  once  to
generate  profiles for individuals and groups (Lyon, 2015). The principle of scale is not only
based on the potential of technologies to generate, host and analyse data at this scale but also
because there is an assumption that increasing the scale of the types and quantity of data will
always lead to more accurate results. To represent that certain information is high value or to
show something has been a success, higher numbers are used, and to evaluate whether success
has been achieved the quantity of whatever is measured is assessed, with the higher amount
being considered a success. For example, digital membership organisations may identify whether
they have been successful or not through quantified measurements of people’s actions. They may
represent the effectiveness of their communication strategies and campaigns through how many
emails have been opened or how many people have shared their posts on Facebook, how many
people have signed up to be members, or how many signatures they received on their petitions.
This is demonstrated in the screenshot from Avaaz’s website in figure 2.1 below. 
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Figure 2.1: Avaaz’s website homepage shows the use of quantified metrics in order to
represent themselves (Avaaz, 2019)
        
However, data sets can be too large and varied to analyse them, as there are too many
false patterns and, especially given that data now often comes from many different places such as
social media metrics or data brokers, it is difficult to know if the sample is representative or
inclusive  enough  to  carry  out  effective  analyses.  Errors  are  amplified  by  the  inability  of
technology to recognise any errors outside of the rules it has been given (boyd and Crawford,
2012).  This  principle  also  manifests  as  a  tendency  to  collect  as  much  as  data  as  possible,
sometimes  more than necessary,  with sometimes important  consequences  for democracy.  As
Lyon (2015) demonstrates, this may involve governments tracking all journalists and academics
under the banner of the importance of ‘national security’.
The principle of scale is also an issue due to the fact that it is treated as an end in itself,
rather than as a means in service of a purpose. Some organisations collect data ritualistically,
assuming  it  will  reveal  its  use  once  collected.  Often,  more  data  is  collected  than  the  data
collectors know what to do with. Furthermore, scale is not always considered the most useful
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measure for success. In particular,  it may encourage the collection of simple actions such as
signatures, rather than longer-term or more focused actions of engagement. In addition, there will
be a temptation to collect the numbers which show scale,  rather than those which are better
proxy indicators for the aims the organisation set out to achieve.
Principle Three: technical standardised processes 
The third principle underlying the ideal type of data logic is a trust in technical standardised
processes  for  gathering  and  analysing  data.  These  processes  are  technical,  in  that  they  use
computer technologies, and standardised in that they can, and will, run the same process over
repeatedly  to  collect  and analyse  the data.  In  her  account  of computational  politics,  Tufecki
(2014) describes how data is processed through standardised and automated methods far more
rapidly and accurately than any previous human-processing method. Kitchin (2014, p. 4) and
boyd and Crawford (2012, p. 667) discuss how these processes gain their authority as rational,
reliable and even benign through the attributes of technical, standardised and automated. These
processes consist  of technical  experts,  such as programmers,  technology companies  and data
scientists, as well as computer programs collecting and analysing the data. As van Dijck (2014,
p. 204) highlights, those who are engaging with these practices trust not just “in the objectivity of
quantified methods” but also “in the independence and integrity of institutions deploying these
methods—whether corporate platforms, government agencies or academic researchers.” Faith is
placed on the objectivity of the computer processes, including those who control these processes.
Parasie and Dagiral (2012, p,862) write how in data journalism, the “structured” nature of
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information  in  databases  can  support  journalists  in  collecting,  analysing  and  presenting
information.  The  structured  nature,  also  reliant  on  the  premise  of  quantification,  allows  for
automated  analysis.  The  automated  processes  also  collect  data  with  the  same  ‘rule  set’
throughout. Often then, a programmer or data scientist, working with the software will describe
their interpretation of the data which will also be taken as standardised. CSOs engage with this
principle in their political communication when they gather and analyse data through processes
involving  data  scientists  and the  algorithms  they  devise  for  data  collection,  processing,  and
analysis. This may involve data specialists analysing their social media analytics and website
traffic. This principle may also involve trusting an algorithm to process the information in a
database to provide valid results for the data analysis—for example, allowing a CRM to dictate
what information an organisation will collect or host on individuals, or relying on the algorithms
of a social media platform to create profiles for organisations to target their audiences.
The trust in technical  and standardised processes is criticised due to the fact  that the
processes can still have errors within them, even if they are standardised, which are amplified by
the large-scale and rapid processing that computer technologies can afford. For instance, Kitchin
(2014, p. 4) argues that algorithms tend to be treated as “technical, benign and commonsensical”
and “purely formal beings of reasons” despite the fact that they have been created by people,
consequently containing bias, and can include and magnify any errors. Devolved agency to the
processes means those who wish to use the data lose control over understanding the processes
that have produced and transformed it during the analysis. The systems can be ill-equipped to
recognise problems as there is a faith in the process to produce valid results, rather than checking
both the process and the final result.
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Principle four: Algorithmic Reasoning
The  fourth  principle  of  the  ideal  type  of  data  logic  is  faith  in  algorithmic  reasoning.  This
principle focuses not on the process but on the method of taking input through a series of rules,
to create an output. This is how algorithms function. Kraemer, Overveld, and Peterson (2010)
define an algorithm as “a finite sequence of well-defined instructions that describe in sufficiently
great detail how to solve a problem” (Kraemer, Overveld, and Peterson, 2010, p. 251). There is
an input of data, processed through these instructions, and an output is generated. By changing
the input data or the instructions, the output is managed and controlled. Being able to control
outputs through inputs and instructions is the basis of the principle of algorithmic reasoning. 
One  of  the  most  commonly  referenced  manifestations  of  this  principle  is  predictive
modelling techniques which allow organisations to predict future patterns (Raley, 2013; Lyon,
2015).  The  principle  of  algorithmic  reasoning  manifests  in  the  modelling  and  prediction  of
information from the data, such as the future actions of individuals (Lyon, 2015). This is possible
as Couldry (2014, p. 887) points out, because big data is “vital to discovering complex patterns
in  huge datasets”.  These  patterns  are  used  to  predict  future  data  points  -  which  in  turn  are
translated back into a predicted action an individual may take. Raley (2013), Kitchin (2014) and
Lyon (2015, p. 86) discuss how models are used to understand and predict the future actions of
individuals and to assess what might create change in behaviours to achieve desired outcomes.
For  example,  through analysis  of  data  on  demographics  and voting  history,  political  parties
predict  how  people  are  likely  to  vote  in  any  upcoming  elections,  and  can  then  target
communications to groups based on the predicted and desired behaviours (Kreiss, 2016). One of
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the most  famous examples  of this  principle  was research that  analysed data  on a variety  of
activities on Facebook and on that basis was able to successfully predict age, family situation,
sexual orientation, religious and political views, and personality traits (Kosinski et al., 2013). 
    In Parasie and Darigal’s  (2012) research on data journalism, they show how data-
driven methods are used to connect and analyse data to generate new information which becomes
the source of their news. To do this, the journalist must rely on algorithmic analysis to produce
good  results, or as Meyer (1973, p,4) puts it to “find facts” and “infer cause”. Outside of the use
of algorithms, there is also the use of data to measure, and guide, success. Organisations may set
goals in numerical  forms and assess ongoing improvement by examining the ability  of their
tactics (cause) to achieve numerical targets (effect) which, combined with the first principle, is
considered representative of a real-life effect (Karpf, 2017). In association with personal data, the
principle  of  algorithmic  reasoning  is  seen  in  the  use  of  a  mix  of  behavioural  science  for
understanding, changing, or controlling the behaviour of individuals or groups (Tufecki, 2014).
In communication, for example, A/B testing is a common practice. A/B testing involves two or
more  tactics  which  are  carried  out  in  a  controlled  context  and  their  impact,  and  success,
measured by individual data. This method is the basis of constant experimentation and is used to
create and test predictions and hypotheses of the effects of different communications on people’s
behaviour  (Karpf,  2017;  Tufecki  2014).  Karpf  (2017)  describes  how  CSOs  measure  the
responses from the audience to the organisation and fine-tune their communications accordingly
to achieve the desired response. For example, instead of an expert choosing a single headline for
an online article, CSOs carry out A/B testing where they present different headlines to different
segments  of  the  audience  and measure  which  headline  gets  the  best  results.  CSOs also  use
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theories  of  behavioural  change  for  public  education  campaigns,  for  instance  around
environmental topics, in which they assess what form and content of the message will change
people’s behaviours to take a more active role in environmental campaigns.
This type of cause and effect  reasoning is not useful in contexts  which are complex,
including social change and human behaviour. Lyon (2015) argues that this approach can lead to
dangerous  practices  in  policing  in  which  pre-emptive  decisions  are  made  around what  may
identify someone who may commit a crime, even if they have not yet, and may never, commit a
crime. These people are ultimately treated with suspicion on the basis of data-driven predictions.
In CSOs, the applications of predictive algorithms may not be so extreme, but if the future is
predicted through what has happened in the past, designs around how to create social change will
be greatly limited. Most of the data which is input into the processes, and the rule-sets, is based
on the past, and can still only produce extensions of what we know already, not what we do not
know yet. As a result, the space for imagination and creativity is compressed (Pariser, 2012).
Furthermore, large and diverse datasets can encourage organisations to see patterns and
create models that are neither realistic nor effective for their intended goals (boyd and Crawford,
2012) and, relatedly, can generate an illusory sense of a connection between inputs and outputs.
This is a particularly important criticism for CSOs given that many outcomes of social change
initiatives  take  years  to  show  their  effects.  Organisations  need  more  creative  methods  to
understand the unpredictable and unexpected nature of social change. This is particularly true
when much data is collected from the inputs that tech companies dictate, which may not be so
clearly connected to social change. For example, a ‘react’ and ‘share’ reaction on Facebook is
not always an endorsement of the content or the organisations and does not represent deeper
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engagement, even though it may be used to build profiles of individuals’ interests.
Summary: Data Logic as the Research Object
Data logic is an ideal type which consists of the four principles which shape a recognised and
accepted  way of working with information:  quantification,  scale,  standardised processes,  and
algorithmic reasoning. The principles of data logic have become pervasive across various fields,
including communication. These principles are adopted as a logic, as they influence the ways of
working in an organisation based on a belief about how the principles contribute to knowledge.
These principles are adopted despite substantial criticisms of their effectiveness in developing
accurate and useful knowledge. Data logic is not only shaping the ways of working of new CSOs
but has prevailed across older organisations too, changing their tactics if not their strategies. By
examining the distinct ways of working as a set of principles, I will identify the contexts in
which new data practices have been adopted within CSOs. By identifying the principles CSOs
engage  with,  I  can  evaluate  the  circumstances  where  data  logic  has  had  an  effect  on
organisational knowledge. This can support a critical review of these practices,  based on the
criticisms outlined above, and the consequences of the effect of the principles, particularly in
their  contribution  to  organisational  knowledge.  The  next  question  is:  in  what  contexts  is  it
acceptable for CSOs to engage with these principles in relation to political communication?
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2.2 Political Communication and Data:  The Trustee and Delegate Models
In the first half of this literature review, I described the elements which are consistent across
descriptions of how new data practices work. I synthesise these into four principles which form
an ideal type that I term data logic. There are two further characteristics which are integral to
descriptions  of  data  practices  but  rather  than  consistently  appearing  together  as  part  of  the
practices, the values contradict each other. These two antithetical characteristics can be found in
the  differences  between  the  practices  described  in  the  introductory  paragraphs:  ‘analytics
activism’  and  ‘mass  surveillance’.  On  one  side,  Karpf  (2017)  proposes  that  an  element  of
analytic  activism  is  “listening”  and  useful  for  organisations  who  wish  to  be  audience-led:
organisations use data-driven methods to listen to more people outside of the organisation and
involve them in decision making. For example, the digital membership organisations described
in the introductory paragraphs believe that data-driven methods to support the involvement of
large membership bases in organisational decision making. On the other side, mass surveillance
data practices consist of monitoring what people do and through this monitoring asserting control
over their behaviours,  which reinforces the decision-making power of the data collector - an
expert-led model. The former of these practices is praised by scholars in political communication
such as Karpf (2017) and the organisations themselves, while the latter is criticised by scholars in
critical  data  studies  and  surveillance  studies  such  as  Tufecki  (2014)  and Lyon  (2015).  The
tension  between  these  two points  is  the  starting  point  this  thesis  takes  as  a  framework  for
understanding not only how data is used, but also how it can be used in a just manner within the
context of political communication.
In this section, I will describe the practices associated with audience-led and expert-led
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models. I will demonstrate how the responsive leadership  theory of political representation and
political communication, outlines two models, the trustee and delegate models, and that these
models  can  be  helpful  to  understand  these  two sides  of  new data  practices  within  political
communication. By bringing together this theory, and the ideal type of data logic, I present a
framework from which I can examine elements within CSOs and determine how they are using
data practices. I demonstrate what the practices may look like in CSOs by drawing on literature
from other areas of political communication such as news organisations and political parties. By
placing the  practices  within  the framework,  it  is  possible  to  evaluate  their  consequences  for
political communication in CSOs.
2.2.1 Data Justice in Political Communication
As described in the introduction,  there are several approaches to addressing issues with data
practices  that  include  the  features  of  data  logic.  These  approaches  include  data  ethics,  data
protection, data activism, and data justice. This thesis builds from the concept of data justice,
which presents a comprehensive approach to considering the social and ethical impacts of data-
driven  practices  (Dencik  et  al.,  2016;  Tayler,  2017).  Tayler  (2017)  describes  three  main
approaches in data justice. The first approach, presented by Johnson (2014) posits the importance
of open data initiatives in which data about governance and political bodies is made available for
researchers and the public to interrogate. The second approach, from Heeks and Renken (2016),
examines how data on social and political inequalities and needs can help support decisions in
the international development sector regarding priorities and allocation of resources.
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The third approach to data justice is the most relevant to this thesis and is developed and
presented by Dencik et al. (2016). Dencik et al. (2016, p. 2) start their research problem from the
“implications of the Snowden leaks for political activists”. This is a similar motivation to my
own for conducting this research, in which I consider how NGOs balance their criticisms of data
practices used for mass surveillance, such as those revealed by Snowden, and their own data
practices. Dencik et al.’s (2016) article highlights the ‘disconnect’ between the critical views of
surveillance  which many activists  hold and how activists  undertake participation in activism
through data-driven practices. The authors propose that due to the prevalence of tools such as
Facebook and Google, and their utility for connecting, communicating and organising people, it
is difficult for activists to undertake any counteraction to the surveillance entailed in these tools.
This  view aligns  with  the  experiences  outlined  in  the  introductory  paragraphs  of  this  thesis
between Amnesty’s digital engagement strategy, and desire to engage with data-driven methods,
and their campaigns against the collection of personal data for mass surveillance.
Activists are not only at risk due to data practices such as mass surveillance, but must
also consider these same principles in their strategies, tactics and actions. Data justice aims to
build a framework that can allow those critical of data practices to find ways to counter them
despite their prevalence. Dencik et al., (2016) and Tayler (2017) reflect that solutions to justice
within data practices are limited. The authors describe how solutions focus on that which can be
controlled by the technical or legal elements. However, they do not handle broader questions of
what  values  the  practices  align  with,  and  consequently  what  systems  of  governance  they
generate.  Data  justice  should  “examine  the  ideological  basis  of  data-driven  processes”  and
situate the specific form of governance that stems from their ideology, within the structures of
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how we already understand and agree on “how society is and ought to be organized” (Dencik et
al., 2016, p. 9).   For this, Dencik et al. (2016) present the need for data justice so as to support
the examination of the implications of data-driven practices across a variety of problems from
privacy to self-censorship, profiling, biases, and economic inequalities.
The need to examine a collective approach to data justice is also emphasised by Tayler
(2017) in her development of a data justice framework. Taylor (2017, p. 8) argues that data
justice needs to move away from an individual rights approach, towards a collective and group
approach  to  “how fairness  should  be  determined  and  whether  justice  can  be  realised.”  She
presents  a  synthesis  of  the  different  issues  of  data  collection  including  privacy,  open  data,
transparency,  discrimination,  and autonomy,  and the need to  find a way to address them all
consistently. She presents a  capability framing which suggests that those who wish to engage
with data justice should focus on “what functioning they value, and what capabilities they wish
to prioritise” (Taylor, 2017, p. 10). For example, debates around privacy usually focus on how
the rights of an individual are exchanged with governments for the benefit of national security
(Lyon, 2015). The argument on either side is whether this benefit of national security is worth the
personal data. This is in line with a contextual privacy approach (Nissenbaum, 2009) in which
the functions and needs of the context are what defines whether an individual would want to pass
their  personal  data.  This context  brings  up the idea of  what  model  of governance and what
functions  people  are  engaged  in.  This  is  how  Martin  (2012)  refers  to  the  social  contract
approach, in her article on the use of data in commercial organisations. Personal data can be
collected in the context of improving products – either on behalf of the data subject’s request or
at the direction of experts creating the products and services. I take this approach of considering
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the  functions  that  are  valued  by  CSOs,  combined  with  Dencik  et  al.’s  (2017)  approach  by
considering this function in relation to their role within structures of society - and the way in
which data-driven practices can affect these.
CSOs collect data on a variety of different audiences they represent such as members,
supporters,  beneficiaries  and  followers,  to  perform  a  function.  A  useful  starting  point  to
understand what is expected of their function is to examine what is celebrated about the use of
data in analytics activism and the concerns raised regarding mass surveillance. Firstly, analytics
activism is  best  seen  in  digital  membership  organisations,  such  as  Avaaz,  MoveOn and  38
Degrees, who describe themselves as ‘people-powered’ to highlight their model of large-scale
participation from a public audience and in which their members set and implement the agenda
of  the  organisation.  To  achieve  this,  the  CSOs  depend  on  methods  which  demonstrate  the
principles of data logic. CSOs use behavioural data to track what content people engage with and
use  this  information  to  further  design  engaging  content.  CSOs  also  use  social  media  data,
petitions and surveys to represent people’s opinions which guides what they decide to work on.
The staff also use contact data to keep in touch with these individuals. CSOs also use data to
represent themselves, such as in the image from Avaaz’s website above (figure 2.1) which aims
to demonstrates their success by how many members they have, how many ‘actions’ (such as
petitions  or  single  activities  within  a  campaign)  have  been  performed,  and  the  number  of
campaigns which have taken place.  These numbers are used to demonstrate  their  success to
outside groups in order to have more persuasion power in their campaigns and to draw more
support from a larger public.
Whichever way the organisations use the data, whether to measure the success of their
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content and channels, to represent the opinions of their audiences, or to represent themselves, the
data contributes to their mission for their campaigning to be led by the subjects of the data – the
members and activists associated with the organisation. Karpf presented how new organisations
were prompting a shift within the field of CSOs, writing that they are “creating field-defining
shifts in membership engagement and small-dollar fundraising practices” (Karpf, 2017, p. 2).
Not only have new organisations been established with these ways of working from the outset,
but other arrangements of CSOs including older non-technology era organisations and those with
expert-led structures have also taken on many of these tactics – not just methods which contain
elements of data logic set out above, but the organisations have also changed their goals and
structures to ‘listen’ and involve more people in decision making.
The praise, and influence, of data-driven techniques for mobilisation, not only came from
digital membership organisations but also the use of the techniques in Barack Obama’s election
campaigns for President in the US in 2008 and 2012. Obama’s election campaigns were highly
praised not just by other political campaigners but also by CSOs because, among other things,
they created well-resourced data teams who used personal data to profile and target individuals in
order to mobilise large-scale support (Ambider, 2009; Issenberg, 2012). The techniques were so
popular that they became, to use Kreiss’ term for the phenomenon, a prototype which others
attempted to reproduce for their  own mobilisation  campaigns  (Kreiss,  2016).  While  political
parties’ election campaigns have different goals to CSOs’ campaigns, they often share tactics
including  mobilisation  and  fundraising:  at  the  E-Campaigning  Forum  two  years  before  the
‘creepy  or  crafty’  session  described  in  the  introduction,  Amelia  Showwater  (2013),  former
Director of Digital Analytics of the Obama campaign, presented lessons on how to use data-
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driven tools to support mobilisation campaigns. Notably, what was impressive about the use of
data in the Obama campaign was the speed and scale of involving people in campaigns,  the
audience-led model which is also positively attributed to the methods of digital  membership
organisations.
However, critical scholars have argued that data practices have the opposite effect on
structures of representation, supporting and reinforcing the decision-making power of the data
collector in an expert-led model. Martin and Norman, writing in 1970 when computer-based data
practices  were  developing,  referred  to  the  George  Orwell  novel  in  which  surveillance
technologies  create  a  dystopian  society:  “Can  we  avoid  creating  with  greater  subtlety  and
intricacy  some  of  the  facets  of  Orwell’s  1984?”  (Martin  and  Norman,  1970,  p.  17).  This
dystopian future involves  a model  in which a group of political  representatives  manage and
control  people through surveillance and behavioural  management techniques.  The connection
between data practices  and this  expert-led model  is  captured by the popular use of the term
dataveillance (Espoti, 2014; Lupton and Michael, 2017). Clarke (1988) created the portmanteau
‘dataveillance’ to demonstrate that the issues raised by the collection of data are the same as
those in surveillance. These are criticised because of their association with the violation of the
privacy of the data subjects and the use of the tools to monitor people with the aim to control
their behaviours. For example, Lyon (2015) uses the term dataveillance when presenting how
governments have used data collection and analysis techniques to the detriment of the privacy
and social rights of citizens, as described above, in the name of national security.
Dataveillance is associated with government surveillance, rather than communication, but
the criticisms are similar to those levied against the use of the data-driven practices in political
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communication too. These critiques focus on how political representatives collect and analyse
personal data to influence and manage their constituents. Tufecki (2014, p. 3) suggests that data-
driven practices amplify the negative effects of public opinion research, developing an argument
by Adorno:
Soon after public opinion research started seeping into politics,  cultural  critic Adorno
called the forms of “classifying,  organizing and labeling” as a form of propaganda in
which “something is provided for all so that none may escape.” In other words, Adorno
feared a public sphere in which politicians correctly identified all subcategories of voters
and served each of them with a palatable message.
Political  representatives aim to use data to understand what content is most persuasive to their
desired audiences, and individually target them to gain their support so as to achieve the goals
that  the  political  representatives  themselves  want  to  achieve.  At  their  extreme,  these  data
practices bypass citizen engagement by personalising and targeting messages and avoiding the
public discourse that is the necessary function of their role in society.
On the one hand, data is used to ‘listen’ to people so they can lead the strategy of the
organisation, such as in the digital membership organisations. This is an audience-led model. On
the other hand, the strategy is set by political representatives who in turn persuade the audience
to behave in line with their vision. This is an expert-led model. This two-sided debate is reflected
in various other  contexts  within CSOs,  and in  political  communications  and technology and
information  literature.  The  following  table  2.1  shows  various  terms  used  across  previous
literature which align with these two models.
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Table 2.1: Different terms for centralised and decentralised structures of decision-making
in political communication


































Peer to peer creation







to empower citizens to
lead change themselves 
Han (2014)
The  table  shows  various  ways  of  understanding  similar  opposing  perspectives  of
audience-led or expert-led models. For example, in economic aid CSOs, this kind of relationship
is  commonly  referred  to  as  paternalism  versus  empowerment  (McCormack,  2011).  In
paternalism  models,  there  are  experts  and  there  are  citizens,  and  the  former  decide  and
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implement,  what the latter  need. In empowerment models,  citizens are trusted as the experts
themselves and the role of organisations is to support the decisions made by the citizens by
providing the resources they request or supporting frameworks and forums within which citizens
can make decisions. Skocpol (2013) describes the two types of social and political rights CSOs.
The first type refers to older membership organisations built for and by broad groups of people
who would come together to represent and achieve the group’s interests. Later, in the 1990s, a
wave  of  staff-led  advocacy  organisations  emerged.  These  organisations  are  structured  by
professional staff who are fully in control of what is worked on and how it is achieved and
funded by large grants or small personal donations from people who do not have power in the
everyday operations of the organisation. From these concepts, I draw on the trustee and delegate
models proposed by Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson (1962).
2.2.2 The Trustee and Delegate Models and Responsive Leadership
The trustee and delegate models are two sides of the responsible leadership theory. The theory
was presented by Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson (1962) though the principles within
the models can be found in other political theory and communication literature such as Lippmann
(1922), Bernays (1928), and Burke (1949). The models are based on the relationship between a
political  representative  and  those  they  represent,  mirroring  the  two  dichotomous  elements
described in data practices  – trustees mainly monitor  and manage their  constituents  whereas
delegates listen and respond to their constituent wishes. These models will be described in more
detail in the following paragraphs as I highlight three benefits of the model for this project over
the  aforementioned  mirroring  of  the  approaches  to  data  practices  and  CSOs  representation
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models: firstly, while this theory has only been applied in empirical research to politicians, the
responsive  leadership  theory  is  broad  in  scope and  allows  for  a  cross-examination  between
different representatives who undertake political communication; secondly, the theory allows an
examination of how the staff within CSOs view their own role; finally, both models are presented
under the umbrella theory of responsible leadership which proposes that representatives will take
on either an expert-led or audience-led model in different contexts, allowing a more nuanced
understanding of the use of data practices.
In  the  trustee  model,  political  representatives  are,  or  work  with,  skilled  independent
experts to make decisions. These experts are assumed to have the ability to reason and make
clear judgements (Burke, 1949). These trustees do not believe that constituents have the ability to
effectively contribute to long-term decision-making, priorities and decision-making as they are
not sufficiently educated to a level in which they can make decisions on political issues. At the
extreme, the public is seen as incapable of being educated or making educated decisions as they
are  uninformed,  prone  to  change  their  mind,  easily  swayed  by  misinformation,  and  often
contradict themselves. Instead, political representatives make decisions on what the right strategy
and policies are and how best to implement them. The representatives then inform the audience
and mobilise the constituent’s support for the decisions. To manage this role, trustees have to
work  alongside  skilled  media  and  communication  professionals  (Lippmann,  1922;  Bernays,
1928). Once experts have made a decision, they will communicate with the public to persuade or
inform them of the validity of the decision.
Trustees value data-driven practices for understanding how best to gain support from
constituents for the outcomes decided by professional experts in the organisation. In her theory,
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of computational politics, Tufecki (2014) draws a connection between political representative’s
use  of  new  data  practices  and  Bernay’s  proposal  that  the  public  is  controlled  through
communication as opinion research has become “bread-and-butter of political campaigns in the
post-war West” (Tufecki, 2014, p. 3). The collection of personal data is not only now available
through opinion polls and surveys, but also through practices showing many principles of data
logic such as social media and website analytics, location data, and data derived from shopping
transactions. This information is then used to adapt messaging to personalise it to audiences. This
personalisation  may  be  achieved  through  framing  the  messages  based  on  the  audience’s
preferences  and  therefore  introducing  salient  issues  or  the  language  the  audiences  are  most
receptive to so as to encourage them to behave and feel in a certain way (Entman, 2007, p. 164).
Personalisation of the message is supported by the capacity to target individuals or small groups
through data-driven platforms and communication channels such as Facebook or email which
allow audiences to be identified and segmented.
In the delegate model, on the other hand, representatives place responsiveness to public
opinion as central to effective operations and are comparatively passive agents who deliver the
wishes of the constituents (Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson 1962; Jacobs and Shapiro,
2000). A central premise of this model is that citizens have the capacity to be informed and
empowered and can make decisions for their own self-governance (Dewey, 1966; Jacobs and
Shapiro, 2000). Representatives adhering to the delegate model will facilitate, to the best of their
ability, the capacity for their constituents to set priorities, and desired outcomes and to decide the
order  of  these  priorities  and  consequently  where  funding  and  resources  are  invested.
Representatives will  engage with political  communication to listen to the constituents  and to
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communicate how effectively their choices have been implemented.
Delegates will collect data on the opinions of the audience, through the same methods as
the trustees such as opinion polls, social media, or data around people’s movements and habits.
This  data  will  be  used  to  understand  what  the  audience  wants  so  as  to  create  appropriate
strategies  and  tactics  to  achieve  this.  The  representatives  will  also  provide  the  resources
requested by the audience including data-driven tools to help them research the topic themselves
and data-driven platforms on which they can share their opinions or ideas. The delegates will
design and provide the tools and channels for the audience and will iterate the design of the tools
based on data showing how people interact with the tools. Delegates will also use data to help
publish audience-created content and encourage peer to peer sharing. The organisation's role is to
be an effective channel for the visions and goals of the audience, and the organisation justifies
the use of data to help support or carry out citizen’s visions and initiatives effectively.
This delegate approach is the one proposed by those conducting Karpf’s (2017) analytic
activism, such as digital membership organisations. The trustee approach represents the elements
of  data  practices  which  are  criticised  such as  in  Tufecki’s  (2014) concept  of  computational
politics, such as seen in the scandals of Cambridge Analytica’s involvement in various political
elections.  However,  as  demonstrated  here,  there  may  be  those  that  support  this  model,  and
furthermore, both models of representation come with problems. The organisations can realise
their  role  as experts  and their  responsibility  to educate or motivate their  audiences  to act  in
certain  ways  so instead  of  the  audience-expertise  led  structure,  there  is  a  staff-expertise  led
structure. For example, there are CSOs who hire staff for their expertise in a particular topic, and
it is these staff who decide the strategy and design the campaigns of the organisation. The staff
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will then run behavioural change or education campaigns, or if their work is advocacy-based,
look for funding or mobilise support for their staff expertise-led decisions in the form of petitions
or demonstrations. This can be particularly useful around unpopular campaigns or ones that take
a long time to change such as the campaign against the death penalty or for gay marriage in the
US.
There are still criticisms levied at each model. The trustee approach is criticised on the
principle  that  persuasion  and  mobilisation  will  turn  into  coercion,  either  accidentally  or
purposefully, and a person should never be coerced into a belief or action even it will be better
for them because their innate rights and freedom are more valuable (Mill, 1861). The use of data
often  leads  towards  manipulation  and  malicious  consent  engineering  (Turow,  2013).  In
particular,  in  the  trustee  model,  there  is  a  violation  of  specific  rights,  such  as  privacy  and
freedom of expression. Dworkin (1972, p. 65) describes this as an "interference with a person's
liberty of action justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs,
interests or values of the person being coerced". These are the same rights that are at the heart of
criticisms of the use of data in this way, as described in Tufecki’s (2014) criticisms of the use of
data to personalise messaging to engineer consent. However, the delegate model also receives
criticism. If citizens have control over decision-making a variety of problems can ensue. For
example,  a ‘hyperdemocracy’  may overemphasise utilitarian benefits over important  minority
protections  or citizens’  emotional  decisions may take precedence over reason (Heclo,  1999).
Further, constituents may request more benefits and support from their government than can be
supported (Jacobs and Shapiro; 2000). In the delegate model, fast and quick data collection, as
well as large-scale participation, may lead to many of these problems. 
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The  responsible  leadership  theory  suggests  that  representatives  acting  as  responsible
leaders will both be trustees and lead constituents, and at other times take the role of delegates
and  be  responsive  to  constituents.  For  example,  a  trustee  model  may  be  more  likely  to  be
embraced in times of national security, deciding between conflicting goals and leading initiatives
(Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000). The representative or delegate model is where the politician steps
back from a leadership role and carries out actions mainly based on responsiveness to public
opinion (Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000: 298). This is an important contribution to understanding the
use of data technologies and engagement with the principles of data logic. The trustee model is
the model described in the use of data for surveillance, and there are many criticisms of the use
of data this way. On the other hand, the audience-led model of membership organisations is
praised, and the use of data seen as good only when it is supporting this model. By examining
this political communication theory I can demonstrate how both sides, trustee and delegate, are a
viable model for representation and there is a time and place for both. Taking this  balanced
approach can help move discussions away from a space in which organisations can only discuss
data uses if they are for supporting audience-led models, by both showing the potential negative
consequences of use of data to support an audience-led model, and the potential positive uses for
using data to be expert-led. The theory of responsive leadership helps understand data-driven
practices with more nuance, moving away from a model in which only the gathering of public
opinion to facilitate an audience-led model has been celebrated, and showing that there are good
arguments for using a trustee model at times. In the next section, I will describe in detail how
these models can be applied to the data-driven practices in political communication of CSOs.
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2.3 A framework for examining the use of data in CSOs
In the first half of the chapter, I showed how a set of data practices have emerged that have a
consistency I  argue is  best  understood as an ideal  type,  which I  term data logic.  Data logic
involves  trusting  the  process  of  quantification,  scale,  process  and  deduction  as  practices  to
validate outputs and information. Next, I demonstrated how the adoption of these principles can
be interrogated from the perspective of data justice.  To do this,  I  introduced the trustee and
delegate models. The theory does not present one model to be right or wrong but instead focuses
on how the organisation views their  function and role with the audience  which may change
depending on the topic. I will describe which CSOs practices show principles of data logic and
whether  they fall  into the trustee or  delegate  models,  as shown in the two quadrants  of  the
framework in figure 2.2 below. This ability to clearly distinguish practices will allow for analysis
of the consequences of how CSOs engage with data. As there is only limited empirical research
on what the data-driven actions of CSOs look like, I will also outline what has been documented
in other areas of political communication such as from media and political parties to demonstrate
these models and their use of personal data.
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Figure 2.2: The current use of data-driven methods in CSOs which will be investigated in this
research
There are two concepts which help understand the functions of CSOs which will help
support the analysis: the planning cycle and the ladder of participation. Firstly, CSOs work with
a planning cycle, shown in figure 2.3 below, which demonstrates the process the organisation
follows  from analysing  an  issue  to  developing  a  strategy,  planning  and  delivering  relevant
projects  and campaigns and evaluating their  success, which feeds back into the first stage of
analysis of the issue. When analysing the topic and setting the strategy, staff make decisions
about what they want to work on either through their own expertise, in the expert-led trustee
model,  or  through  analysis  of  public  and membership  opinion,  in  the  audience-led  delegate
model. The planning and delivery stage is when the CSOs implement the projects and campaigns
to  achieve  the  goals  set  in  the  strategy  which  involves  activities  such  as  fundraising,
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mobilisation, and advocacy. During the evaluation, the staff will consider how successful their
tactics were, and analyse whether the problem has changed which in turn feeds into the next
cycle starting once again with setting a strategy.
Figure 2.3: The campaign planning cycle from the website of the National Council for Voluntary
Organisations (Brennan, 2017)
Secondly, engagement is measured in CSOs by frameworks which are classically drawn
from  Arnstein’s  Ladder  of  Participation  shown  in  figure  2.4  (Arnstein,  1969).  This  ladder
demonstrates a linear progression from the least participation from the audience to full citizen
control. While those following this ladder work on the premise that an organisation would aim
for the top of the ladder to facilitate audience-led approaches, there are alternative adaptations to
demonstrate the importance of groups who are ‘informed’ and ‘consulted’, the approaches that
would be used by a trustee organisation. The language of both Arnstein’s ladder, and adaptations
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of it, will be used to discuss audience-led delegate models and expert-led trustee models.
Figure 2.4: Arnstein’s Ladder of Participation (1969)
2.3.1 Delegates and Data Logic
Organisations  who wish to  run an audience-led  model  carry out  the  role  of  a  delegate.  For
example, digital membership organisations profess to engage with data practices to support their
‘people-powered’ audience-led model. These CSOs perform a delegate role and facilitate, to the
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best of their ability, the capacity for their constituents to set the priorities for the organisation's
long-term and short-term plans. Online surveys and opinion polls are used by CSOs to facilitate
the participation of a large number of constituents in a setting a long-term strategy. Due to the
principle of scale, made possible by data technologies, the surveys can collect more information
than before and databases can host input from these surveys. Further, computerised processes
can collect,  process and visualise the information from the surveys and polls  quickly.  CSOs
engaging with data logic will assume that the more people involved in decision-making the better
quality  their  strategy.  For  example,  Avaaz  supports  a  large  membership  to  make  decisions
through the collection and analysis  of their  personal data.  Avaaz has an annual  membership
survey in which emails are sent to members to ask their opinion on the organisation's priorities
and campaign ideas for the following year (Karpf, 2017, p. 44). MoveOn, another campaigning
organisation, uses a tool called PileOn which sends a petition to 1000 members asking if they
think MoveOn should further support this campaign. An agreement is represented by a signature
on the petition which becomes data that reveals the level of support for that campaign (Karpf,
2017,  p.  89).  The  larger  the  quantitative  representation  of  support,  the  more  likely  the
organisation is to take on that campaign. The members guide not only what outcomes MoveOn
work towards, but also what priority the campaign is for the organisation, and therefore what
percentage  of staff time and organisational  budget  will  be put  towards the project.  The data
technologies  allow  the  CSOs  to  engage  with  a  numerically  larger  and  more  real-time
constituency.
CSOs not only use tools which collect data so directly such as opinion polls and surveys,
but  also use indirect  methods to gauge the public  opinion of their  constituency.  These tools
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gather ‘latent’ or ‘trace’ data through automated collection practices. The data is processed and
analysed to produce assumptions about the profiles and opinions of the audience, without them
knowingly disclosing any information. This personal data is collected from a variety of places,
including but not limited to data from social media metrics, website traffic, google analytics and
lists the organisations can buy from data brokers that can include further information such as
financial status and demographic information. The data can be connected to an individual such as
by connecting  it  to  an IP address,  tracking cookie  or  account  login,  but  is  most  commonly
collected,  presented  and analysed en masse.  These  aggregate  collections  of  data  include  the
number of likes on a Facebook page, watches on a YouTube video or emails  opened. These
aggregate statistics can be connected to other information such as common demographics  or
other behaviours and may be turned into profiles which can be applied back to the individuals.
The advantage of indirect data for CSOs who wish to perform a delegate role is that it can
represent  the  opinion of  a  larger  constituency  (Karpf,  2017)  than  just  those that  respond to
surveys. The observation is covert and automated, and therefore requires no extra effort from the
citizen other than conducting their usual activities, as well as less effort from the collector who
does not need to be present when the data is collected. This routine and automated method mean
that the collection of data can happen continually without risking consultation exhaustion from
the group. The organisation can monitor individuals in almost real-time and understand their
response to priorities all year round, rather than what might have previously been quarterly or
annual collections of data through surveys.
Furthermore, the data collected can appear to create seemingly genuine opinions through
these automated processes, as they are collected and analysed from behaviours that are carried
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out when people are not watched, rather than the potentially aspirational answers given when
answering direct polls and surveys. For example, data can not only be collected on how many
people support a topic by signing a petition but also what framing in the headline or images
prompted the significance of the topic to the citizen. The capabilities of new technologies also
include  segmenting  this  data  after  collection  to  understand  nuanced differences  between  the
behaviours  and the  activities  of  individuals  and groups,  allowing for  nuanced feedback.  For
example, an organisation can understand the sentiment from those in a specific region or of a
specific  gender.  Kreiss  (2016,  p.  146)  demonstrates,  for  example,  how  data  around  these
demographics can be segmented to personalise messages to different groups in political elections
in the US.
The use of this indirect data for contributing to what topics the organisation will prioritise
is also seen in newsrooms. In particular, Anderson’s (2011) study of newsrooms revealed how
audience metrics, such as click-throughs, read-throughs and shares of articles, are replacing the
expertise of editors in deciding the topics to be covered, contributing to a shift in their role to
delegates, rather than traditional trustee role of journalists in some of these organisations. The
fast  and constant  collection  of  data,  allows  for  the  audience  to  impact  the  priorities  of  the
newsroom and the production of news each day. The faith in quantitative metrics, in which a
higher number gives priority, is also manifested in an increase in the number of ‘most read’
sections on news websites. Another example of the use of these metrics in newsrooms is the
now-defunct UpShot, a blog run by Yahoo. Articles for the blog were only written if the data,
gathered  from  quantitative  monitoring  of  search  queries  and  click-throughs  on  the  Yahoo
platform, showed that these topics had gathered large-scale interest (Pariser, 2012: 71).
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CSOs’ use of indirect data is documented by Chadwick (2013) and Karpf (2017) who
both demonstrate how indirect data is used as “iterative feedback” in which content is shared and
then  adapted  constantly  depending  on  the  response  of  the  audience,  represented  in  online
analytics  data.  CSOs  implement  their  strategy  through  the  use  of  tactics  and  tools  such  as
protests, advocacy and petitions. Delegate CSOs work to support their constituents in creating
and leading the  implementation  of  these  actions.  The organisations  will  support  the  content
created by citizens - their petitions, their protests, and their campaign plans. CSOs can then use
data  to  increase  their  capacity  as  delegates  that  facilitate  and  encourage  constituents  to  be
involved in shared decision-making, implementation and accountability for the activities which
will  achieve  the  long-term goals.  CSOs also  use  supporter  journeys,  a  term that  captures  a
plethora of tactics that encourage individuals to move through activities that require anything
from  a  minimal  commitment  to  full  participation  and  have  shared  ownership  of  delivering
outcomes. Data practices assist the institutions to carry out this activity as they allow them to
form  profiles  of  constituencies  and  retain  their  personal  data  including  demographics,
behaviours,  interests  and networks,  in  a  CRM. The  organisation  can  use  the  data  to  record
preferred  activities  of  individuals,  track  their  development  and  help  create  personalised
opportunities  for  individuals  to  be  directly  involved  in  implementing  change  (Han,  2014).
Ultimately, an organisation aims to have, as described in Kreiss’s (2016) research on data use in
election campaigns, a whole unified person in their database.
A  fuller  representation  of  the  person  can  support  the  creation  of  better-personalised
opportunities for individuals to become leaders in the movement. These leaders can be involved
and champion the movement of other activists, as shown in Han’s (2014) research on activists. 
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Those who lead this would follow Han’s (2014) distinction between transactional mobilisation
and transformational organising, respectively ‘getting people to do stuff’ and developing their
capacity for organising and leadership. The transformation needed for civil society movements
and community building is created through actions such as chanting in crowds or decisions made
with  the  involvement  and  input  of  people  from  across  class  and  geographical  boundaries
(Skocpol,  2013;  Ahlquist  and Levi,  2013).  Mobilisation  neither  supports  these  activities  nor
creates the kind of relationships with the constituents that even trustees need to maintain in long-
term movements and to have communities that will mobilise regularly (Skocpol, 2012). This can
lead to shallow movements which ultimately do not come together over the long-term to create
change. Instead, delegates will use data-driven tools to lead constituents to a position in which
they can be leaders  and can invest  in  their  community.  To do this,  delegate CSOs can also
condense and visualise the data for constituents, so not only decision-making but accountability
for creating change can be shared with them.
2.3.2 Trustees and Data Logic
The trustee model for civil society organisations values data for understanding how best to gain
support from constituents  for the outcomes decided by professional  experts.  Trustees  do not
believe that constituents should be the ones to contribute to long-term decisions, priorities and
decision-making.  Instead  constituents  are  there  to  support  these  decisions  through  joining
membership  or  signing  a  petition.  This  is  less  well  documented  for  CSOs,  as  the  literature
focuses on the success or failure of CSOs in supporting the decentralisation of decision-making
power. Further, the practices of trustees that apply data logic can mostly be described by drawing
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on principles in the literature which is critical of data-driven practices. However, there is some
demonstration  of  when  the  trustee  model  is  considered  acceptable  from  the  perspective  of
political representatives and organisations in studies of news organisations and political parties.
Anderson (2011) shows how some journalists hold a paternalistic view of the audience - a
trustee approach which downplays the capacity of the audience. The journalists limit the impact
of audience metrics on their decisions on what content to write about and publish. Instead, data-
driven methods are used to find ways to share the expert-led content to a wide audience. This
same practice  is  documented  in  other  cases.  In  2012,  The  New York Times  did  not  allow
journalists  to see how many people clicked on their  stories,  trusting instead their  considered
editorial  expertise  to  choose  and  write  the  content  (Pariser,  2012).  Further,  Finley  (2015)
documented a growing dismissal of the significance of online comments which may not even be
read by people running blogs or news sites. 
CSOs will rely on their own experts to make decisions on the strategy of the organisation
when  performing  a  trustee  role.  The  organisations  will  then  implement  these  decisions  by
engaging with other authorities and experts to create desired social change - commonly referred
to as insider campaigning. However, the CSOs may also require a larger public audience which
can be supported through data practices. To do this, they rely on mobilisation events such as
elections, protests and online petitions (Kreiss and Howard, 2010). The numbers of participants
who attend these events are used to represent the size of their constituency. Actions are measured
as quantitative data such as the amount of signatures collected through petitions or emails sent to
a local MP from their constituents on a particular topic. The data measured may be more passive
or  latent  such  as  YouTube  video  views  or  Facebook  likes  and  shares.  The  value  of  this
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information is seen in media publications presenting ‘viral hits’ as news stories in themselves.
These numerical  figures  can be a  powerful  way to gain access  to,  and authority  with,  other
experts  such as  government  officials.  Data  can  also  reveal  the demographic  make-up of  the
audience which may reveal, for example, an important constituency to the experts they wish to
persuade.
By  using  data  to  profile  the  constituency,  trustees  can  also  develop  personalised
persuasive content to encourage the audience to take part in these activities (Tufecki, 2014, p. 2).
The  profile  can  represent  an  individual’s  or  group’s  demographics,  interests,  sentiment  and
behaviours  which can be used to predict  and test  what is  most  persuasive to constituents  to
mobilise them to carry out the actions the organisation has deemed necessary to create change
(Skocpol, 2013; Han, 2014). As Tufecki describes, data is used by political representatives “to
profile people, sometimes in the aggregate but especially at the individual level, and to develop
methods of persuasion and mobilization” (Tufecki, 2014, p. 2). Jacobs and Shapiro (2000, p.
301) document how Republican and Democratic  party staff use data to find the most salient
arguments to educate the public and win their support. Kreiss (2016) show how the data is used
in US elections to target them to persuade them during get out and vote campaigns.  This is
supported by the data logic principle of causality, in this case, the use of behavioural science and
testing to understand how best to achieve their aims. The data is used to create the appropriate
messaging to persuade constituent support for the goals of the trustees.
Trustees will create profiles from personal data they have collected to represent those
who are already supporters, likely supporters and those who are not supporters. Hersh (2015)
describes the tool Catalist which predicts voters’ partisanship based on more than 150 data points
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and predicts a value for the voters’ support. Kreiss (2016) shows US-based political parties use
of predictive modelling scores for individuals based on characteristics shared with others and
anything  the  organization  could  gather  on  that  individual  through  direct  or  indirect  data  to
categorise their audience by their level of support for the party. The Obama campaign relied on
these models to categorise voters who supported Obama, those likely to turnout, and those likely
to  be persuadable  and responsive  to  specific  types  of  appeals  (Kreiss,  2016).  In  Kreiss  and
Howard’s (2010) research of Obama’s campaign they also showed how tracking cookies were
used to  follow people after  they left  the visitor  section  of  the website  to  present  them with
adverts  relating to their  preferences such as an advert about education policy if  they look at
parenting websites.  The Obama campaign also used testing on the website to gather data on
effective colour, size and order of information that had the most impact on individuals to remain
reading information from the site and donate (Kreiss and Howard, 2010). The organisation can
also  evaluate  the  formats  and content  of  communication  to  see  what  framing works  best  to
encourage action, support or behavioural change. The organisations can use data from polls and
surveys to find the right language and salient arguments to educate the audience and win their
support. They can use trace data they have collected and used to assist in persuading their desired
audiences or useful audiences for achieving their goals to support them. They can also utilise
data to improve the chances of their content being found by the desired audience and formatted
or written to be received by the audience in the desired manner such as through the tool of search
engine optimisation (SEO) (Frary, 2015).
The evaluation  as to  whether  tactics  will  succeed was previously decided by the gut
instinct of experts whereas now testing provides evidence for decision-making (Issenberg, 2012).
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Trustees can use the metrics instead of tacit knowledge for the basis of evaluating the success of
tactics. New data technologies allow monitoring and evaluation to be done in real-time now,
seeing feedback from individuals immediately. Organisations can test the reach and engagement
quality with their products to understand if they are having the impact they expected to have.
Within this, it is possible to see the use of data as not a method to reflect on the people, but as a
reflection on the quality of the content or the format. For trustees, this is particularly important as
they  can  measure  the  success  of  their  attempts  to  change behaviour  in  real-time.  As  Karpf
recorded from one member of staff “Without the data and math and tools, I’m 93% an idiot”
(2017, p. 110). Instead, the staff in these scenarios were excited to learn what the data showed
did work.  Kreiss describes a  successful  use of data where the staff of the Obama campaign
considered ”political metrics, we had communications metrics, and we had fundraising metrics”
but their primary goal was 51% of the vote and with the data used strategically, this was where
success could be measured (Kreiss, 2016, p. 52). Trustees can show support for their decisions,
and  create  further  support  for  their  decisions,  create  behavioural  change  needed  for  their
campaigns and test how effectively they have managed to carry out their decisions all through
the practices associated with data logic.
2.3.4 Summary: Data logic and political representation
The new data technologies,  and associated principles of data logic,  are praised and criticised
based on two distinct outcomes of their use. Firstly, the principles that guide data-driven working
practices are seen as synonymous with the production of valid outcomes. Secondly, new data
practices are viewed as either supportive of a delegate role in which the organisation hands the
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power  to  set  strategy  over  to  their  audience.  They  are  inherently  associated  with  the
centralisation  of  strategy-setting  power.  I  reframe  the  critical  approach  relating  to  political
participation as the responsibilities of the organisation shift depending on whether they want to
take more control or to share power - a choice the organisations have to make. I have taken the
political representation theory, trustee and delegate, and used this to create a set of principles
which helps us to understand the new data practices. This reveals that the organisations can take
on either form of representation, although there are negatives and positives to both approaches.
To build on this theory it is necessary to test tension points within the framework. In particular,
as the most documentation has been on how the data is used to support new CSOs in the delegate
role, which has potentially negative consequences, and little attention has been paid to CSOs
who may choose an expert-led approach. There is a third tension based on the third element of
criticism: the mediation of data-driven processes alters the relationship between a representative,
whether  delegate  or  trustee,  and  the  audience.  As  described  in  the  introduction,  it  is  also
important to consider the additional roles involved in making decisions, given that an important
aspect of data-driven practices and the trust in data is that decision-making power is given to
three agents - the technocrats, the software, and the data double. The potential impact of these
agents is described in the next section. 
2.4 Agency and Decision-Making in Data Logic
As described in the introduction, scholars argue that there is a surveillance realism in which data
practices are adopted as the status quo along with faith in their ability to produce accurate results
(boyd and Crawford, 2012; Dencik et al., 2016). Ultimately, as the processes are trusted with
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little interrogation, decisions are made by agents within these processes: the technocrats, who are
the technical experts who operate the technologies that collect  and analyse the data,  and the
software, which contains algorithms which collect, process, store, analyse and present the data.
Furthermore, as is described in the section above on data logic, the quantified metrics are treated
as authoritative over and above other forms of data (Raley, 2013), leading to a situation where
the data double of a person may hold more authority than they do. Not only are some of these
situations problematic in themselves, in that decisions are made with a lack of transparency and
hidden  biases  which  cannot  be  interrogated,  but  the  role  of  these  three  agents  also  has  an
important consequence for political communication. Traditional political communication theory
considers  the  representatives’  communication  with  constituents,  at  times  working  alongside
traditional media. The trust in data practices, however, leads to a situation in which technocrats
and software can make decisions without the awareness of the political representative, and the
data double likewise represents the audience without their consent or awareness (see figure 1.3 in
Chapter 1). These issues are explored further in the following sections.
2.4.1 Technocrats
Firstly, political representatives entrust decisions on what data to collect, and how to analyse and
present  the  data,  to  technocrats.  Technocrats  have  the  technical  expertise  to  operate  data
technologies. Technocrats can carry various job titles such as data scientists, programmers, social
media officers and analysts. As Karpf says (2017, p. 167) “The work of digital listening falls
primarily on the analysts, technologists, and strategists who are gathering and rendering the data
accessible.” This can be expertise in data analysis techniques, in the creation of software which
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hosts and analyses  the data,  or  knowledge of how to operate  data-driven platforms,  such as
Facebook or Google Analytics.
The technocrats make several decisions within CSOs. For example, they make decisions
about how to gather data - usually including a decision on how best to represent the object as
data. They also decide how best to host the data, which will require decisions about what data
they are collecting and what form it will take. The technocrats also make decisions about how to
analyse and visualise the data to other staff, such as managers in the CSOs. They might collect
and analyse  the  information  from other  platforms  like  google  analytics  and present  relevant
information to the content makers such as researchers and campaigners in the CSO. Technocrats
may also be consultants the CSO hire to help them decide what to do with the data or what data
they might need.
When  staff  engage  with  the  principles  of  data  logic,  technocrats  are  part  of  the
standardised  processes  which  are  treated  as  if  they  are  unbiased.  However,  there  are  many
indications to show that technocrats are not a neutral part of the process. Technocrats can affect
all aspects that they have control over as each person will have a different perspective and make
choices about the data: “The design decisions that determine what will be measured also stem
from interpretation.  For example,  in the case of social media data, there is a ‘data cleaning’
process: making decisions about what attributes and variables will be counted, and which will be
ignored. This process is inherently subjective.” (boyd and Crawford, 2012, p. 667). They are
biased,  driven by agendas of their  own or due to their  passive biases such as their  financial
position or upbringing. Trusting the technocrats is problematic for trustees and delegates who
would have faith that their, or the constituents', values have been accurately carried out from one
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part  of  the  process  to  another.  By  recognising  the  agency  of  the  technocrat  CSOs  could
understand how the technocrats' biases affect outputs and incorporate this into decision-making.
The technocrat is an added layer of decision-making which can prevent transparency.
Transparency is  also important  for  constituents  to  decide whether  they would like to
continue  investing  in  the  civil  society  organisation,  with  time,  money  or  other  forms  of
engagement. The data-driven platforms that CSOs engage with, however, are guarded about their
data practices (Pariser, 2012) making it difficult for the CSO to make promises on how their
audience’s data is used. Constituents engage with the delegates or trustees on the basis of trust
that appropriate measures will be taken to protect their privacy, but due to the complexities and
inadequacies of trusting technocrats, this cannot be guaranteed. Furthermore, the security of data
is a constant arms race and nothing can protect from a determined data miner or a subpoena from
a government (Gallagher and Greenwald, 2015). Government programs have been used to tap
cables to gather uploads and downloads from YouTube, Google and Facebook (Lyon, 2015).
This is particularly important when civil society organisations collect sensitive data on people’s
political  interests  that  could  be  used  against  them  in  the  wrong  hands.  Environmental
campaigners, journalists, human rights activists and aboriginal peace protesters, have all been
tracked by the state (Korff and Brown, 2012; Lyon, 2015). There may be no way to fully secure
the data, but the representatives, whether trustee or delegate, should be aware of the risks the
data is under and technocrats can create an opaque layer between the CSOs and that knowledge.
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2.4.2 Software and algorithms
The second entity is not a person but a technology. The agency of algorithms is becoming a more
commonly recognised issue, particularly due to the development of machine learning. In these
cases, decisions are made by the analysis of an algorithm which applies a ruleset to inputted data
to  create  new data  -  and therefore  new information  is  designed by the  decisions  within  the
algorithms. These algorithms are trusted as a ruleset - rather than due to the person who created
them. As Kitchin writes: “Algorithms search, collate,  sort,  categorise,  group, match,  analyze,
profile, model,  simulate,  visualize and regulate people, processes and places” (Kitchin, 2016,
p,11) - as does software, or any code that shapes the form and function of the software. The
decisions the algorithms make are becoming further removed from a human agent as machine
learning algorithms can redesign their own processes to create new outputs.
On top  of  this,  I  broaden  the  understanding  of  the  impact  of  algorithmic  agency  to
software in general – the best example of this is a database. People will have to make decisions
as to what can fit into the database system they are using. For example, staff using a CRM system
to host information on their constituents not only have to fit the information they have into the
specifications of the CRM system they use but also may choose to collect information based on
the suggested fields of the database. In CSOs, for example, there is trust in CRM systems. These
are databases  that  host information  about  constituents,  including their  email  address,  actions
carried  out  by  the  constituents  and  demographic  information.  Further,  the  databases  are
becoming more likely to offer analysis that may profess to help provide further information about
individuals such as their other hobbies or interests. The staff in CSOs may also trust the analysis
provided by the algorithms on platforms such as Facebook and Google analytics tools, placing
102
their faith in algorithms to generate profiles on individuals and types of audiences which are
becoming commonly targeted by CSOs and political campaigns.
Algorithms and software also carry seeming neutrality, as is seen with technocrats. As
boyd and Crawford argue the approach of these tools (2012, p. 667) “attempts to remove itself
from  the  subjective  domain  through  the  application  of  a  dispassionate  process  whereby
hypotheses are proposed and tested, eventually resulting in improvements in knowledge.” This
removal from subjectivity is part of the algorithm or software’s claim to provide an authoritative
form and method to create valid information. In particular, software requires information to be
reduced to a format that is possible to contain and process in a database; software dictates what
format the information will take. This is problematic because, as Kitchen (2014, p. 8) puts it,
“The  notion  that  nearly  everything  we do can  be  broken down into  and processed  through
algorithms is inherently highly reductionist”. There are a variety of inadequacies that can come
about when trying to evaluate how to turn complex questions into answers that can be solved
with a system that requires everything to be eventually coded as a one or zero. Even with the
qualitative  surveys,  some form of  coding is  usually  needed to  manage  the  analysis  when it
reaches a certain quantity. This usually involves framing the questions in ways that are easy to
represent in a unique numerical value (for example yes=1 and no=0) or other forms of coding
where the organisation either chooses themes and indicators or trusts a program to find trends
and associations. This can be an issue, as described earlier, for evaluating objects that require
context - change and understanding people may all be too complex to reduce to singular values
(Kitchin, 2014; Karpf, 2017).
The algorithms also maintain consistency in their process even when things are wrong
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because while they have agency, they do not have awareness. For example, one organisation that
gave over decision-making power to algorithms is the media organisation, Gawker news. Here
the ‘Big Board’ lists articles and numbers representing how many times the article has been read
allowing  all  writers  to  understand  what  people  are  reading.  This  then  influences  editorial
judgement as well as human resource decisions as those who stay at the bottom too long lose
their  job.  The  organisations  that  relied  too  heavily  on  the  algorithms  of  search  engine
optimisation targets ultimately failed including Demand Media and Yahoo’s Upshot, or the tactic
was removed such as Gawker News’ Big Board as they believed it was leading to the wrong
motivations and values in producing content, and not improving their profits in the long-term.
Databases  require  money,  time  and  expertise  to  run,  and  people  can  end up using  creative
methods for storing data (Anstead, 2016; Kreiss, 2017, p. 135). These methods might involve
excel spreadsheets or online spreadsheets through Google drive services which results in less
secure systems and increasing the likelihood of data breaches.  Software has a similar problem,
in  this  way,  to  technocrats,  because  it  creates  a  layer  of  decision-making  power  which  can
prevent  transparency around decision-making and security.  This use of the software happens
even if CSOs do not want to follow data logic but only have certain tools available. This is why
understanding  where  the  software  comes  in  decision-making  processes  is  fundamental  to
understanding how well any data justice framework can be applied.
2.4.3 The Data Double
The data double is the third agent to consider when CSOs engage with the principles of data
logic.  The  data  double  is  the  representation  of  a  person’s  or  group’s  behaviours,  activities,
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demographics, or other attributes in the form of  data. Other terms have also been used including
the data shadow and data traces. As with software, the data double is not a person and does not
choose their agency, and instead is given agency by political representatives allowing the data to
lead decisions. There are various forms a data double can take such as an individual's contact in a
database or a profile of a group of ‘those who live in London’ or ‘those who are interested in
refugee  rights’  or  ‘those  who  vote  Labour’.  The  data  double  is  used  not  only  from  an
organisation’s perspective but also our own, as we can measure our steps on a Fitbit or on apps
on our phone, or in our work by the number of people reached by our publications. As Couldry
argues,  “we have become accustomed to giving accounts of ourselves in such data-saturated
ways” (Couldry, 2014, p,890). CSOs can measure their communications such as 100,000 visitors
to the website, how many times articles were read and how many people donated, as well as
understand the demographics or other interests of their audience.
The data double is useful for organisations – instead of having to ask people what they
want or like they can look at the data double. For example, they could look at their responses to a
survey but there is less action required from the audience if the organisation can, instead, look at
latent trails they leave behind on Facebook or email or petition signatures to understand what
topics they like most. This can be seen as helpful to engage with people who would not normally
have the time to engage with an organisation. Examining a person’s data double can also be
helpful when trying to understand what a person ‘really wants’. The way that people react and
respond to a website for example, the amount of people that reply to a call to action, or read an
email, or click through to the website, shows to the organisation what content and format is most
interesting and engaging for an audience. In user design terms it helps show what is the easiest
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journey. The organisation can use this to place the donation button in the best place or use the
best headlines to get the most results. It has been suggested that in some cases the data double is
trusted over and above the constituents, in data-led decision making. As Hersh (2015) argues
politicians do not make decisions based on actual voters but perceived voters, those who are
made of available data.
However, people are difficult to simplify and it is difficult to use data to represent the
audience’s opinion. Descriptive data is captured from current actions and modelling is applied to
predict the aspirational vision of the future for those individuals or groups. However, revealing
what is happening in the present, or the immediate past,  neither captures what an individual
might want for the future nor ideas that are outside current thinking and therefore innovative.
The problem with the data double is  that  in this  case,  it  is a numerical  representation of an
individual  or  group’s  opinion.  Public  opinion  is  contestable  in  how  and  whether  it  can  be
represented and there are a variety of formats it  can take.  Karpf (2017) terms the difference
between these as Opinion 1, the opinion voiced when asked directly,  and Opinion 2,  shared
“without  the urging of  a  pollster”  such as  activism through attending protests  and rallies  or
writing to authorities. As Karpf presents, opinion 2 is a limited concept when in fact much more
than overt political activities are captured by indirect data such as opening an email or retweeting
a news article. This is perhaps better captured in the distinction between what people say they
want, aspirational opinion, and what people’s actions currently convey, descriptive opinion (see
also Pariser, 2012). The ease of collection of indirect data may create a reliance on a type of
opinion they did not plan to use.
The data double may also not be an accurate representation as it  can fail  to properly
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account for resource-rich individuals or organisations manipulating the opinion being measured
(van Dijck, 2014: 200). This can include paid workers, volunteers, rogue individuals or bots who
may  Tweet  or  comment  on  Facebook  with  a  consistent  or  disruptive  message.  Financially
stronger  organisations  can  also  afford  access  to  analytics  from data  companies  and  pay for
prioritisation  which  algorithms then take  into account  when sorting  information,  such as  on
Google and Facebook. By doing this, they can gain better insight into where and when the most
effective  advertising  spaces  should be used (Kreiss  and Howard,  2010;  boyd and Crawford,
2012; Chadwick, 2013, p. 197). The public opinion then is not of a broad constituency opinion,
but a privilege driven opinion. For civil society organisations, this means that their attempt to
draw authority from their ability to represent opinion could be based on false claims to represent,
listen, or speak for a broad constituency.
The organisation acts as a delegate or trustee on the basis of a relationship formed on
consent and trust. The data double is not a good enough representation of an individual to give
consent  to form the relationship.  Constituents  rarely have the opportunity to  opt out of data
collection  and security  through anonymisation  cannot  be  assured  due to  techniques  such as
triangulation that have become possible with large quantities of data (Lyon, 2015; Rutkin, 2015;
Rita Raley, 2013). This is particularly true for indirect data which may have violated the privacy
of individuals as some is collected and sold without actually obtaining any consent. In addition,
although some online spaces are more obviously public, such as Twitter or open forums, some
are more obviously private, such as emails and private Facebook accounts. Monitoring of data
across these spaces violates individuals’ privacy, minimizing the space for intimate and private
conversation for the development of ideas and opinion. A private opinion shared in a private
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space is as important as public opinion shared in public space. A private opinion should be free
from  the  view,  and  undesired  influence,  of  other  citizens,  civil  society,  governments  and
corporations. This is vital to allow people the intimacy and creativity to build an informed sense
of  self  and society  (Clarke 1997;  Kreiss  and Howard,  2010;  McGarvey,  2011;  Odoemelam,
2015).
Insights from the data may be used for legitimising the actions of the organisations as
delegates but if it does not truly reflect the citizen's public desires the data will lose value as it
leads to decisions not intended or authorised by the constituency. The data double is also often
created without the explicit knowledge or consent of the individual for this use of their data. For
example,  so-called  “public  data”  from public  internet  platforms  (boyd and Crawford,  2012),
usually reveals actions in relation to questions asked by the platform for furthering their goals,
for example, what business Facebook aims to generate compared to the political preferences a
campaigning organisation might want to trace. This is also relevant as more and more data is
purchased or transferred from other organisations, departments or private companies (Kreiss and
Howard, 2010).  This is an issue for trustees and delegates as the data double is not actually the
individual themselves, but a representation of them based on whatever the question asker wanted
to know - such as what would bring the platform more revenue.
A  limited  understanding  of  the  constituency  does  not  allow  delegates  to  give  this
constituency access to full  or complex activities,  instead can only provide them with limited
opportunities.  As Han (2014) describes this is the important  difference between transactional
mobilisation  and  transformational  organising,  respectively  ‘getting  people  to  do  stuff’  and
developing  their  capacity  for  organising  and leadership.  Following data  logic  will  lead  to  a
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necessarily transactional mobilisation rather than transformational organising, though the latter
should be the priority of delegates. Furthermore, there is a tendency in data logic to seek growth,
scale and higher numbers. A focus on scale creates the risk of putting more focus on mobilisation
activities  rather  than  leadership  activities.  Data  logic  may  encourage  a  focus  on  recordable
information.  Simple  actions  are  easier  to  record  against  an  individual’s  profile  and  offline
activities can be more difficult to capture, such as protests, or complex leadership activities and
conversations with friends and family. However, the other issue of reductionism relates to the
entity  of  the data  double,  not  only are  actions  simplified,  but  individuals  are  represented  in
simplistic ways that do not capture them as a whole person.
As Hersh (2015) refers to this, decisions are based on “perceived voters”. This can lead to
the issue of groups of people being targeted on the basis of limited data, as data can regularly be
wrong, due to inaccurate technical systems and reliance on imperfect machines, and because it is
difficult to categorise aspects of humans in ways possible for machines to understand. As Hersh
(2015) describes in his description of political parties use of databases, the representations of
individuals is often inadequate due to the decision about which data to collect, how to use it, and
how it is stored which is at times held in inadequately supported databases that are not used
effectively. These representations lead to people being wrongly targeted or some being missed
out  because  they  do  not  fit  the  groups  created  by  the  categories  (Hersh,  2015).  This
misrepresentation  is  an  issue  for  civil  society  organisations  who  wish  to  create  meaningful
relationships with individuals when these relationships are based on simplified information and a
reductionist  view of the individual,  the data double,  necessarily  simplified by the process of
databases and algorithms that these processes rely upon. A focus on the data double then means
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actions are not on behalf of individuals, so trustees lose their legitimacy, and may not have the
desired impact anyway.
2.5 Conclusion
This research project was inspired by a desire to find a way to understand how the influence of
new data practices, which have led to mass surveillance and associated violations of privacy and
freedom  of  expression,  could  also  be  utilised  in  CSOs.  The  data  practices  have  also  been
presented as advantageous in their use in CSOs to empower them in their engagement with civil
society. These data practices have a distinct nature, which can be understood as an ideal type,
data  logic,  made  up  of  four  principles  -  quantification,  scale,  standardised  processes  and
algorithmic reasoning. Despite criticisms, data logic has become increasingly influential on how
organisations  form knowledge,  including  for  political  communication.  I  question  how these
practices influenced spaces where they are not already prominent and how data logic works with
existing institutional logics. Political representatives may engage with these practices to support
either of two traditional models: the trustee model, which is expert-led, or the delegate model,
which is  audience-led.  These two models  of expert-led or audience-led are both seen in  the
descriptions  of  the  impact  of  data  practices  in  political  communication,  as  well  as  in  the
categorisations  of  CSOs.  The  trustee  and  delegate  models  are  beneficial  to  support  an
understanding in which organisations  may take on either  model,  and there are strengths and
weaknesses to both. Whether the organisations take on a trustee role or a delegate role when
engaging with data logic, they will also devolve decision making to the agents within the data
processes - the technocrats, the algorithms, and the data double. If CSOs do not account for the
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role  of  the three entities,  these entities  can negatively  impact  their  ability  to  carry out  their
desired role as delegates or trustees because it can lead to inaccuracy and a lack of transparency.
Whether data logic supports or hinders the ability for organisations to carry out either an expert-
led or audience-led model based on the concerns laid out in this chapter is at the heart of the
research questions for the empirical research explored in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3. Methodology: two ethnographic case studies
In this chapter, I begin by examining the characteristics of the research problem: the study of the
alignment between the values of an organisation and their personal data practices. In doing so, I
provide a justification for the choice of an ethnographic approach as the most appropriate for this
research  which  investigates  and  develops  a  theory  around  practices  which  are  constantly
changing and under scrutiny. I present the two case studies I choose as having unique features
which can be compared to the research problem: both organisations have a potentially conflictual
relationship  to  new  data-driven  technologies  and  each  has  a  different  approach  to  their
relationship to their constituents. Amnesty is audience-led and a traditional organisation. Tactical
Tech is expert-led and campaigns for a critical approach to technology. I describe the tools of
ethnographic  research  and  how I  utilise  them.  I  also  outline  an  evaluation  of  the  risks  and
limitations of ethnographic research and how they are mitigated in this research. I also include a
section on the indicators and measurements of the research, specific to the questions relating to
the organisation’s self-perceived role in representation,  their approach to data logic and their
relationship to the agents embedded in data processes.
3.1 The Research Questions
In chapter  1,  I  presented  the  aim of  this  research:  to  assess  what  indicators  can be  used  to
differentiate between acceptable and unacceptable data practices, which in turn can be employed
to create a data justice framework for civil society organisations. By reviewing the literature, in
Chapter 2, I presented three different sets of criticisms levelled at the outcomes of data practices.
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The first set of criticisms deals with data logic’s effects on how organisations form knowledge,
and  whether  the  knowledge  that  derives  from these  data  practices  is  the  most  useful  in  all
contexts. The second set of criticisms highlights the problems raised by connecting the collection
and analysis of personal data with surveillance and questions whether data practices can be used
to support an audience-led, delegate model, or only an expert-led, trustee model. Based on these
two models, I derive a framework which presents exemplary practices and principles for how
CSOs engage with data in either governance model. This framework can identify what CSOs’
data practices are and evaluate them against their purported aims, as well as relevant theoretical
debates. The third set of criticisms addresses the inability of organisations to make autonomous
decisions when using data logic, given the role of technocrats, software and the data double, to
whom decision-making is inevitably delegated to when data logic is adhered to. These three
criticisms lead to the following three research questions:
1. Are both the expert-led and the audience-led models in CSOs supported by data-driven
practices?
2.  What are the main factors  that  guide the decisions made by CSOs regarding their
engagement with data practices to support either the expert-led or audience-led models?
3. Is decision-making regarding data practices devolved to agents other than the staff or
constituents within the expert-led or audience-led models?
By answering these questions, I can test and build on a framework to address data justice for
CSOs who wish to engage with data-driven methods.
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3.2 The Advantages of an Ethnographic Approach
To answer  these  three  questions,  I  adopt  an ethnographic  approach.  Howard (2002,  p.  553)
defines  ethnography  as  the  “systematic  description  of  human  behaviour  and  organizational
culture based on first-hand observation”. The research inquiry has three characteristics which I
argue make ethnographic research the best approach to tackling the problem. Firstly, the research
questions aim to develop theory concerning data practices, a task for which an inductive and
qualitative approach is best suited for. Secondly, an ethnography is useful for assessing both
practices and purported values in a group or organization at the same time. Finally, the use of
technology and the study of organisations are both sensitive topics and studying them requires an
approach in which the researcher is embedded within the organisation. These issues are explored
further in this section.
Before describing the advantages of an ethnographic approach for addressing these three
attributes of the research problem, it is helpful to outline what other methods could have been
used for this research and their limits. This discussion not only helps to show why I did not use
these tools but also brings to the forefront aspects of this study that make it particularly suited to
ethnographic  research.  There  are  various  methods  to  understand  practices  or  values  in  an
organization. Practices can be documented through process mapping, interviews, and document
review. However, these methods are separated from the values, beliefs, and other individual or
collective  factors  that  drive  or  guide  these  behaviours.  Mapping  processes  alone  would  not
provide  the  information  needed  to  draw  conclusions  useful  for  analysing  the  theoretical
frameworks that explain why certain data practices take place. To understand the values, beliefs
and  other  personal  factors  that  guide  the  actions  of  individuals,  I  could  have  conducted
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qualitative interviews or surveys. However, these research methods would not document whether
and how these purported values are reflected in current practices. The aim of this research is to
understand how practices, namely data practices, are carried out and whether they align with the
staff’s  values  and perceptions  of  their  own role vis-a-vis  their  constituents.  In  addition,  this
research examines the actions of staff within an organisation who may be self-aware of how they
should appear to others. This is particularly true around their use of technology, an area which is
under public critical review. Therefore, methods which are as close as possible to members of
staff’s everyday working routines and practices are best suited to capture any differences between
how people talk about what they do and what they actually do.
The first reason why I chose an ethnographic approach is that I aim to develop a theory
for understanding which data practices are acceptable for CSOs to undertake. The criticisms of
data practices which need to be addressed are complex and overlapping, and to this end, I have
proposed  a  framework  that  includes  a  separate  analysis  of  the  role  of  different  agents
(technocrats,  software,  and  the  data  double)  in  carrying  out  data  practices.  I  believe  it  is
important to secure a nuanced and comprehensive understanding of the interrelations between all
three  criticisms  to  build  theory  which  can  unpack  and  reformulate  understandings  of  data
practices. To build this theory, empirical research should have adequate space to examine the
connections between these different aspects and for challenges to the proposed framework. For
this  theoretical  development,  an  ethnographic  approach  allowed  me  to  examine  the  context
surrounding the findings, which can help develop a comprehensive theory. Halperin and Heath
(2012, p. 290) outline how the exploratory and inductive nature of ethnographies make them
particularly  useful  for understanding “difficult  to  define or  multifaceted  phenomena”.  In this
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case, the research involves three theories (data logic, the trustee and delegate models, and the
three agents) which are not only complex in themselves but have rarely been separated to put
into dialogue with each other in this way. This research aims to uncover whether theories around
data practices hold up in practice or the observations reveal contradictory or additional values
and behaviours that would suggest the theory should be changed. This endeavour requires that
the researcher is embedded in a relevant community to understand these decisions and practices.
This is only possible through the long-term and real-time observations  that  are an important
component of ethnographic research.
The second requirement of this research which an ethnography is particularly well suited
to is to understand the connections between the values held by CSO staff and the practices they
carry out. Context is not a singular moment: team dynamics, resources and emotional states are a
few of the many aspects that constitute, and constantly change, the context in which decisions
are made. A major tenet of an ethnographic approach is thick description (Geertz, c1973.) which
puts behaviour in context, capturing and describing the details of a situation: the atmosphere,
environment,  personalities,  relationships  as  well  as  values,  beliefs  and  attitudes  expressed.
Therefore,  an ethnographic approach can document values  and beliefs  in relation  to practice
rather than independently of each other. The context-heavy descriptions will help us understand
how different data practices come about. The documentation of behaviours and attitudes helps
comprehend how an organization’s desired outcomes align with its data practices. This approach
can  provide  an  understanding  of  nuanced  power  dynamics  and  differences  in  values  and
behaviours between individuals (Boswell et al., 2017). By embedding myself in the field as an
ethnographer, I could also gain access to intimate or hidden spaces and unscheduled activities
116
(Munck & Sobo, 1998) which increases the number and variety of contexts I could assess.
The hidden contexts I was able to observe as an ethnographer are important for the final
characteristic which defines this research and the need for an ethnographic approach: the study of
elites  and  technology.  Not  only  are  elites,  the  CSO  staff,  more  likely  to  wish  to  present
themselves in a certain way to outsiders of the organisation, those using technology are also keen
to either show their successful engagement with these tools, or their keen awareness of privacy
concerns. There are so many public criticisms of the use of personal data and approaches to data
are therefore a particularly sensitive topic. Therefore, practitioners involved with data practices
may be inclined to overstate their understanding or their  ethical  assessment of the topic.  An
ethnographic  approach is  particularly  well  suited  to  shed light  on  the  context  and decision-
making of the elites (Halperin and Heath, 2012, p. 298). An ethnography can achieve these goals,
not only by opening up for scrutiny normally hidden meetings and spaces but also by being
carried out over a length of time. The time duration of an ethnography is useful as practitioners’
desire to be seen to be doing the right thing will fade as they have to carry on with their work and
their behaviour will normalise over time (Nielsen, 2012). The data can be collected in real-time
with first-hand observer status to understand what practitioners say they do as well as what they
actually do in practice (Halperin and Heath, 2012, p.298).
Combining  these  characteristics,  an  ethnography  supports  building  a  practice-based
theory.  In  particular,  a  space  to  develop  theory  is  particularly  important  for  researching
technology and political communication, given that many assumptions of this field are drawn
from research  into  traditional  communication  methods  (Karpf  et  al,  2015).  An ethnographic
approach can help demystify the use of technology by engaging with it to the extent that the
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ethnographer embeds herself in a community, first to become familiar with it, then to extract
themselves from it and communicate new insights about this community, and the broader field it
belongs to, to others (Boswell et al., 2017; Halperin and Heath, 2012, p. 298). There is a mystery
implicit  in  the  nature  of  data  logic  itself:  faith  is  placed  in  data  to  provide  the  truth,
unquestioning black-box algorithms and opaque processes (Kitchin, 2014). There are parallels in
this  research with  Latour  and Woolgar’s  ethnographic  study in Laboratory  Life,  where they
argue (1979, p.13-14) “It is sometimes discouraging that although we dedicate our lives to the
extension of knowledge... the work of individual scientists, or the work of scientists in general, is
often understood only in a sort of magical or mystical way.” This research aims to demystify the
similarly  blind  trust  for  the  work  of  data  scientists  and  algorithms  that  is  common  in
contemporary public debates. To achieve this goal, my study aims to unpack what goes into the
decision-making and processes by which important CSOs employ data practices.
Ethnography is a particularly helpful method to investigate elites’ values and practices
because links between elites’ behaviours and their assumptions have often provided inconsistent
findings,  highlighting  how  complex  the  connection  between  elite  behaviour  and  values  is
(Boswell  et  al.,  2017).  Researchers  have  employed  the  ethnographic  method  to  show  that
technology and its use by different political elites is complex and multifaceted and often defies
simplistic assumptions. For example,  Nielsen’s Ground Wars (2012) presents an ethnography
which challenges  the understandings  of political  campaigning,  uncovering  an account  of  the
importance  of  personalised  communications  for  political  campaigning  and  the  complex
assemblages  that  are  required  to  enable  these  endeavours.  The  ethnographic  approach  can
support the inductive research necessary to develop new ideas in a field where the disruption
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brought about by new technologies threatens to unsettle many key assumptions (Karpf et al.,
2015; Bennet and Pfetsch, 2018). An ethnography can be particularly helpful in this effort as the
open  questioning  style  of  an  ethnographer’s  approach  gives  space  for  answers  that  are  not
entrenched in previous knowledge (Howard, 2002). Ethnography allows for ideas and concepts
to be documented in the language of the observed participants, thus making available data that is
outside of the theoretical framework.
3.3 Limitations, Risks and Mitigation Strategies
There are drawbacks to all social science research methods and ethnographies are no exception.
Ethnographic research in particular relies on less standardised analysis and instead places greater
emphasis  on  the  interpretations  of  the  researcher  (Halperin  and  Heath,  2012,  p.  302).
Importantly,  interpretation  is  also  a  necessary  and  valued  aspect  of  ethnography:  “what  is
interpretive of is the flow of social discourse; and the interpreting involved consists in trying to
rescue the ‘said’ of such discourse from its perishing occasions and fix it in perusable terms”
(Geertz,  1973,  p.23).  Halperin  and Heath (2012,  p.  290)  describe  the  value  of  ethnographic
interpretation for meaning-making as “a valuable addition to knowledge in its own right”. Hence,
in my analysis, I did not aim to remove interpretation but accounted as best as possible for the
potential  of  biased  interpretations  on  my  part.  However,  decisions  in  both  qualitative  and
quantitative research always require some forms of interpretation which can bring in biases, for
example when the researcher makes decisions on what data to collect, what to retain and how to
analyse it (Latour and Woolgar, 2013; Gelman and Loken, 2014; Boswell et al., 2017).
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In presenting my analysis, I outline as clearly as possible the prompts or metrics of what
is being measured, as well as specifying how they are drawn from the literature. Furthermore,
while  emotions  do  not  necessarily  dominate  the  research  simply  because  it  is  interpretative
(Geertz,  c1973.), and in this case, as a researcher who has worked at the organisations I am
aware  that  while  I  may  have biases,  I  do  not  have an  agenda to  prove the  success  of  any
organisation or technique.  Nevertheless,  I recorded my own experiences  and emotions in the
field notes so I could reflect, to the best of my ability, where my own biases may have occurred.
A threat to the ability of the ethnographer to interpret evidence without bias is that by immersing
herself in a community, the researcher can end up “going native”. As a result, the researcher can
become unable to balance between good relations and the capacity for critical analysis (Halperin
and Heath, 2012, p.301). This problem could obstruct the ability to make the necessary critical
and  theoretical  analysis  of  the  work.  I  limited  this  risk  by  continuing  conversations  with
academics, including my supervisors and within academic spaces such as conferences, so as to
retain  the  aspects  of  my  identity  as  a  researcher  that  allow  for  critical  analysis.  Finally,  I
triangulated my ethnographic data by gathering observations, interviews, document reviews and
comparative fieldwork together to allow for cross-analysis of any findings.
The  purpose  of  observation  is  to  avoid  aspirational  answers  given in  interviews  and
surveys; observation can counteract, to some extent, participants’ giving their desired response
(Boswell,  2017).  However,  an  ethnographer's  presence  can  also  have  an  impact  on  the
organisation,  especially  as  I  was  being  open  about  my  purpose  which  may  have  led  the
participants to provide answers based on what they perceived to be desirable (Bryman, 2004).
The ethnographer may also impact what work the organisation is doing by providing information
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from their research or feedback. Again, the value of ethnography is also in this ability to both
observe and participate.  As the researcher,  I  could mitigate  the effect  by accounting  for  my
actions  and  reflecting  on  my  role  and  the  interactions  with  me  within  the  analysis  and
presentation of the findings (Howard, 2002, p. 555). Another possibility was to document data
practices at the start and end of my fieldwork to record differences over time and the role I might
have  played  in  causing  them.  However,  simply  finding  and  documenting  some  of  the  data
practices itself took the whole time of my research, so instead, I examined in interviews and
observations  if  the  language  I  had  used  was  being  picked  up  and  reflected  in  future
conversations. There are also potential harms to participants, which were clearly outlined in my
consent form outlined in Appendix C. Everyone taking part had the option to remain anonymous
and to review anything they are named in before publication of the thesis or future publications.
All information was kept in an anonymised and encrypted format.
It can be complex to draw generalisations from ethnographies. The rich and deep nature
of the observed data, valuable for understanding the context, also reveals the specific aspects of
the research that make it less translatable to another context. Further, the fieldwork observations
sacrifice control over the situation, potentially making it unrepeatable (Howard, 2002, pp. 557-
558). This is particularly true when researching technology, which provides challenges of its
own. Karpf (2012) highlights that the speed of change in digital technologies, which he terms
“internet time”, creates complexities for research, among which the risk of quickly becoming
irrelevant because the technology it focuses on changes in the timespan between fieldwork and
publication. I took great care in documenting the specific features of organisations and context,
including the time and technologies in use during my fieldwork, to allow anyone looking at the
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research to understand if parallels can be drawn to another context and different developmental
stages of the relevant technologies. The replicability issue will also be dealt with through the
comparison of the two cases, considering the commonalities and differences in each organisation.
3.4 Case Studies: A Comparison of Two Ethnographies
Comparative ethnographies have previously been used to examine attitudes and behaviours of
individuals from various backgrounds and with different approaches to the same phenomenon
(Blumler  and  Gurevitch,  2002;  Burnham  et  al.,  2008;  van  Biezen  and  Caramani  2006).
Alongside  the  rich  data  of  ethnography  relating  to  values  and  attitudes,  differences  and
similarities between different organisations can be explored surrounding new data technologies.
The research problem has two important elements which I draw on to choose the case studies.
The  first  element  is  to  understand  how data  is  used  in  relation  to  its  support  for  either  an
audience-led delegate or expert-led trustee model by choosing an organisation which would be
expected to predominantly act according to each model. The second element is to understand the
unquestioned adoption  of  data logic,  for which  I  choose two least-likely  cases  (Gerring and
Seawright, 2007), that is, two organisations that are unlikely to have extensively adopted data
logic. This choice enables this study to explore tensions around the adoption of data logic and
areas where data logic prevails, even amidst a relatively hostile context. This approach also helps
further scrutinize theories that have been well documented in contexts more favourable to the use
of data logic than the ones I study. The least-likely case studies I focus on will help test the
assumptions of these theories in a more robust way than studies of most-likely cases have been
able to do (Rodriguez, 1998).
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To this end, I chose two organisations that correspond to, and understand themselves as
embodying, the trustee model, Tactical Tech, and the delegate model, Amnesty International.
The decision to describe Amnesty as adhering to a delegate model and Tactical Tech as trustee
was  made  prior  to  the  start  of  the  research.  I  classified  these  organizations  based  on  their
governance structures, style of campaigns, and public-facing materials. There has already been
descriptive research on the use of data to support CSOs that mainly perform the delegate role
(such as Karpf, 2017), but little on how a trustee organisation may use data undertaking the
practices  synonymous with surveillance.  Not only can examining a trustee organisation help
shed light on how they might use personal data but by comparing both, it is also possible to
examine  whether  these  practices  can  be  distinguished  as  demonstrated  in  the  framework
presented  in  the literature  review.  The case studies can also help confirm how data logic is
understood and performed in an organisation with older logics, helping identify when data logic
is complementary with older logic or when it is contradictory and therefore exclusive from older
logics,  and  therefore  when  and  where  data  logic  has  influence.  Secondly,  I  choose  an
organisation which was founded in the digital age, but which has an openly critical approach to
surveillance, and therefore will show what values are influential when an organisation navigates
the prevailing influence of data practices. Amnesty International, the delegate organisation, is a
traditional  organization  with  practices  which  predate  the  advent  of  data  logic.  Tactical
Technology Collective, the trustee organisation, approaches technology with a critical approach
at the forefront of their campaigns.
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Amnesty International
The  first  case  study  is  Amnesty  International  (Amnesty).  Amnesty  is  an  international  non-
governmental organisation campaigning for human rights. The organisation started in 1961 when
Peter Benenson published an article in the Observer newspaper calling for an appeal to action to
release two Portuguese students who he believed to be unfairly imprisoned. The organisation
grew as people around the world became interested in setting up and running their own active
groups with the same aim of working on prisoners of conscience and later a broader set of human
rights campaigns.  Amnesty’s brand is well-known and their  successes range from campaigns
freeing  prisoners  of  conscience  to  policy  change such as  the  ratification  of  the Arms Trade
Treaty  in  December  2014  in  which  over  100  countries  signed  to  agree  to  strict  rules  on
international arms transfers.
The structure of Amnesty International enables the organisation to perform a delegate
role  on an international  scale.  Within  a  federated  structure,  the  international  office conducts
research,  facilitates  the setting of the organisation's  agenda and the activities  of the national
offices. The international office is situated in London and five other regional offices. There are
over 70 national offices around the world and members are registered as part of these offices. The
majority of their funding comes from members while the rest is made up of a few specific grants
and large one-off donations. The agenda is set at the International Council Meeting which is
made  up of  around 500 delegates  elected  by  members.  Amnesty  is  also  a  case  which  may
demonstrate tensions in where data logic is influential because they are a traditional organisation,
founded in 1961, and has  developed practices  using traditional  communication  methods and
accompanying logics. Further, Amnesty has run influential campaigns on the unethical use of
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data  in  surveillance  techniques  from various  governments.  For  example,  after  the  Snowden
revelations  on  mass  surveillance  by  the  UK government,  Amnesty  joined  other  CSOs  in  a
lawsuit  against  the  GCHQ for  surveilling  Amnesty  staff.  The  campaigns  place  privacy  and
freedom of expression as central rights to the organisation’s values and within staff knowledge
when they make decisions on how to use personal data.
Tactical Technology Collective
Tactical  Technology Collective  (Tactical  Tech)  was founded in  2003 to  serve  human rights
defenders  by  improving  access  to  information  about  how  best  to  engage  with  technology.
Originally, the organisation performed a meta-role within civil society working to support other
CSOs and activists in their use of technology. In this capacity, Tactical Tech’s staff served as
experts designing tools and resources for other CSOs to navigate the use of technology in their
work, such as Maps for Advocacy a tool for understanding how to use online digital maps, and
other online media, to carry out investigations and Security in a Box, a resource for activists to
learn how secure their  information.  Recently,  Tactical  Technology has shifted their  focus to
include a public audience. For example, the Data Detox Kit is a public education tool on how to
protect  our  personal  data  and  The  Glassroom which  is  a  public-facing  art  and  education
exhibition for the public to learn about wider context and impact of digital technologies.
Tactical  Tech’s  governance  and  finance  structure  enable  the  organisation  to
predominantly perform a trustee role. Firstly, the organisation is governed through a supervisory
board, who approve the strategy and long-term work plans created in conjunction with the staff
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in the organisation. Secondly, Tactical Tech is funded through foundations and grants in which
money is provided for specific projects or core funding which supports the organisation’s overall
maintenance.  By examining their  practices,  I  hope to be able to  test  the ability  of  a  trustee
organisation to effectively engage with data practices without falling foul to the risks associated
with surveillance. Tactical Tech originally worked on projects which aimed to support activists
and  NGOs  in  using  technology  strategically  in  their  work.  Strategically  using  technology
involved a critical questioning of the risks involved too, which has become an increasing part of
their work including creative projects on various risks of technologies such as the violation of
privacy, misinformation, and the role of big-business in ubiquitous technologies. 
3.5 Indicators
In this section, I describe the indicators, drawn from the literature, which I use both for guiding
the collection of data and for carrying out analysis of the data. Due to the nature of ethnographic
approaches, analysis is not only carried out when coding the findings but also when choosing
what contexts and scenarios I  should follow (Saldana,  2015).  Furthermore,  the nature of the
research can change based on inputs from the context over the period it takes place. The object of
research  does  not  change,  but  the  terms  and  indicators  change  based  on  the  language  and
contexts  of  the  organisation.  To  give  objective  structure  to  interpretive  observation,  I
extrapolated from the literature a variety of metrics that enabled me to structure the gathering
and analysing  of  field notes—two activities  that  in  ethnographies  often blur  into each other
(Halperin and Heath, 2012, p.303; Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). In this section, I lay out the
principles which guided the questions I asked, as well as detailing how I used the measurement
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tools I developed. A detailed table of indicators can be found in Appendix B.
Constituency  Communication:  To  understand  whether  the  organisation  desired  to  perform a
trustee  or  delegate  role  when using  data,  I  examined  their  perceived  relationship  with  their
audience.  I  looked  for  indicators  of  these  patterns  in  the  language  they  use  around  their
constituents  (members,  activists,  supporters, donors,  audience,  constituents)  as well  as where
constituents  sit  in  terms of decision-making processes,  and when and how the organisations
decided  to  interact  with  constituents.  I  also  asked  what  members  of  staff  considered  their
relationship and advantage to the audience was, as well as what they looked to benefit from when
communicating with their audience. From this starting point I began to develop codes specific to
the  organisations  -  for  example,  at  Amnesty  there  were  commonly  used  terms  to  describe
constituents based on the action they provided for the organisation, such as donors who provide
donations, or action takers for those who sign petitions. These are detailed in the findings in
chapter 4. Further, Amnesty regularly referenced themselves as a movement or an institution,
and through these symbolic terms, I could examine the rest of their work. These concepts and
labels, on reflection, fit well into the themes already set out from the literature of organisations
who are staff-led and those who are constituent-led. The staff at Tactical Tech did not term their
audiences  so clearly  leading  to  a  need for  a  more  nuanced  approach to  understanding  their
relationship  with  different  audiences.  Their  relationship  with  their  audience  was  found  in
examining  practices,  for  which  the  participant  as  observer  role  within  the  ethnography  was
particularly useful, coded in relation to what their outcomes were in accordance with the ladder
of  participation  (Arnstein,  1969).  As  is  shown  in  chapter  5,  the  organisation  had  several
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relationships  from public  audiences,  expert  investigators,  partnerships  with  CSOs and media
relationships, which they involved in different ways in their decision making processes.
Data Logic: To examine the principles of data logic, I looked to the parts of the organisation in
which communication with the audiences was important and examined the tools and techniques
used. This inquiry allowed me to get a sense of what I was looking for - what software they were
using, what tools they used and when they were used. From this standpoint, I could look at the
values, attitudes and emotions surrounding these. I focused on documenting any instances which
show value in the four principles surrounding data practices: quantification - where anything has
been  described  as  a  numerical  value;  scale -  where  there  is  a  tendency  to  prioritise  large
quantities of data; technical standardised processes - use of algorithms or other technologies to
process data; and algorithmic reasoning - a belief in the ability to control outputs by engineering
the right process of testing or optimisation. As I examined scenarios where the data practices
might be expected to be found in decision-making, I could also examine both the tools and the
values that are present when organisations did not engage with data logic. The analysis  was
guided by the object of study - situations where data logic is present, and situations where it was
not. The coding around these instances was inductive, allowing an understanding of the different
values and principles surrounding the level and style of engagement with data practices. In both
organisations, I was clear about the object of the research - data technologies - and would be
guided immediately by people’s reactions illustrating where they believed this was very clearly a
part of their work, or where they believed it was not at all. At Amnesty, I examined situations
where reference to data logic was present, whether it was because it was present or because it
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was explicitly rejected. At Tactical Tech I examined the use of data practices in communication
of a few different projects, from the strategy-setting to implementation level. My fieldwork at
Tactical Tech was enlightened by the research I had previously conducted at Amnesty, so I could
look to the same spaces to see if the two organisations used data in the same way.
Agents in decision-making: I also examined who was involved in decision-making with attention
to the role of three agents: the technocrats, the software, and the data double. I investigated how
the elites in the organisation relate to the agents, such as whether this relationship is conscious or
accidental,  and  what  values  guide  the  decisions  that  lead  to  these  relationships.  For  the
technocrats  I looked for data scientists,  programmers working with the data and people who
work with data-driven channels such as digital communications roles. At Amnesty, as with the
instances of data logic, the staff themselves guided me in relation to the people they believed to
be in control of data and those who did not. Their signposts guided my areas of analysis and
methods of coding based on the job roles and practices of these staff members. At Tactical Tech,
I went in expecting to find a similar division of labour among the staff, but as I ended up finding
a very different language and set of relationships, I had to start with the technologies and work
backwards to see who had the expertise to use them.
For software, I looked for the expected programs that had already been documented in
previous literature: Customer relationship management systems, mailing lists, analytics software,
and online platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. In terms of the organisations' relationships
with software, I examined at what point in decision-making they were engaged with, and as a
participant  as  observer,  I  was  in  a  particularly  privileged  position  to  understand  within  the
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process at what points and what values led both organisations to engage with different tools. As
software tools are not human-agents, I did not seek to follow them, but the individuals around
them, to document their attitudes and emotions when engaging with the technology.
Finally, for the data double, I looked for representation of the organisation’s audiences’
behaviours, demographics and opinions. I used the common understanding from the literature to
know what to look for: in particular, profiles in databases, website analytics, and social media
metrics (Kreiss, 2016; Karpf, 2017). At Amnesty, as I was initially assigned to a specific project,
this project provided further ideas of the data double around metrics of representing the whole
organisation - in line with how new CSOs use data - such as membership numbers or number of
donations. These additional indicators were added into my code guide. At Tactical Tech, where
quantified  metrics  turned  out  to  be  rare,  I  examined  audiences  and  associated  data  the
organisation  used  to  consider  what  the  alternatives  to  quantification  were.  I  also  directly
questioned the organisation on why it decided not to use data to assess the values and perceptions
relating to the absence of data logic and data practices. The ethnographic approach allowed me to
assess  the  empirical  validity  of  these  claims  in  actual  practice.  In  both  organisations,  these
approaches enabled me to examine the values of those using the terms, creating codes from their
terms and then creating ways to connect these to understanding themes.
3.6 The Method
An ethnography involves  various  tools  as  part  of  the  method and generally  take place  over
weeks, months, or even years. Various tools can be used in conjunction, which together forms
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the specific ethnographic method design. The set of tools is adaptable for gaining proximity to
different contexts (Ridge-Newman, 2014, p.44). The tools include overt and covert participant
observation, ethnographic interviewing, memoirs, focus groups, archival research and surveys
(Hammersley  and  Atkinson,  2007;  Halperin  and  Heath,  2012;  Boswell  et  al.,  2017).  As
Hammersley and Atkinson (2007, p.45) write: 
Ethnography usually involves the researcher participating, overtly or covertly, in people’s
daily lives for an extended period of time, watching what happens, listening to what is
said,  and/or  asking  questions  through  informal  and  formal  interviews,  collecting
documents  and artefacts  –  in  fact,  gathering  whatever  data are generally  available  to
throw light on the issues that are the emerging focus of inquiry.
For  this  research,  I  will  combine first-hand observation,  formal and informal  interviews and
collection of written texts over several months in the two different organisations. 
I conducted both observations and interviews to collect stories and obtain personalised
detailed information on attitudes and values. The information in these stories built the picture of
where I would next sit for observations and with whom I next conducted interviews. Informal
conversations  provide  signposts  for  topics,  individuals,  groups  or  other  contexts  within  the
organisation that require more in-depth observation (Howard, 2002). I also reviewed internal
documents  to  understand  how  information  is  presented  and  communicated  between  the
individuals under observation as well as their conversations and behaviours. I considered each
source of data I observed - individuals or groups, official documents and informal texts such as
emails - as agents and actors in their own way that interact with others within the organisation.
The observations  were collected through the traditional  method of field notes.  I  wrote notes
every day reflecting on my role as a researcher, what I observed and what I believe this meant. I
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used indicators described later in this chapter to guide what contexts I pursued and which people
I chose to interview.
The stages of the research were gaining access, building rapport, observation, interviews,
and analysis. At Amnesty, I had access to the organisation for three days a week for six months.
This stage took place from September 2017 to March 2018, as shown in Figure 3.1 below. In
December, I was not able to conduct research as consistently due to the holidays of staff, as well
as my own. At Tactical Tech, I carried out research from their office in Berlin over three days a
week for four months which took place from May to September 2018, as shown in Figure 3.2.
There was a time before each of these ethnographies took place in which I was in contact with
the organisation to gain this access. The analysis took place after each ethnography ended.
Figure 3.1 Timeline of research method carried out at Amnesty
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Figure 3.2 Timeline of research method carried out at Tactical Tech
Gaining Access
The first  stage of the research was to  gain access  to  the organisations  which,  given that  an
ethnography  can  be  quite  invasive,  can  be  difficult  (Hammersley  &  Atkinson,  1995).  At
Amnesty, I had previously worked at the organisation from August 2011 to August 2015. My
previous  connections  with  staff  and  knowledge  of  how the  organisation  works  gave  me an
advantage in first accessing someone within the organisation. I initially sent my proposal to an
ex-colleague who worked there to ask for their  advice on my approach. They advised that I
changed some of  the language to  be  more  in  line  with  the  current  internal  language of  the
organisation -  referencing specific audiences  and teams such as the growth and membership
team.  I  then  contacted  a  senior  manager  with  the  revised  proposal,  with  the  aim  to  gain
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permission from the managerial level. This approach had two advantages, firstly, to ensure that
the research had consent from someone who could represent the organisation and secondly, to
ensure that I carried the authority of management if anyone was nervous about my presence in
the office or meetings.
The senior management met me with another staff member who worked on technology
education for the organisation, and who as a result they believed would be most relevant for my
research, to discuss what my research would entail. The staff were concerned that I would not
have anything to do once inside the organisation, and would require their time to support me, but
I reassured them by explaining that I would make contacts myself and do my own desk research.
So they would understand where I would be working, I was placed as an observer to a specific
project,  named “Goal  5”,  that  staff thought most  relevant  to  my research.  Starting from this
meeting, I began taking notes as part of my observation. Though the staff accepted my role as a
researcher within the organisation quickly, logistical issues such as identifying who would be the
main contact for my work and providing me access to the building meant it took almost two
months before I could officially start the research.
At Tactical Tech, I was already in touch with the organisation because I had previously
carried out a few days of research work for the organisation at the end of 2017 and the start of
2018. In March 2018, I approached the organisation, with less knowledge of the staff as I did at
Amnesty, but already with a contact, and asked if I could carry out research with them from their
offices in  Berlin.  In  this  case,  I  provided the manager  with an overview of the aims of  the
research. The manager agreed, saying that they assumed I would not be able to do too much as
they  do  not  use  analytics  very  much,  but  that  they  welcomed  transparency.  I  took  this
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information on board to note the usefulness of a least likely case who are open to discuss their
rejection of data logic. The agreement involved me continuing work at the organisation during
the three days a week I was also carrying out observations, and I, therefore, travelled to Tactical
Tech’s offices in Berlin. From this meeting, I began to take ethnographic notes.
Building Rapport
The next stage of the research in both organisations was to generate rapport with the staff. This
endeavour required impression management, in which I ensured the staff trusted my intentions
and were comfortable with my presence (Gengler, 2018). At Amnesty, the offices are over four
floors and there are over 100 staff. I sat on the fourth floor with the team I was allocated to and
within that space, I reintroduced myself to old colleagues and I introduced myself to anyone I did
not know. I would explain my research in a broad way which I perfected over time, to allow both
those with technical and non-technical expertise to understand why I was there and what I was
doing. This introduction described my interest in how the organisation uses data such as from
online analytics. I spent some time in the first few weeks conducting desk research, allowing the
team to become used to my presence. During this time, I was also presented with introductory
documents such as team overviews and templates used by the team. However, it took a couple of
months before I was invited to any meetings. This lack of access to meetings was because of the
sense that the meetings would discuss sensitive topics that I was not yet to overhear and because
the staff were often busy and would not invite me to a meeting unless I requested access.
The Tactical Tech office is smaller, with between 25-30 staff over two floors. When I
began, I sent an email to all staff to describe my background and my research, also ensuring
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everyone knew I was available to talk if they had any questions. I went for lunch with staff
members to get to know the team, and the staff members often approached me first. As I had just
recently done work with the office and continued to work on projects  while there (described
further in the next section), many of the staff were keen to get to know me in relation to these
projects, and during these meetings, I would also begin discussing my research. I introduced my
research with the same broad description I used at Amnesty and found that people at Tactical
Tech were often quick to  provide their  own opinions which turned into conversations  about
research, data and transparency. Both Amnesty and Tactical Tech welcomed the transparency
that my research could provide on their activities and were keen not only to support my research
but to understand its meaning for their own work.
Observer as Participant and Participant as Observer
As Delamont  (2004,  p.  218)  writes,  ethnographies  are  about  watching  and  interacting  with
people to understand what they are doing, thinking and saying in order to capture how they
understand the world. To do this, I carried out first-hand observation in both organisations. First-
hand observation within an ethnography allows the researcher to create a systematic description
of behaviours in a certain context, such as within a community or organisation (Howard, 2002;
Brewer, 2000). To carry out observations, there are various roles a researcher can take in an
organisation,  outlined succinctly as four types by Gold (1958). The complete participant is a
member of a community and conceals their role as a researcher from the group, allowing covert
documentation of their  behaviours and preventing any changes that might happen due to the
awareness of an observer. The participant as observer is a member of the community and the
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group is aware of them as a researcher. In this case, the participant participates in activities as
part of the group and can engage with the values of the group through these methods, but the
group are aware of their role as a researcher. The third role swaps these terms as observer as
participant. The researcher can be in the same spaces and activities as the participants but she is
there predominantly to observe rather than to participate. Again, with this role, the participants
know that the researcher is there but do not consider her as one of them. Finally, the complete
observer is hidden from the participants in some way and watches their activities from outside. In
this  case,  the participants  will  not know the research is  being carried out and the researcher
cannot interfere with the participants’ activities.
For  this  research,  I  take  on both  the  role  of  participant  as  observer  and observer  as
participant at Amnesty and the role of observer as participant at Tactical Tech. I took on both at
Amnesty as the opportunity arose later in the research to take on the second role as they offered
me work for a month. I took on the role only of observer as participant at Tactical Tech as this
was the prerequisite for the access to the organisation, but this also allowed me to get more
involved in meetings and decisions from the start and allowed for a shorter time to integrate into
the practices and begin observation. The roles allow me to embed myself within the community
of the organisation so I can observe not just the outcomes or face value of decisions but also
understand the beliefs at the heart of them. I can ascertain the meaning of signals not just in the
content  of language or emotions which align easily with the content  expressed,  but also the
nuances  of  their  cultural  expressions.  These  two  roles  allow  me  to  interact  closely  with
individuals  in  the  organisation,  and  understand  group  activities,  without  becoming  overly
involved or depended upon by the organisation (Adler and Adler, 1987). This involves active
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observation, informal conversations and detailed field notes (DeWalt and DeWalt, 2002). I also
did not wish to go for either observer role which would involve observation without making
myself known as a researcher. This is, in part, this research is important to me partly because of
my own concerns regarding privacy. I am aware that to examine the collection and analysis of
data, I too must go about the collection and analysis of data. To carry out the collection of data
from anyone  without  their  consent,  which  under  no  circumstances  I  could  argue  would  be
proportionately necessary, would go against the principles I have highlighted in the literature
review.
At Amnesty, between September 2017 and February 2018, I took the role of participant
as observer. I spent most of my time sat with the strategy end evaluation team on the fourth floor,
which was close to the fundraising team, and due to this spent most of my time with these two
teams. I then managed to have interviews or join meetings with digital communications, IT, and
campaigns. It took just over a month before I was invited to meetings, and overall, attendance to
meetings was restricted, partly down to a desire to ensure the meetings could flow naturally and
discuss sensitive content without an observer,  and partly due to my ability  to push for more
information and access, which increased as I became more embedded in the organisation. I was
initially invited to some meetings relating to the original project I had been assigned to and an
additional two meetings relating to data plans. When I did attend a meeting, most documents
relating to it were shared with me.
During March, the strategy and evaluation team at Amnesty asked me to carry out some
qualitative data analysis on the annual organisational evaluations, at which point I became an
observer as participant. The team already had a budget set aside for extra resources during the
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analysis stage and asked me to perform these tasks as I had been sat with the team during the last
few months. I carried out analysis over a few weeks, sitting and working with the team. This
helped me gain access to meetings that I was not able to see before and to take part in a day-to-
day  task  they  have  allowed  me  to  understand  the  organisation’s  decisions  from within  the
process. I continued to journal every day reflecting on the critical questions arising from my
literature review to remain focused during this time. There was little perceptible change in the
staff’s attitudes and behaviours expressed around me but there was more access to meetings and
decision-making moments.
At Tactical Tech, I took on the role as observer as participant during all four months.
Taking an observer as participant role allowed me faster access to meetings and a shorter time to
build rapport. As the office is small I found myself able to talk across all teams - which are
organisational,  cross-project  or  project-based.  As  I  was  also  working  at  the  organisation,  I
attended all staff meetings and all meetings around the one project I worked on as a researcher.
During the time I worked three days a week in the office simultaneously carrying out research
and working for the research project. I carried out the tasks set for the work objectives I had,
interacting with data myself when it  was part  of the expectations of the job role.  I used my
position to embed myself in the context and observe other teams and focused the field notes on
my reflections on the values and culture in the organisations, and the observations of practices of
teams and projects around me. Spending no time at all as participant as observer, I found it hard




I used semi-structured, open-question interviews both to discover what areas might be of interest
for deeper discussion and observation and to unpack participants’ attitudes and uncover actions
within processes that might not be visible. I used open-ended questions which are useful to allow
the participants to reflect their point of view in the way they would prefer to, framing knowledge
in their own way, and consequently also providing space for them to reveal unexpected details
(Aberbach  and Rockman,  2002,  p.674).  At  Amnesty,  I  conducted  21  interviews,  varying  in
formality depending on the seniority of the individual. The more senior the role, the more the
format adhered to a traditional question and answer format, whereas members of staff who were
less senior were comfortable enough to have a more relaxed discussion. The flexibility of format
and venue for interviews supported comfort and ease of communications, ranging from in a local
coffee shop or within a meeting room at the organisation. At Tactical Tech, I conducted eight
interviews, which cover a third of the staff, with the same structure of questions as at Amnesty
and varying in the formality of location depending on the seniority of the individual, again from
cafes to meeting rooms, based on their preference. The interviewee list for both organisations can
be found in Appendix A. The questions  which I  used to  initially  guide the interviews were
guided by the indicators, explored in the next section.
Analysis
Ethnographic research leads to a body of evidence generated and analysed through indicators.
The  final  corpus  of  texts  which  I  analyse  includes  a  collection  of  field  notes  from  my
observations and interactions with staff, documents from the organisation, and the transcripts
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from the interviews with staff. Every few days I would write a journal entry to reflect on what
my findings  so  far  might  mean,  where  to  guide  my next  actions  as  well  as  my role  as  an
ethnographer. These indicators guided the questions I asked in interviews and the areas I tried to
observe in the offices of both organisations. Finally, the indicators guided my analysis, in which I
begin with a theory of the framework and the data agents,  building from the literature.  The
choice of ethnography allows to explore and interrogate the data before and after it is coded,
including  the  aspects  that  contradict  the  theory  and expectations,  and thus  allowing  for  the
development of theory, and therefore themes, as the research continues. This combination of top-
down deductive and bottom-up inductive analysis was crucial to help develop new concepts and
theory, as well as testing existing ones. I iteratively coded the written up-interviews, field notes
and documents as I incorporated them into my corpus. I do not, in the final analysis, quantify the
coding.  The codes  mainly  constitute  a  guide  for  connections  between  themes,  practices  and
values. While it may be significant if a code appears far more than another, I present these results
with the context which gives them significance. If something only appears once, I look to see if it
is an anomaly or culturally important, albeit rarely made explicit, through the analysis of values
available due to the nature of ethnography research. This endeavour became more difficult during
my time at Tactical Tech in Berlin, which was further away from the academic community I was
a part of, and when I finished the research it took a while to take space from the notes to analyse
their meaning.
3.7 Summary 
I have shown how an ethnographic approach is best suited for this research, as it attempts to
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assess the use of data practices against different organisational and societal desired outcomes,
evaluating attitudes and values against behaviours and activities. I have shown how the two case
studies  of  Amnesty  and  Tactical  Tech  compare  against  the  framework  and  discussed  their
appropriateness  as  organisations  to  examine.  I  outlined  which  tools  of  ethnography  I  have
selected and how I went about using them for my data collection. I set out the indicators, drawn
from the literature, that is a descriptive guide for collecting and analysing data from field notes,
interview questions and coding. I also reflected on the limitations of this research, including my
own experiences.
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Chapter 4. Data Logic and Political Representation
In this  chapter,  I  explore the findings of the first  research question:  are both expert-led  and
audience-led models in CSOs communication practices supported by data logic? The literature
review revealed that research on the nature of data logic within political communication focuses
on either one of these approaches, expert-led or audience-led. Firstly, critical data studies and
surveillance studies literature describe how the uptake of data technologies is innately connected
to data collectors using the techniques to monitor and control an audience in an expert-led model  
(Tufecki,  2014; Lyon, 2015).  Yet,  Karpf’s (2017)  Analytic  Activism,  and digital  membership
organisations themselves, are optimistic about the use of data to support audience-led activism. I
draw on the responsive leadership theory, which consists of the trustee and delegate models, to
understand the nuanced benefits and disadvantages of the expert-led and audience-led models
respectively. While all organisations are expected to enact both models at different times under
‘responsive leadership’, I have chosen two organisations and each predominantly corresponds to
one of the two models. Tactical Tech has the structure of a trustee model in which decisions are
made by professionals and they are funded by grants given from other expert-run organisations,
whereas Amnesty has the structure of a delegate model whereby the staff facilitate the members
to  contribute  and  lead  decisions  on  the  strategy,  and  the  organisation  is  mostly  funded  by
members of the public. By examining an organisation more closely aligned with each model, it is
possible to understand whether both models are supported by data logic and what values lead the
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staff in the organisations to use data logic to support either model.
The findings demonstrate how the balance between the trustee and delegate models is
achieved  and  maintained  differently  in  the  two  organisations.  Understanding  this  balance
provides a starting point to delve into the other findings regarding the different data practices
within the organisations. While both organisations did predominantly align with the expected
models,  Tactical  Tech  with  a  trustee  model  and  Amnesty  with  a  delegate  model,  both
organisations also demonstrated a responsive leadership model, where they undertake delegate
and trustee functions in different contexts. Understanding what the organisations choose to take
into account when choosing which role to support with data-driven methods builds nuance, from
the  organisation’s  perspective,  into  the  benefits  and  disadvantages  of  the  expert-led  and
audience-led models. Both CSOs want to listen to certain groups who are already on board with
their overall mission to guide their strategy, and in these cases perform a delegate role, but that
organisations believe there is an advantage to persuading people to demonstrate support for the
decisions they have already made and those who do not already agree with them, in a trustee
role. This is a useful starting point, given that most literature so far has focused on the benefits of
technology for audience-led models  in CSOs such as Karpf (2017) and Dennis (2018).  This
research begins to build the theory and justifications for the use of data-driven technologies to
support an expert-led, trustee approach for CSOs.
Neither organisation uses methods reliant on elements of data logic to support top-level
strategy decision making in either the trustee or delegate models. The findings reject the concept
that  data-driven  practices  have  become  prevalent  such  as  is  presented  in  the  theory  of
surveillance realism (Dencik et al., 2016) as resistance to these data-driven methods is at least
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apparent  in  both  these  organisations  at  the  top  level  of  their  strategy.  However,  both
organisations use data-driven methods to support some elements of their work in which they
carry out the trustee model, particularly at Amnesty. These findings support one argument of the
critical data studies and surveillance literature, (Lyon, 2015; Tufecki, 2014; Clarke, 1997), that
when data collection and analysis are undertaken it will always be used to reinforce the power of
the data collector. This also challenges the claims of new CSOs documented in Karpf’s Analytic
Activism (2017), that their ability to be audience-led is founded in tactics reliant on data-driven
technologies. While new membership organisations purport to use data to support their delegate
model, the audience-led organisation, Amnesty, does not utilise data-driven methods to perform
a delegate  role.  Instead,  Amnesty  relies  on  traditional  deliberative  and  qualitative  practices.
Tactical  Tech who predominantly functions within the trustee model,  do not use data-driven
methods  in  most  of  their  work.  Instead,  Tactical  Tech  relies  on  their  staff’s  intuition  and
expertise. Tactical Tech does use data in a few specific moments to support their trustee model,
specifically to represent their support to external funders. Amnesty, however, uses data-driven
methods actively to support most of their work when they perform a trustee role, specifically to
increase the number of people they represent and to support their fundraising strategies.
The final set of findings describe how the organisations decide when to use, and not use,
data-driven practices to support either model. Staff in both organisations recognised how data-
driven  methods  could  support  either  delegate  or  trustee  models.  However,  based  on  their
respective models believe that data would encourage the negative aspects of these models: using
methods driven by the accessibility to large quantities of personal data available online in their
strategies  would lead to a populist-driven approach to topics lacking a deliberative approach
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which could incorporate minority views in the delegate model, and a manipulative, coercive and
opaque leadership in the trustee model. This awareness of the normatively more troubling sides
of their respective models, and how data-driven practices may lead to these sides, is important
for recognising that not only is there an active aversion to data practices in some spaces, that
there are various ways to carry out an audience-led organisation, in which the direct democracy
of technology may not be the right approach. The findings also demonstrate how the trustee and
delegate models are useful for not just understanding how the organisations perceive their own
roles, but also the risks of those roles when employing data logic.
4.1 The Internal Balance Between the Trustee and Delegate Models
The ‘responsive leadership’  theory proposes  that  a  political  representative  will  carry out  the
trustee and delegate models in different contexts. Amnesty predominantly take a delegate role
and have audiences who they listen to in that role, but they also take a trustee role at times to
mobilise people to support the decisions made by the former group. Amnesty’s relationship with
each  of  these  audiences  is  defined  in  their  strategy  document,  using  their  own  terms,  and
managed by different teams. Tactical Tech predominantly takes a trustee role, in which the staff
make  decisions  and inform and mobilise  partners,  media  and the  public  but  at  times  some
partners take more of a dominant role in designing strategy or creating a product at which point
Tactical Tech take a delegate model. The times the staff in either organisation take on each role
is dependent on team members skills, type of product and aim of the project and is therefore
different in each context. The process of distinguishing the moments different roles are taken is
important to understand how each is then associated with different data practices and the benefits
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of each model for the organisation. 
Amnesty details the definitions of their different audiences in an internal document called
the standard action report (SAR) guidance notes. These guidance notes are used by national
offices to help them fill in standard action reports which are annual reports to the international
office to provide information on their “impact, growth and accountability” (Amnesty, 2016b).
This information is used by the strategy and evaluation team at the international office in their
monitoring and evaluation of Amnesty’s work. The audiences outlined in this guidance note are
members, donors, activists and followers. The distinctions between each of these audiences are
outlined  below.  Amnesty  play  a  delegate  role  with,  in  their  terminology,  members,  and
sometimes activists and beneficiaries.  With donors, followers, and again sometimes activists and
beneficiaries Amnesty performs the role of trustee.
Amnesty  perform  a  delegate  role,  predominantly  with  their  members.  Members  are
defined by the statute of the organisation and are formally given a role in the governance of
Amnesty. According to the statute, Amnesty defines their members as (Amnesty International,
2017): 
A person who contributes to and shares the Vision, Mission and Core Values of
Amnesty International may become an individual member: 
a. by joining a section or structure where they live and paying a membership fee
(if applicable) to that section or structure; or 
b. if there is no section or structure where they live by paying a membership fee
(if applicable) to the International Secretariat, to become an international member.
There are three steps to obtaining the status of member: registering interest in doing so,
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donating regularly, and providing a single identifying piece of data such as an email address. In
some cases, for various reasons, the fees are waived. In this  way, the member-led nature of
Amnesty International begins from a different starting point to the new CSOs: members in the
new  CSO  structure  usually  only  have  to  register  interest  and  give  over  a  contact  detail.
Furthermore, and significantly, an Amnesty member is defined as “a person who contributes to
and shares the Vision, Mission and Core Values.” (Amnesty International, 2017). Through this
statement, Amnesty already secures a membership who aligns with their core values. A senior
manager in their governance team reiterated the importance of this in an interview. He said they
must “adhere to amnesty” and “contribute to amnesty” (Interview 5190). The organisation is
happy to directly represent these individuals’ opinions through a delegate role. 
Secondly,  Amnesty takes  the role  of delegate only sometimes with ‘action takers’ or
‘activists’ (hereon referred to as activists) who are defined as individuals who are interested in
the organisation, have taken an action (such as sign a petition) and have permitted for Amnesty
to contact them (Amnesty, 2016b). These people are not members as they have not fulfilled the
requirement to register as one and/or donate. This audience is usually connected with contact
data such as an email address, social media account, mobile phone number or postal address.
Activists are mostly, however, treated as constituents who do not make decisions but support the
organisation with whom the organisation play a trustee role through education and mobilisation
practices  demonstrated in this  chapter.  Some people might  take action,  such as by attending
protests, but who have not handed over contact details and are therefore not included in this
audience for Amnesty. If these people have been recorded, it will as  followers. Followers are
defined  in  their  SAR  action  report  guidance  notes  as  “People  who  are  interested  in  the
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organisation  and  human  rights  issues”  (Amnesty,  2016b).  Examples  are  provided  in  the
document to explain that this definition includes Facebook fans, Twitter follows, and YouTube
subscribers. The organisation performs a trustee role with this audience. 
The organisation also performs the trustee role for the audience defined as donors: “ALL
individuals, major donors, and trusts and foundations that have contributed financially within the
year of reporting” (Amnesty, 2016b). There is a lot of overlap between donors and members: to
be a member you have to donate regularly, and if you donate regularly, you only have to register
interest  in  becoming a  member  to  become one.  The guidance notes  confirm the  overlap  by
clarifying  donors  includes  members  who pay  their  membership  fees.  Different  teams  in  the
organisation  manage  the relationship  with the  different  audiences,  even when it  is  the  same
person. For example, someone who is a member and a donor may receive some communications
from the campaigns teams and different communications from the fundraising team. 
The audiences at Tactical Tech are not defined in a single clear document as Amnesty’s
are  but  instead  described in  different  documents  and within  the  staff’s  values,  uncovered  in
interviews and observations. This is partly because they are a smaller organisation. This is also
partly as a trustee-presenting organisation they do not need to clarify decision-making processes
for the sake of internal or external communications or to distinguish the role of members from
other audiences. Tactical Tech staff take either a delegate or trustee role depending greatly on the
project and staff members involved. Whether the staff performed the functions of a trustee or a
delegate role changed per project, or even within stages of a project, rather than between clear
teams or audience titles. The values and skills of the staff also influenced how they would engage
with their audiences.  
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At Tactical Tech, the co-directors create the strategy with input and approval from the
board and staff, and the management and staff decide together on what new projects  will be
carried out. Even if the staff engage with partners or stakeholders such as other CSOs to include
them in decision-making, the staff still  have the final formal decision. For example,  in some
cases, partners are consulted to understand their needs or to contribute content to a project, but
ultimately the staff are the experts who design and approve the overall project outputs. Tactical
Tech also performs the role of trustee with a broad public  audience.  This audience includes
website visitors, people who follow them on social media, and attendees to their events. The
public audience is quite new at Tactical Tech but becoming more important as the organisation
increases the number of public-facing projects, addressing the perceived need to normalise issues
of technology at a public level.
Tactical Tech does perform a delegate role in certain circumstances with partners such as
trainers, tech activists and other experts in the field and intermediaries who can disseminate the
work further.  The organisation works with these partners as a delegate to enable them to be
involved in the creation of projects. For example,  in the strategy-setting stage, some partners
may  be  involved  in  co-designing  and  creating  products,  described  throughout  this  chapter.
Secondly,  in  implementing  the work or materials,  the organisation  would sometimes  turn to
partners to understand how they like to co-opt the materials into their plans giving them control
and working for them. As a communication officer said in a meeting “Tactical Tech mobilises
but it isn’t the movement itself” (Observation Day 10). The organisation relies on partnerships
with  organisations  who have larger  audiences  who incorporate  Tactical  Tech’s  work,  which
through a partnership is accountable to Tactical Tech but not managed by Tactical Tech, and as
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such Tactical Tech performs a trustee role when preparing the content, and then a delegate role
where partners design for themselves the outreach of the materials.
4.2 Data Logic Absent in the Delegate Model
Both organisations reject methods that demonstrate elements of the ideal type of data logic when
making  decisions  about  their  strategy.  Both  organisations,  instead,  set  their  strategies  using
methods which demonstrate elements contradictory to those of data logic. Amnesty, the delegate
organisation,  uses  qualitative  and  non-standardised  deliberative  methods  to  involve  their
members in decision making. The use of these methods is something seen in both their practices
and in interviews. Tactical Tech, the trustee organisation, relies on the expertise and intuition of
staff to create their strategy. Again, this is both seen in the observations of their practices, as well
as in interviews.
As the new data-driven practices are publicised to support new CSOs in performing a
delegate  role,  if  they  are  influential,  Amnesty  would  be  expected  to  engage  with  the  same
principles to support their  delegate role. To examine whether the elements of data logic can
support a delegate model, I look for two sets of characteristics. Firstly, I look for features and
manifestations of the principles of the ideal type of data logic in the organisations’ practices,
work plans and values.  Secondly,  I look for language and practices  which demonstrate  their
approach to their audience, specifically looking for descriptions of audience-led approaches such
as involving members opinions in strategy setting, empowering members and activists  to run
their  own campaigns,  and demonstrating  accountability  to  the membership.  The prompts  for
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observations  and interview questions  were  open and allowed the  organisations  to  frame the
relationship with their audience in their terms (see Appendix B). I found Amnesty, as expected,
predominantly takes a delegate role. They perform this role, as will be shown, with little use of
methods of data logic and at  times a clear  rejection  of the principles  of data logic.  Instead,
Amnesty facilitates member-led decisions through the collection of opinion through traditional
qualitative and deliberative approaches to integrate different opinions of staff and members. The
observations and interviews at Tactical Tech demonstrate that staff sometimes take a delegate
role, although usually with a small expert audience of partners. I will discuss this briefly in this
section to demonstrate the commonality that the methods they use to perform the functions of a
delegate  are  irreconcilable  with  the  principles  of  data  logic  such  as  using  face-to-face
collaborative discussions to design strategy and outputs. 
Amnesty’s long-term strategy is created and decided upon through an approach which is
dependent on deliberation and qualitative methods, both of which are contrary to the principles
which  make  up  the  ideal  type  of  data  logic.  The  methods  the  staff  facilitates  with  their
constituents  are  face  to  face  discussions  in  which  both  the  conversation  and  decisions  are
captured  in  minutes,  summary  notes  or  other  formal  documentation  such  as  written
recommendations,  decisions,  resolutions  or  policy  documents.  Deliberative  conversations  are
held with various stakeholders including experts, staff or volunteers, beneficiaries, activists and
members  to  discuss  the  strategies  together.  These  stakeholders  then  create  collaborative
documentation  in  which  draft  policies  and  strategies  are  proposed  and  other  people  can
contribute to the content. I will show how they use these methods, contrary to those found in
organisations engaging with data logic,  to support an audience-led approach to creating their
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international strategies, national strategies and in some cases in designing their  campaigns to
implement the strategies. 
Amnesty’s long-term international strategies are referred to as their global goals. At the
time of writing, they have five global goals for a four year period from 2016-2019. These cover
all aspects of the organisation’s work, from research, to campaigns and operations, and are titled
and summarised by Amnesty as (Amnesty International, 2016):
 Goal 1: reclaiming freedom: “A world in which everyone knows and can claim their
rights”
 Goal 2: equal rights for all: “A world in which human rights and justice are enjoyed
without discrimination”
 Goal 3: responding to crises: “A world in which people are protected during conflict and
crises” 
 Goal  4:  ensuring  accountability:  “A  world  in  which  human  rights  abusers  are  held
accountable”
 Goal 5: maximising our resources and engagement: “We will be a truly global human
rights movement of people defending human rights for all”.
These five global long-term goals are set at a bi-annual International Council Meeting
(ICM). This is the first method documented in which the organisation takes an approach which is
traditional and not influenced by data logic. The ICM happens every two years and had taken
place the summer before I began. The details of how the ICM works were described to me in
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interviews, informal discussions and seen in both internal and public-facing documentation.
I  conducted  my  research  at  the  international  office  of  Amnesty,  where  the  staff  are
responsible for facilitating the creation of the international strategy including the running of the
ICM, evaluating the progress, impact and success of Amnesty’s work as well as for conducting
research  and  ensuring  the  cohesion  of  international  campaigns.  There  are  over  70  nationals
offices made up of staff and volunteers, who are accountable to both the international office and
to their  national  members.  The ICM is attended by a few select  members from the national
offices.  Between  these  members,  staff  from  the  international  office  and  guest  experts,
approximately 500 people attend the ICM. 
Elected members and experts come together to form working groups across the different
topics the organisation has been working on and is thinking of working on in the future. In these
working groups, the group discuss and negotiate from their various positions to incorporate their
opinions and develop ideas ultimately creating draft strategies and policies around certain topics.
These meetings are also where members make decisions around governance and accountability,
such as electing the board, reviewing finance and defining terms such as member or local group,
which affects who can take part in decision-making and who can represent the organisation. On
the final day of the meeting, members vote as to whether to accept or reject the decisions and
policies. This deliberative small-group approach is far from the quantified format, large-scale of
input  and standardised and algorithmic reasoning approach to producing information  of data
logic. 
Furthermore, the national offices take these strategies and plan for how to achieve these
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overarching goals. The national offices of Amnesty consult with their members through various
forums, especially annual general meetings (AGM), to make decisions on what campaigns to
run. These AGMs also take the format of face to face discussions and collaborative documents
between  the  board,  staff,  members  and  other  stakeholders  they  might  choose  to  bring  in,
including activists or beneficiaries. The outcomes of these AGMs are captured in formal written
documentation such as resolutions and policy documents. These documents are created through
collaborative  processes,  which  again,  display  an  approach  which  is  not  standardised  nor
formulaic to perform a delegate role, and not demonstrative of the methods or principles of data
logic.
The  international  and  national  strategies  are  implemented  through  various  functions
within the organisation including research, campaigns, fundraising and activism. While I chose
to investigate Amnesty as an organisation demonstrating a delegate structure, in observations and
interviews  it  was  clear  that  the  performance  of  the  delegate  role  is  not  omnipresent  at  the
implementation stage of the organisation’s work and instead sometimes the staff within Amnesty
take a trustee role. There were few consistent factors or, through the scope of my investigation,
observable factors which influenced the choice between delegate and trustee role of the staff.
This mostly seemed to relate to a combination of the skills of the staff member, the value they
placed on the importance of involving their audience, and whether the staff had the time. In this
section, I will describe those staff and projects which followed a delegate model, and later in the
chapter address those which followed the trustee model.
Amnesty’s method for carrying out the delegate role at the implementation level of their
campaigns is institutionalised in a single common term, active participation, used across internal
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documents,  and through the appointment of a staff member to  be responsible for supporting
active  participation  across  campaigns.  Active  participation  is  a  collective  term for  a  set  of
methods which are used by staff to consciously involve constituents as closely as possible in
decisions in creating and implementing campaigns. They also have other tools and forms for
promoting  work.  For  example,  in  a  toolkit  produced  to  support  national  offices  in  their
relationship with youth constituents, they present a flower of participation, seen in Figure 4.1
below, created based on the ladder of participation to show the different levels of involvement of
a youth constituent to encourage medium and high responsibility from the constituents (Amnesty
International,  2018). The top-level petals  are high responsibility,  and it  describes the lack of
involvement quite harshly, such as tokenism, decoration and manipulation.
Figure 4.1 The Flower of Participation from Amnesty’s Toolkit for Youth Strategies
outlines the possible levels of involvement of youth-constituents in decision-making
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In interviews and informal discussions staff discussed the use of many different methods
to  encourage  their  constituents  to  take  high  responsibility,  all  of  which  as  qualitative  and
deliberative as those used to set the strategy. Some of the main techniques they described include
focus groups, long-form communications through email or face to face conversations. The staff
then use the information they gather through these methods either to create the necessary content
or services or to create forums or spaces for the constituents themselves to create and share
content and services. These practices are qualitative data collection approaches, antithetical to
the quantitative metrics of social media or website analytics. The processes are also unique to the
project, staff and individuals in the audience involved, rather than the automated processes which
are standardised and based on algorithms. The practices engaged with to perform the delegate
role at Amnesty are far from the principles of data logic. 
Although Tactical Tech is predominantly a trustee organisation in structure, I observed
some projects  in which the staff performed the functions of a delegate.  Team members also
referred to decisions being made by partners or the significant contribution of communities and
networks in interviews. One staff member from the management team referred to some of their
projects being “beneficiary-led” (Interview 29478). The staff often have formal partnerships with
MoUs  as  well  as  more  informal  relationships  with  networks.  The  partners  are  people  or
organisations who work on related topics, and whom they work with across all their projects at
different  levels  with  shared  decision-making  power.  Tactical  Tech  holds  a  bi-annual  retreat
outside  the  offices  to  discuss  strategy and organisational  processes.  At one  retreat,  during a
discussion of the necessary aspects of the grants, a staff member who works on the grants and
funding said that “our theory of change is working with partners” (Observation Day 30). The
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partners are also experts  rather than a mass public audience,  such as another CSO, a public
institution such as a library or a media organisation.  Although overall the organisation retains a
trustee  model  through this  approach,  as these partners  are other  experts,  the  staff perform a
facilitating delegate role with the partners and I examine these situations to look for similarities
or contrasts with Amnesty’s values. 
Tactical Tech staff also use traditional methods, based on principles contrary to those of
data logic, to carry out the functions of a delegate model. When consulting with partners to set
the strategy Tactical Tech uses a loose set of methods including to host discussions and face to
face meetings where the partners come together to design and create products including deciding
what content is needed, writing the content and deciding the needs that will determine the format
of the content. The organisation takes the role of delegate often in projects which involve the
creation of tools that help other CSOs and activists. These tools include Gendertech, an online
education platform which shares resources and workshop plans on gender and technology, and
‘Security in a Box’ which presents different tools to be used for digital security (Tactical Tech,
2019). In two projects similar to the concept of these projects, I observed during my time at the
organisation. The staff held a face to face workshop, run in a series of sprints (Interview 01938),
named after the tool from the project management technique, Agile, which emerged from the
technology field. Sprints involve face to face workshops where they invite people either through
open calls, or through their activist networks, and then the participants produce the final product
as a group. These sprints are not standardised and small scale unlike the principles of data logic. 
For other projects, Tactical Tech hands over decision-making power at a later stage of
implementation, producing content which they make accessible for people to adapt, rather than
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controlling where and how it is used. The staff send materials to other organisations for them to
re-design  and  re-create,  as  they  feel  it  is  important  to  delegate  decision-making  around
implementation to the partner’s discretion. Tactical Tech remains open to requests for different
formats and makes their projects available for download to be adapted and modified as wished.
Furthermore, when it comes to dissemination they translate based on partners requests and work
with partners to make sure the content is relevant using locally relevant examples and assuring
the language is inclusive of the audiences which the constituents themselves guide in decision-
making.  In  particular,  by  waiting  for  requests  from  partners,  the  staff  are  not  using  the
deterministic algorithmic reasoning of data logic, but an approach based on whether other people
decide to get in touch. The dissemination of their  content  is  done through relationships  and
conversations, rather than standardised and deductive methods. 
Amnesty have formal qualitative  methods including annual  or bi-annual  meetings  for
setting  the  strategy  and  an  active  participation  approach  in  some  of  their  projects  at  the
implementation  stage.  Tactical  Tech  performs  a  delegate  role  in  some  of  their  projects  by
involving partners at the design and creation stage, and in some projects allowing for control
over the use of the final product. Both Amnesty and Tactical Tech, when carrying out a delegate
role, rely on small-scale contribution, deliberative and qualitative methods including discussions
and  meetings  which  are  captured  in  internal  documentation.  These  methods  are  based  on
principles which oppose those of quantification, scale, standardised processes and algorithmic
reasoning which make up the ideal type of data logic, showing how data logic is now engaged
with to perform a delegate model. 
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4.3 Data Logic Absent from the Trustee Model 
Some critical data studies and surveillance studies literature argues that not only is data logic
becoming  ubiquitous,  but  that  these  data-driven  ways  of  working  are  synonymous  with
surveillance methods which are used to manipulate,  subvert or pacify constituents to achieve
self-serving aims of political representatives (Tufecki, 2012; Dencik et al., 2016). I presented the
trustee model to present a view of an accepted expert-led approach, the trustee model in which
expert staff provide information constituents need and take control over decisions on the basis
that  this  has  been entrusted to  them.  Tactical  Tech has a  structure which supports  a  trustee
model: they are funded by grants, staff have control over decisions on the strategy and project
plans and they are only accountable to a supervisory board. Tactical Tech, however, does not use
data logic in either the acceptable realms of the role of trustee or in the ways which are criticised.
Instead, the staff rely on their own expertise and intuition to make decisions. As with the delegate
model, findings from Amnesty also show a few ways in which they take on a trustee role show
and in which they also utilise intuition and expertise instead of data-driven methods to support
and test their decisions.
Confirming their performance of the trustee role, a manager described their choice of a
staff-led structure in an interview by way of comparison as to why they decided not to have a
membership when founding the organisation (Interview 61394):
at  the beginning we knew we didn’t want to have membership...we wanted to
maintain Tactical Tech to be fully flexible international organisation and we’ve seen a lot
of  membership  organisations  whose  flexibility,  was  maybe  not  compromised,  but
minimised to satisfy a certain type of membership and we thought that's fine, that's how
you decide to run the organisation but we thought for us to be able to move from topic to
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different topic we can’t do that.
The founders’ reason for their decision to not have a membership remains to underpin
how the organisation works: the staff make decisions about which topics to work on choosing
them as they go, rather than having a membership deciding an overarching long-term strategy.
Projects  are  chosen  through  the  direction  of  the  senior  managers’  decisions  based  on  the
capabilities and expertise of staff and grant opportunities. The senior management makes final
calls  which shape the organisation’s choice of grants and final project  outputs. The result  is
several different projects across different grants running at the same time, where ownership is
between staff members and one of two senior managers and is accountable to the board and the
relevant grant organisation.
Staff trust the guidance from management who use intuition, built from their experiences
and knowledge, to choose what to work on next. Various staff members confirmed this trust in
the manager’s ability to recognise trends in various informal conversations, and engagement with
work from staff often comes with a recognition that the topics they are working on are not just
topical  but  at  the  forefront  of  discourse.  For  example,  in  one  interview  a  one project  staff
member said: “the organisation has the reputation it has because it has been able to uncannily
pick the next project” (Interview 15398). The staff member goes on to describe the choice of the
managers to create a project, The Glassroom, in 2018. The project aims to make discussions of
technology easy to engage with through art in a public exhibition and comes about at precisely
the time the topic becomes a public issue. Staff at Tactical Tech were observed to also make
decisions based on their  expertise.  This does not utilise methods of algorithmic reasoning to
make  the  decisions  or  any  standardised  processes.  The  lack  of  data-driven  methods  at  the
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strategy-setting stage is  not unexpected for the trustee model  where experts  make decisions,
whereas data is usually representing the audience, and therefore would be used by trustees in the
stages of implementing and communicating these decisions, and evaluating their success.
Tactical  Tech does not  look to profile and target  people with the data -  the methods
associated in particular with the negative aspects of a trustee organisation, which can be used to
subvert  audiences  by  targeting  some  with  personalised  messaging  and  ignoring  others.  In
reference to these techniques, one staff member who worked on the website describes the mass
amount of data used in startups and the music industry to test and follows up with “tactical tech
just fundamentally disagrees with a lot of that” (Interview 15398). Their reasons for disagreeing
are  discussed  in  detail  further  in  this  chapter.  Surrounding  their  decisions  about  how  they
conduct outreach of their content, products and services, the staff trust that as their content is
good,  interested  people  will  come  to  them  or  will  be  amenable  to  being  presented  with
information. The staff believe that, as they are both experts and have established rapport, people
will come to them. 
To reach new people, the people who already know of them will pass this information by
word of mouth, traditional media outlets or through reference to Tactical Tech’s materials in the
partner’s work. As one manager expresses in a meeting where they are planning a new project
"we don't reach out to people, we let them come to us" (Observation Day 5). A staff member
working  on  the  communications  of  a  project  said  they  are  not  interested  in  “using  [their]
audience to market our products, rather give them information” (Interview 01938). She goes on
to give an example of this by the value she perceives the organisation to place on the newsletter
which is sent to an email list, as opposed to their social media because the people who are on
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their email list have “specifically asked they can find out, but on social media it’s like, well you
follow us but...it feels a bit less genuine” (Interview 01938). For the staff in the organisation, the
audience comes to them because they like what the organisation does and ask to hear more,
rather than because the organisation has decided they need to hear it. Staff also had other mailing
lists  which each team kept for their  specific partners or communities.  Then when something
needs to be outreached, it is sent around the office to ask people to send it to their networks for
which they are responsible for maintaining themselves. 
This is the same mentality they have for social media. As described above, the staff do
not use metrics to decide on content, they also do not use metrics to profile the audience in order
to  disseminate  the  information.  Instead,  they  rely  on  their  intuition  and  expertise,  and trust
people can choose to engage with them on the channels in their own way if they are interested in
what  content  the organisation  shares.  A manager  runs  the Twitter  pages  and describes  it  as
(Interview 61394):
our Twitter is basically everything that happened from a personal, professional point of
view,  a  bookmarking  system that  is  looking  at  interesting  content  that  is  related  to
Tactical Tech work very broadly and related topics so that would include news, research,
reviews, references all this kind of stuff and the reason I am sharing that with people
sometimes is basically to, I know they are following Twitter...it is a collection of things,
so I read a lot and I share that freely.
He saw Twitter as a tool for curating news content, and through this, saw his role to
curate  what  Tactical  Tech wanted  to  share  and discuss.  Further,  he  wraps  up personal  and
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professional, showing his expertise at the centre of what he is doing, rather than based on the
audience’s wants and needs. The manager also explains he did not see any need to explore any
tools from the platform to advertise or profile the audience as it is up to the audience if they
wanted to read what is going on. The staff member who controls the Facebook page also says
they are not interested in using the targeting or profiling methods associated with the platform,
instead, they prefer to share content and allow others to use the platform as they would like. 
Tactical Tech staff do not use the methods associated with data logic such as metrics on
social media or a/b testing content or headlines to decide how to communicate their projects and
campaigns. Instead, the staff either consider themselves or others in the organisations as experts
in design. A manager said in a group meeting we “need it to look good, that's what we have
experience at, that's what gets people passing something round” (Observation Day 18). The staff
member who predominantly manages the design and website outputs confirms that this is what
they are good at because of their expertise and said in an interview that they work from “an
educated, not gut reaction, but an educated understanding, an innate understanding of what is
going  to  work  and  what  is  not  going  to  work”  (Interview  15398).  The  approach  of  using
educated understanding is not replicable as the standardised approach associated with data logic.
Further,  they  are  not  afraid  to  experiment  with  new  formats  -  such  as  the  aforementioned
exhibition, The Glassroom - based on their principles blended with what could be considered a
creative intuition. Basing innovation on their intuition and expertise, rather than what would be
dictated by trends in data differs from the algorithmic reasoning principle with data logic. 
Trustees look for feedback to test the success of their instincts and assess if changes need
to be made to the implementation of their strategy. The staff do not engage with the principles of
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data logic but instead,  they rely on external  professional  evaluators  and qualitative feedback
which the staff view as a guide within their  decision-making,  rather  than instructive to their
decisions. The senior staff member whose job involves assuring the quality of the outcomes of
the projects explains how the organisation works with expert external evaluators. This shows that
as trustees, there is trust in other professionals and experts, rather than the public audience, in the
evaluation  of  their  work.  The other  group which  has  an important  role  in  the evaluation  of
projects are the grant funders who make requests on what information Tactical Tech need to
provide to be accountable to the grant they received. Confirming that this still does not involve
the quantification and scale of data logic, the staff manager who manages this work explained
that they “don’t include mass-scale data collection” (interview 15398). They use some metrics
around how many people  they have reached but  they focus  on either  personal  anecdotes  or
qualitative feedback from partners, or public measures such as what has been published rather
than personal interactions. 
Even these evaluations, however, are not instructive but instead were one of many factors
which guide the staff’s decision.  The factors vary in their  level of importance for each staff
member, in balance with their beliefs on the topic and their trust in the evaluation. One staff
member who also worked on grants,  and worked across different  projects  (interview 36724)
explained the role of the feedback of the external evaluator saying:
we do look at it and read it and think about it, and it does inform decision but it
also  could  inform more,  but  it's  tricky  because  why  is  that  data  of  interviewees  of
external partners more valuable than what people in the organisation believe to be true?
Or best? And of course, it's a relationship.
This quote is demonstrative of an attitude held by the staff across all the projects who
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recognise it is important to listen to this feedback, they ultimately rely on their own judgement
calls. This is seen in meetings where decisions are made based on the strength of confidence of
staff  members,  and  their  articulation  from  them  on  the  importance  of  the  topic,  with  few
references to previous evaluations and no references to audience metrics. This nuance in how
they respond to feedback, taking it in but also relying on their judgements was also confirmed
during an impact workshop, in which the staff reviewed how they are measuring the impact of
their work. They discussed qualitative surveys and feedback cards and talked about how positive
and negative feedback is helpful, but it is not always to be taken on board as there are so many
different opinions around the issues (Observation day 12).  They rely on these expert evaluators
as one of many factors, and while they report website metrics and social media metrics to grant
funders sometimes, they do not often and do not use either of these as justifications for their
decisions about future projects.
Findings from Amnesty parallel the findings of the importance of intuition and expertise
in decision-making in situations where Amnesty perform the role of a trustee. As with Tactical
Tech, Amnesty does not stick to one role, and at certain times take on the role of a trustee,
though, as was observed, only after the broad strategy was set by members would staff in the
organisation decide the plans for some projects and prioritisation of resources. Prioritisation both
involves deciding what work they will be carrying out and how many resources are allocated to
each  project.  In  these  contexts,  the  staff  use  their  judgement  and  qualitative  feedback.  At
Amnesty International, this is referred to as resource allocation management. When it comes to
prioritisation, though there are criteria, as shown in table 4.1, there is no set weighting on the
priority criteria. 
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Table 4.1: The priority criteria used by Amnesty to guide decisions presented in a
conference to other CSOs and academics
The priority criteria
1. Gravity of problem
2. Amnesty value add
3. Relevant across regions
4. Clarity of the proposed outcome
5. Human rights impact
A staff member on the team described that these criteria are treated as themes to guide the
conversations, however, the final decisions are, as with Tactical Tech, made in ways that can be
documented qualitatively, but not an exact process (and therefore without algorithmic reasoning)
nor with external evidence (such as quantified metrics). Instead, the staff member says “there is
no scientific method” and decisions on priorities are made through three parts expert analysis,
consultations with members and intuition. Concerning the last part, the staff member from the
strategy  and  evaluation  unit  says  “the  element  of  subjective  judgement  is  necessary”
(Observation Day 36). While the five criteria give a sense of opportunity for calculation she is
explicit that “It’s very difficult to have any mathematical equation” to help balance these: final
decisions are made on judgement calls. This concept of judgement is far from the standardised
and algorithmic reasoning approach of data logic.
Tactical Tech does not use data-driven methods to test their decisions or get feedback
from their constituents to feed into their strategic decisions. Instead, Tactical Tech carries out the
role of a trustee organisation with reliance on the education, experience and intuition of the staff.
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These  are  also  the  factors  that  guide  their  decision-making  on  designing  and  sharing
communications, relying on their expertise to create content worth reading and their established
work providing reasons for people to seek out their work. They still make this available on social
media or other tools which could rely on data, but do not use data-driven techniques to profile or
target the audience and instead rely on the audience to come to them. Findings from Amnesty’s
performance on a trustee role around prioritisation of resources also show a reliance on intuition,
though they are more likely to negotiate with others to come to decisions rather than on the
strength of their expertise alone. This shows a rejection of the standardised techniques which rely
on algorithmic reasoning associated with data logic to support the role of a trustee. However,
these methods were used within a few circumstances, described in the following section. 
4.4 Data Logic Supports The Trustee Model
Both organisations reject the use of data, for the most part, for their dominant roles as trustee or
delegate based on their belief that the use of the data practices would lead to the risks associated
with  the  roles:  too  responsive  to  popular  and  non-representative  audiences  as  delegates  or
manipulative and putting people’s privacy at risk as trustees. However, the principles of data
logic  are  present  in  some  parts  of  both  organisations.  In  particular,  data  logic  is  found
substantially in some parts of Amnesty to support the aspects of their work in which they take
the role as trustee - to persuade constituents to mobilise in pre-decided activities or donate, or to
represent the support they have, or success they have, to others. Tactical Tech does use some of
these techniques, mostly in the same case to represent the support of their projects or the success
of their tools. When data logic is used, it demonstrates the aspects which are also commonly
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associated with surveillance, but as shown in the organisations’ justifications, support the expert-
led functions within the organisations. 
Mobilisation
Amnesty uses methods driven by the principles of data logic to support the aspects of their work
in which they are a trustee in the situations in which Tactical Tech instead used their design
principles and expertise. Amnesty use the practices associated with algorithmic reasoning and
standardised practices, such as a/b testing and profiling, to test and develop content for their
communications  in  which  they  aim  to  inform  large-scale  quantified  constituents,  often  to
motivate  them  to  mobilise  in  activities  designed  by  either  the  staff  or  a  smaller  group  of
consulted constituents such as members or activists. Amnesty in the last few years has begun to
increase  their  membership  numbers  through  the  process  of  representing  the  audience  in  a
quantified manner, tactics which aim specifically at growing the scale of the audience and tactics
to  do  this  relying  on testing  and  optimisation.  Firstly,  using  various  profiling  and  targeting
methods  the  organisation  persuades  the  audience  to  increase  their  active  support  for  the
organisation's  pre-set  campaign  strategies.  Secondly,  the  organisation  use  quantified metrics,
such as membership support or petition signatures, to represent the support for their decisions. 
Data logic is therefore apparent when political representatives undertake a desire to persuade
constituents to act in a certain way or agree to a certain policy.
Campaigns,  engagement  and  communications  staff  present  campaigns  to  constituents
with  the  aim  to  persuade  them  to  show  their  support,  demonstrating  Amnesty’s  desire  to
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sometimes  perform a trustee role.  The support  of the individual  could  be through signing a
petition, turning up to a protest, liking or sharing a social media post or signing up to an email
list. To achieve this, the campaigns and communications staff use data-driven tools to profile and
target the audience. One staff member working closely with engaging activists and supporters
said “we use data for everything” and that “we talk in numbers a lot” (Interview 8473). She was
in a role in the organisation that had only been established in the last few years and she had been
hired  from  a  technology  company  background,  confirming  a  recent  engagement  with  these
techniques and bringing in staff to deliver them. Both observing the team’s practices, and in her
descriptions, in the interview, she confirmed this approach. They use the audience analytics tools
in Facebook and Google and advertising services from both these online platforms. They do a lot
of testing of different emails, petitions and donations and collect data on what works the best.
The staff would test content, messaging and time of day that would produce the largest quantity
of responses. The staff also used metrics from third-party software such as Google Analytics for
their website traffic and social media management software, Sprinklr. All of these techniques are
in line with the practices of the new CSOs, demonstrating a belief in all four principles of data
logic  -  quantification  of  success  on platforms,  scale  as  an  indicator  of  success,  standardised
processes involving third party technologists to analyse the data, and algorithmic reasoning to
test and experiment content and its impact on the behaviour of constituents. 
Further Amnesty, carry out profiling of their audience. Like many CSOs, to do this, they
use a CRM to host data of individuals for whom they have contact data for. As I did not have
access to view their CRM databases, I cannot present the exact data they collect or how they
analyse it. However, the staff engaging with these platforms expressed that they did use features
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of the software, and knowing they use the CRM provider Engaging Networks it is possible to
ascertain what possible services they could engage with including hosting individual data such as
donations they have made and campaigns they have participated in and segmenting supporters by
behaviours with the organisation such as opening emails or signing petitions or demographics. 
The staff also described how they used information in their CRMs and from the large
online platforms, to create group profiles for sections of audiences such as those motivated to be
interested in their  topic.  I spoke to one staff member who was working on a new project to
profile the audience through analytics to place people in a spectrum from those who are for or
against support for the organisation (Interview 1387). This was a project in development and I
did not see the data that informed this process. However, in interviews, it was clear their use of
data in profiling was based on behavioural and demographic, or in this one case, development of
profiling based on support. There was no sign of any psychometric profiling associated with the
manipulative data-driven techniques of Cambridge Analytica. 
Amnesty uses the tools to engage the audience, as a trustee might, to inform the audience
of the expert opinions of the organisation or instruct them to act in support of their pre-decided
campaigns and strategies. This data does not, as shown above, feed into the strategic direction of
the organisation such as what topics they work on. For example, a campaigner in one of the
country teams carried out a social listening project in which they analysed content on Twitter to
investigate the opinions of actors discussing human rights in a particular country. When I asked
if they are ready to change projects if their results showed a difference of opinion to their own,
she said they would not have and that this data was only to inform their understanding of the
landscape,  so  they  have  more  information  when  they  make  decisions  either  alone  or  with
171
members. A campaign manager, concerning what campaigns they would choose, confirmed that 
“data  has  value  but  shouldn’t  determine  what  we  work  on”  (Interview  6311).  Instead,  she
confirms that it helps them design the campaigns they use to inform, educate and mobilise a
broader audience. 
One of the ways this practice manifests is through their desire to use popular topics, that
the data shows that people are interested in, to bring people on board with the organisation’s
strategy. A staff member working on engaging members explained that she wanted to change the
strategy of the organisation to do this more, saying about popular topics online “how do you ride
the wave and take advantage of that” (Interview 8473). She gives the example that Amnesty may
not have a specific campaign around Donald Trump, but as there is so much interest they should
take advantage of that to get people interested in the campaigns that the organisation has decided
to work on. In a strategy meeting she continues to argue for this, saying their work “needs to be
timely...what  topics  are  people  talking  about  and  let’s  match  our  campaigning  with  that”
(Observation Day 14). This opinion is generally agreed upon by staff in the meeting, although
there is little plan to implement it in this strategy level meeting. The purpose is to use the data to
design their campaigns, not because the audience would like to work on them, but to encourage
them to be interested in the topics Amnesty has already chosen, in accordance with the trustee
model.
Fundraising
The other audience which the organisation takes the role of trustee with is with donors, and the
team which managed this relationship is the fundraising team. The fundraising team’s reliance on
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data-driven tools is professed by staff. A senior manager started an interview with the statement
“fundraising is  all  data” (Interview 9309).  The manager  did not feel  the need to  justify this
specifically but the whole conversation then oriented around the various methods in which they
use data, which are confirmed in practice. The managers and staff of the fundraising team use
benchmarks and targets to evaluate how much money had been donated, how much is normal
and to drive themselves to achieve more. The staff examined the behaviours of audiences to
understand what  channels  are used to  donate (phone,  web, social  media,  face to  face),  their
donation history (how much how often and when they donate), and their reasons for donating
(such as what topics prompted them to donate, or what style of messaging). 
The staff also created profiles to categorise the audience into those who donate more and
those  who  donate  less,  payment  preferences  of  different  demographics,  and  likely  journeys
different individuals will take from hearing about the organisations to donating. The fundraising
staff also profile their audience and set targets for achieving an outcome from that audience. For
example, they saw that in face-to-face fundraising young people who go out to fundraise attract
young people to donate, which they call “the fountain of youth”. One staff member described in
an  interview how “age  has  the  strongest  effect  on  attrition  rates,  higher  attrition  than  other
groups” (interview 2990). The staff were constantly analysing and making decisions on how best
to create an outcome, in the principle of algorithmic reasoning. 
Representation of Support and Success 
While, as shown, Tactical Tech mostly did not substantially use methods associated with data
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logic, there were a few instances in which they did. This data is used for the most part to show to
their funders. The staff collected data from events they hosted or presented at. Event reports are
filled in by every staff member who attends an event and coordinated by an individual who also
works on projects, and coordinates the role for events for the team. These reports would be used
to collect  the number of people attending the event  and an approximation  of the regions  or
countries represented. This event data was mostly to be used in funding reports and their annual
report - communications with external actors to whom they wish to show their success. 
Tactical Tech staff use some website metrics from the aforementioned Piwik, an analytics
platform  which  tracks  visits  to  websites,  which  overall  is  one  of  the  more  minimal  metric
providers  and  prioritises  privacy.  From  this  they  gathered  statistics  from  their  website,  to
represent how many people had visited the site, and if needed, the countries they are accessing
the  website  from.  As  one staff member  working  on grants  described  in  an  interview:  “The
number of people who visited the website and depending on the funder they might care what
countries  people  are  visiting  or  what  language  they  are  using  because  certain  funders  have
certain target audiences and alongside that a really important one” (Interview 36724). In this
case, staff would try to make the information as broad as possible, not wanting to create risk for
any users from countries where activism is under threat, for example, ‘from the Balkans’ rather
than a specific country in the Balkans (Interview 36724). 
Further,  the staff at Tactical  Tech use this  data to feel good about the decisions they
make, showing enthusiasm to hear if something has done well but never incorporating this into
documentation  or  formal  decision-making  processes.  Instead,  this  would  be  another  factor,
alongside their other experiences, that would influence their expertise and intuition. Even in this
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scenario,  it  was much more important,  and more widely shared within the organisation,  if a
highly respected media organization or other campaigning organisation or academic referenced
their work, rather than large scale responses from a broader audience.  
In general, the staff evaluate mostly from public places and other organisations such as
media mentions, rather than personal data from individual reactions. As one staff member said
the media outlets, partners website and blogs are important as it shows that “someone’s seen
value  for  the information” (Interview 36724).  This  is  true of  their  outreach too,  as the staff
member working on communications  works on both social  media and traditional  media,  but
focuses on the latter. They have one main mailing list for the whole organisation where only an
email  address  is  held  for  each  individual,  rather  than  any  extra  information  such  as  name,
demographics  or  behaviours  recorded by many customer  relationship  management  databases
(CRMs). The staff do not put substantial project work time into encouraging more people to join
the list. They also do not look at the details of what emails are opened or which headlines for the
emails created the most response. However, they do use the number of people on the mailing list
in the funding reports. The mailing lists which each staff member individually keeps for their
communities are not included in funders reports unless there is a specific agreement with the
funder and it is relevant to the project.
As is shown, the main area I found the use of quantification and scale, in particular, are
present, in relation to anything the staff and grants team could use in reports to funders, and
sometimes the Annual Report the organisation publishes. These reports  are mostly about the
impact the projects  had. It is important to show the content has reached a certain amount of
people in countries of importance to the specific funder. For example, funders like the Swedish
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International Development Cooperation Agency will only fund projects in the Global South. This
shows how Tactical Tech staff use data which represents the actions of audiences to confirm that
their decisions and actions as trustees have had an impact. 
Amnesty also engage with data-driven methods to support the situations in which they
take on the role as a trustee by using quantified metrics and scale to represent the support of their
audience, and success of their engagement based campaigns. This audience, in this process, is
reduced to tokenism to support the organisation, now performing a trustee role, following the
rungs  of  the  ladder  of  participation  (Arnstien,  1969).  Across  all  the  staff  from  teams  in
campaigns, strategy and evaluation, membership relations, and fundraising, there is a consistent
sense that a demonstration of their authority can be done through large scale membership, as well
as petition numbers or email action response (in which people use an online platform to send a
pre-written email to their MP). I will go on to show how this authority has two meanings that
they  do  not  openly  distinguish  between.  Firstly,  authority  is  the  power  to  have  influence.
Secondly, authority is a sense of integrity as an organisation. 
Tactics  associated  with  data  logic  principles  of  quantification  and  scale  have  been
embedded into Amnesty’s organisational strategies and institutionalised in the dedication of one
of their major goals set out earlier in this project. Goal 5 (as it is referenced internally and from
hereon) focuses on the organisation's relationship with their audience. The manager who agreed
to my undertaking of research for the organisation also made the association between my topic of
interest  -  how CSOs are  using  personal  data,  and their  project  -  goal  5  and I  was initially
‘buddied’ with a staff member who is helping manage the strategy and evaluation of this goal. 
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The objectives  of goal 5,  visualised in Figure 4.2 below, are to grow the number of
people who support the organisation to 25 million, the number of donors to 4 million, to raise
400 million euros in fundraising and increase the active participation of supporters - involving
them more closely in decision-making and empowering them to make decisions  themselves.
Other  than  the  last  point,  which  I  demonstrate  has  a  limited  role  in  the  overall  goal,  these
objectives  reflect  new standards  which  show a desire  towards  numerically  measurable  goals
supported  by  the  technology  which  allows  them to  collect  and  maintain  databases  of  their
members and donors personal data.
Figure 4.2: Amnesty’s Theory of Change (ToC) for Goal 5 (G5) (2016)
The focus of the goal - growth of the organisation's engagement - at the level of strategy
is new to the organisation, showing how the large scale growth goals associated with data logic
are not how they have traditionally worked. In a meeting about the Goal One of the core team
members said: “we’re special, we are a little different from the other goals” (Observation Day
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14). A staff member in fundraising also commented on its uniqueness as a new goal saying that
at the international level they had “never had a global goal for volume before and no tradition of
making long-term goals for volume” (Interview 2990). The other goals are more aligned with
their traditional goals, based on the impact such as changing laws, freeing prisoners and even
around activism, types of impact of activism. Goal five is notably a new way of working and a
new way of thinking about the organisation - based on both membership as a goal within itself,
and for the goal to be expressed in a large scale number. 
Staff  across  campaigns,  fundraising,  membership  engagement  and  governance  teams
agreed on the need of goal 5, and the large membership numbers, for authority. As one of the
staff members said, if they cannot compete with the large scale membership of the new delegate
CSOs then “who is going to listen?” (Interview 8473), claiming that other experts will not pay
attention to them without large scale membership. A manager, in fundraising and part of the goal
5 team, explicitly said: “25 million is definitely about authority” (Interview 9309). The manager
went on to explain that the more support you have “the more power, the better advocacy, even
behind closed doors” (Interview 9309).  In an interview with a staff member working in the
thematic issues of gender and diversity, she explains that data “is evidence of public opinion”
(Interview 6311). The use of numerical evidence, using new data-driven technologies to collect
the information, demonstrates the principle of quantification of the ideal type of data logic. 
A  fundraising  staff  member  corroborated  this  opinion  in  a  separate  interview  and
followed up with an example. He had been working on campaigns for a long time and used a lot
of experience of working with activists to support his work in fundraising. He described how
they sought meetings with a politician to lobby for a certain bill. As soon as the membership of
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the  national  office  hit  100,000  they  suddenly  began  getting  meetings.  This  staff  member
continued from this story to make the point: “We need 2% of the population because that's how
to have power” (Interview 2990). They associated the scale of the organisations, founded on their
data-driven practices to produce large scale membership numbers, with having the power and
authority to influence other experts to listen to their claims and to enact change. 
A fundraiser who regularly worked with national mobilisation presented how goal 5 was
about a triangle for impact and that you need volume as an important point within this (Interview
2990).  This  triangle  for  impact  is  seen  in  figure  4.3  below  and  was  demonstrated  in  a
presentation from this staff member to national offices at an internal conference. Volume is an
important aspect of the organisation as part of Amnesty’s strategy to create enough authority to
make change happen. By volume, the staff member referred to a large number of supporters. 
Figure 4.3: This image was taken from a PowerPoint slide presented at an internal
conference, by fundraising expert describing the necessary factors for human rights change to
happen
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Like the story of human rights for sex workers outlined above, another story came up
regularly amongst staff showing their rejection of the data-driven methods for making decisions,
however, this one also showed their desire to use the numbers as a symbol of support for their
expert and member-led decisions. Amnesty carried out a survey in 2014 to try to reach a great
number of people to input into their strategy. It would be introduced as a tool they are proud to
have done and reach 25,000 people. However, this is always followed by a rejection of the use of
this  survey. For example,  one staff member said,  “data from the survey confirmed decisions
already  made  [by  staff]”  (Interview  8443).  The  only  thing  they  found  surprising,  again
recognised by many of the staff telling the story, is the importance of women’s rights and they
used  this  to  ensure  that  this  is  a  more  substantial  part  of  their  goals.  This  is  a  method  of
confirming, but not actively allowing the data from this large scale and quantified data collection
method, to feed into the strategy. A senior staff member in governance argued that the role of a
consultation  is  “to  gain  trust”  as  “you  need  to  have  the  backing  of  the  whole  movement”
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(Interview 5190). The data-driven activities are used to get a sense of ‘buy-in’ without actually
listening  to  the  constituents.  This  again  gives  the  people  who  have  represented  in  data  a
tokenistic  role  in  supporting  the  decisions  of  the  organisation,  data-driven  support  of  their
performance of a trustee role. 
In interviews and informal discussions, it is clear that the figures are symbolic to the staff
of their own credibility and fear that they might become meaningless, and not credible, if not
high scale. As a staff member from the governance team said about the growth of numbers of
membership  from 2  -  7  million  “the  set  of  members  we  have  signifies  the  strength  of  our
performance, the seriousness of our claims and how we are a representative point of view for
those people” (Interview 5190). He also argued that to be a global movement “we need way
more than 25 million” (Interview 5190). This is,  of course, linked to their desire to have an
impact,  but  the  numbers  themselves  are  not  to  have  an  impact  but  are  symbolic  of  the
organisation’s ability to represent an audience. The manager leading the Goal 5 projects said that
“the drive for people is one of credibility, it seems having 10 people taking 1 million actions
compared to 1 million taking 1 million actions, having those people who are actively engaged,
the  bigger  the  activists  base,  the  more  credibility  you  have.”  (Interview  0164).  There  is  a
demonstration that both quantified and large scale numbers are what are considered to be the
most impressive and persuasive by these staff.
The  active  participation  element  of  goal  5,  the  part  which  would  rely  on  methods
demonstrating  principles  alternative  to  data  logic,  and  encouraged  a  delegate  role  from the
organisation, is rarely discussed or involved in the discussions around goal 5, confirming that the
data-driven techniques that dominate this project are associated with the growth of a supportive
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audience, rather than a decision-making one and that data logic, and large-scale mobilisation are
synonymous in the organisation and antithetical to the audience-led model. The staff member
representing active participation in the project of goal 5 attends the meetings of goal 5, but barely
gets discussed and their comments were often dismissed by way of moving on the conversation
(Observation  Day  14).  This  absence  of  active  participation  is  discussed  further  in  the  next
chapter around what factors contribute to what is and what is not associated with data logic. 
Summary
Amnesty and Tactical Tech both engage with quantification and scale to represent their success
and the level of support they have to others and themselves. Amnesty see the need for a volume
of support to be so important that it is one of their five organisational goals. The engagement of
the  principles  of  data  logic  in  these  circumstances  shows  their  use  for  supporting  the
organisations’ in performing a trustee role, representing the actions of individuals and groups to
demonstrate support for their pre-chosen campaigns, rather than to listen to their feedback or
decisions. At Amnesty, methods demonstrating principles of data logic such as a/b testing and
profiling are also used to target individuals with personalised messages to persuade them to take
action to show support for the organisation. These are the principles that associate data logic with
a trustee approach, and therefore, also with the approach used in surveillance and manipulative
campaigns criticised by Tufecki (2012) and Zuboff (2015). The campaigns, however, defend this
use as an aspect of building a relationship, or the need for volume in their audiences. These
defences and associations are explored in the following section. 
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4.5 Concerns of Using Data Logic to Support Representation
The organisations both reject the principles of the ideal type of data logic for making decisions
for  their  long-term top-level  strategy.  In both organisations,  as I  will  show, this  rejection  is
directly related to concerns based on their predominant model, trustee or delegate. The models of
trustee  and delegate  both come with  a  set  of  criticisms  particular  to  their  models,  and both
organisations  demonstrate  knowledge  of  these  criticisms  and  are  concerned  that  data-driven
methods  would  encourage  them  to  fall  foul  to  these  criticisms.  Amnesty,  the  delegate
organisation, is worried that following a data-driven opinion will be too quick, simplistic and
lead to a majority rule, ignoring important minority views. Tactical Tech is concerned that, as
trustees,  it  is  necessary  to  then  avoid  anything  that  would  come  close  to  manipulative
communications  that  devalue the audience’s  agency or lead to violations  of their  audience’s
privacy. The area in which there was the most engagement with data, seemed to come from a
desire to demonstrate a large quantity of support, as it was perceived as important to others who
the  organisations  wish  to  influence such as  politicians  or  funders,  in  part  influenced by the
changing CSO landscape in which digital  membership organisation have gained publicity for
their successful engagement with the methods associated with data logic. 
Responsible Delegates: Data Logic and An Over Simplistic Opinion 
As shown, when taking on a delegate role, both organisations engaged with traditional methods
to engage with their constituents and did not use the methods associated with the principles of
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data logic such as standardised large-scale online surveys or algorithmically gathered feedback
from social media and website analytics. This is not due to the reasons posited by the critical
perspective in the literature, the two organisations do not assume data-driven ways of working
could  only  support  the  control  and management  of  political  representatives  in  an  expert-led
model.  Staff  in  both  organisations  believe  the  methods  could  support  a  delegate  model,
however, they contend that the data-driven technologies encourage the dangerous extremes of
the delegate model. The data-driven methods are perceived to be reactive to an online audience
that is fickle and reactive,  making it difficult  for organisations to achieve long-term goals or
unpopular goals. 
In  practice,  there  is  no  loud  or  active  discussion  to  reject  the  tools  and  techniques
associated  with  data  logic,  and  choosing  qualitative  methods  are,  for  the  most  part,  not
accompanied with discussions of the benefits and risks in comparison to data-driven techniques.
Amnesty does not make this argument against data logic in their daily work, where the principles
of data logic are absent without question, but would regularly give this opinion in their responses
to questions in interviews or public-facing presentations. In interviews, when I would prompt
them by asking questions  about  data  and in  some public  presentations,  Amnesty  is  actively
critical of using data tools to fulfil the role of setting strategy. Staff members expressed concern
that the data technologies encourage ownership over decisions from online audiences who may
be representative of the constituents, and the data represented fleeting opinions that would lead to
unstable strategies. 
Two staff members at Amnesty used the same phrase in separate interviews: they didn't
want ‘the tail wagging the dog’. They used this phrase to illustrate that she did not want to use
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the tools that create these large scale quantified numbers because it would lead to a small or
unimportant part of the audience controlling the whole organisation. A campaign manager used
the same phrase in her interview: “you have to be careful whether it is the dog wagging the tail
or the tail wagging.” (Interview 0164). This manager expanded, “do you only chase the topics
that have the most interest or appear to be the most interesting”. The campaign manager said,
explicitly mentioning the work of change.org, a new CSO, and their Beau the dog campaign,
where they raised 632,896 signatures to save a dog from euthanasia (Change.org, 2015). The
campaign manager confidently said while their team could easily generate this sort of interest,
referencing the quantified metrics of success of the petition, but did not want to. She continued
by arguing that data will always represent the most ‘popular’ issues and would not allow the
organisation to work on unpopular, but important, issues that the organisation is known for. The
second interviewee, a campaigner on a thematic issues team expressed, about a broad audience
represented  in  digital  data,  that  data  can help “as  long as  its  a  tool  and doesn’t  dictate  the
agenda” (Interview 6311). Both staff members believe it is important that decisions are made
through  their  formalised  decision-making  processes  above  to  achieve  meaningful  aims:
campaigns that are long-term or important to their audience and only the communication of these
campaigns can be improved by data-driven methods.
Both of these staff members recounted campaigns that held meaning to them due to the
requirement for long-term working on issues that do not always have popular support. These
campaigns were also referenced in other interviews, in public  presentations  and internally  to
other staff members usually to affirm a shared sense of values followed by nods of approval and
agreement from other staff around. Three campaigns are regularly recounted in interviews and
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informal conversations with staff: the slow and successful progress on the abolition of the death
penalty worldwide, their continuation of work in Saudi Arabia despite contemporary difficulties
in access and subsequently limitations on their progress in their campaigns, and a recent policy
passed internally on the protection of rights of sex-workers. To illustrate the importance I will
detail  the  final  one  of  these  examples,  highlighting  the  aspects  of  the  process  which  the
organisation value in their governance structure. 
In 2015, Amnesty International began a consultation to adopt policy recommendations on
how to protect sex workers from human rights violations. Several staff members mentioned that
the data they had collected from social media showed that people were disagreeing with them.
There  was  controversy  around whether  adopting  a  policy  which  protects  sex  workers  could
encourage abuse and exploitation of sex workers by accepting the line of work at all. Two staff
members commented in interviews how the data showed how they would lose supporters and
even some members who did not agree with the final decision but they had to adopt the policy
nonetheless (Interview 6311; Interview 1387). Directly relating this to data one staff member
said: “It is good to get feedback from data if you are on the right track but you wouldn't listen to
it for important policies like sex workers” (Interview 1582). Many of these mentions of the data
were not forthcoming with any actual data, though in other contexts they alluded to the use of
social media content or traffic or surveys, but would retell this story in response to a question
about the organisations use of data-driven techniques. 
To discuss the adoption of the policy,  it went through the same process as described
above.  At the ICM, a working group of  elected  representatives,  who represent  the views of
members  from  their  countries,  looked  at  a  draft  policy  and  reflected  the  views  into  the
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discussion. Through questions, discussion and advice from experts where sought, the staff from
the international office, would make amendments to content and language. Finally, the working
groups proposed a negotiated policy paper to the 500+ delegates of the conference who voted to
accept the paper (Amnesty, 2016a). This example captures their concerns about following ‘data’
and their prioritisation of members’ involvement in deliberative decision-making.
The consistency of the narration of the story suggested its symbolic nature to the staff
members as demonstrating their commitment to difficult topics and deliberative approaches to
making decisions. Amnesty is set up as best as possible to have a deliberative decision-making
process.  In  a  workshop,  presenting  to  other  organisations  and  academics,  they  describe
themselves as a “[d]emocratically ruled movement of millions of people around the world in
over  70  countries  and  2  regions  and  sub-regions”  (Observation  Day 36).  They  demonstrate
recognition  regularly  of  the  complexity  of  bringing all  those voices  together  and coming to
decisions between them. They reject the immediacy and simplicity of metrics which they do not
believe allow the space for conversation, change or nuance. A campaign manager in an interview
said (Interview 0164):
that  ethos  [of  membership]  is  at  the  heart  of  the  values  and  culture  of  the
organisation and influences all of the ways in which we operate even at the global level,
and it leads to healthy and challenging tensions between what our membership may want
us to do versus the strategists sitting in the international secretariat. Sometimes this can
pull in slightly different directions. 
The campaign manager speaks of the complexity of responding to online data within this
tension that already exists. The organisation respects the opinions of membership and experts in
their central international office. The same campaign manager is a champion of using more data
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in the organisation, and adds this should be valued equally amongst the other factors in decision-
making:  “it's not a bad thing for us to let go a bit more, and not hold on, to be a little more open
and responsive and flexible but to hold on to some of that” (Interview 0164). However, the use of
data is a challenge for them to incorporate into this well-established approach partly because it
represents a third public audience.
A team member working on diversity argues that the use of quantified and large metrics,
“should not dictate our work because we can grow and continue talking to ourselves we need to
think about talking to others”. To this staff member, the numbers are not problematic because
they represent a public audience, but because they represent an audience that already agrees with
their work. She argues against even following the data from members, as this can limit their
creativity and divergence in future work: “are we being held back by our members as they aren't
representative of the world? the profile of those who are actively engaged as members are not the
youngest or fringe living” (Interview 5190). The argument is against that of the deductive nature
of algorithmic reasoning,  the principle of data logic:  data will  only show what  support  they
already have - and from those who have not taken much effort to respond, especially if focusing
on quick retention, rather than complex areas where disagreement and progress can be made.
This staff member’s statements are representative of two opinions held across various research
and campaigns staff. Firstly, that their role is not just to listen to those who already agree with
them,  but  to  understand  when  to  listen  and  when  to  persuade  -  confirming  the  responsible
leadership  role  which  involves  a  balance  of  a  trustee  and  delegate  approach.  The  trustee
approach  of  Amnesty  is  discussed  further  on  in  this  chapter.  The  second  value  the  staff
commonly hold is the ability to discuss differing opinions to come to pragmatic and collective
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agreements.
One staff member discussed the rejection of a numerical staff goal that it should not be
those who are easily engaged but it is “much more important to have affected constituency and
politically  motivated individuals  because it  helps build and shape the movement”  (Interview
6311). The is commonly distinguished from the understood concept of slacktivism or clicktivism
(Dennis, 2018). The same staff member continued in the interview: “We are beyond clicktivism,
we need a different kind of engagement, what is beyond, and how can we measure it?” clarifying
that  “person  to  person conversations  are  so  important”  (Interview  6311).  The  staff member
whose job role is championing active participation confirms that  there is a distinction to the
organisation between data-measured actions and quality participation when I tell her about my
research and she briefly explained she does not think there is a crossover between her work and
mine and would not know what to say if we talked. In another conversation with a different staff
member, they mentioned a project they were working with which was exemplary to them for
how they wanted to involve people in the implementation of strategies and “did not cross over”
with my research (Interview 9887). This confirms not only a clear distinction between trustee
and delegate roles in the organisation but the association of data-driven practices also only with
the trustee approach and irrelevant to the person championing the audience-led methods in the
organisation.
Tactical  Tech  mostly  criticises  data-driven  ways  of  working  based  on  other  factors
related to their performance of the trustee role which is explored in the next section. However, in
interviews, the staff presented opinions which corroborated the findings from Amnesty regarding
the negative impacts of the use of data for the delegate model. Two staff members referenced the
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data techniques, in reference to the new CSOs such as Avaaz and change.org, and expressed
issues with their responsive nature to the data-driven audience relationships. One staff member
said  with  disdain,  Avaaz  is  “not  just  populist,  but  populist-driven”  (Interview  29476).  The
implicit argument, due to the association of the word populist currently with the rise of right-
wing politics in Europe, is a danger of populism leading to the control over campaigns from
groups  that  may  be  a  danger  or  have  a  negative  impact  for  minority  groups,  matching  the
concerns of delegate model brought up in the previous research (Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and
Ferguson 1962; Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000).
The issues associated with the data-driven practices for the delegate model are commonly
recognised across both organisations, though are brought up more at the delegate organisation,
Amnesty.  Data  logic  encourages  a  quantified  scale  of  the  audience  which  the  organisations
consider dangerous for the campaigns they work on, fearing data’s perceived objectivity does not
support  the  needs  of  a  complex  decision-making  process.  Further,  the  data  may  represent
opinions which are negative for minorities and short-term, which is perceived to be dangerous
for campaigns which are long-term and, whether due to an active opposition or public apathy on
the topic,  unpopular.  An exploration  of how data is  associated with this  style of thinking is
carried out in chapter 5. 
Responsible Trustees: How to Treat An Educated Audience
Tactical Tech staff, respect themselves as experts in their field, and the audience for their own
expertise, trusting the audience to make their own decisions as to whether or not to engage with
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the organisation, rather than using techniques to target and persuade them to act. It is not, as
critical  scholars  suggest  of  the  trustee model,  that  they treat  the  audience  as  not  having the
competence or education  to make decisions (Lippmann,  1922; Bernays,  1928; Burke,  1949).
Instead, the staff believe the audience knows lots about their own fields and experience, but may
not  know  about  the  organisation’s  area  of  expertise  -  technology  and  social  change.  The
organisation is one expert, delivering projects and information to other experts. This recognition
of the audience’s competence is the justification staff give for rejecting the use of methods which
are associated with the principles of data logic. The staff believe that the principles of data logic
will lead to manipulative techniques but that these do not necessarily have to be engaged with to
perform an expert-led model, which in itself does not have to assume the incompetence of an
audience. 
One staff member, working across various technical projects, in an interview explained
her confidence in her own expertise and the value that guides her relationship with the audience.
She  believes  that  the  audience  has  expertise  in  a  different  field,  and  recognises  that  when
someone is learning something new, they sometimes want an expert who can help them. For her,
her work at the organisation is a way to productively share her expertise with those who want
some guidance (Interview 72948):
you could be absolutely spectacular activists and human rights defenders and be
phenomenal  at  your  job  and  just  have  crap  tech  skills  and  just  need  some  hand-
holding...so if you really just don’t computer, for a lack of a better way of putting it,
maybe you just need someone who will, or a guide who will show you step by step to
install plug-ins because you’ve never done it before, and you don’t feel you have anyone
you can ask, like, privacy badger is really easy to use, it is really well done, but if you’ve
never used a plugin, that's still a learning curve
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The view is both recognising her role as an expert,  who can help bring knowledge to
someone else - and as such performing the trustee role - while also recognising the constituents
as  competent  and educated.  This second view creates  a  scenario where,  as according to  the
language in the ladder of participation, they may inform others, but based on the constituents
deciding their own goals, and the organisation are not interested in stepping into the realm of
manipulation and placation of any constituents for achieving any of the staff’s own goals.
This attitude is common across staff in how they see the constituents interacting with
their products. For example, as described above, when they design the messaging and format for
their products and services they may share these on platforms such as Facebook or Twitter, but
they do not engage with the tools provided by these organisations to ensure the content gets out.
Instead, they assume the audience themselves can use the platform as they would like to access
the information and provide other ways for people to find out more such as their mailing list. 
As a staff member who manages the communications says when discussing the mission
of the organisation, this even extends to people who are not necessarily experts but are engaged
individuals who are keen to learn more: “the more general public or engaged audience,  who
aren’t necessarily aware of what they can do, but they are ready” (Interview 01938). She says
they can be given things that are, as she describes, well designed as they have “something [that]
no matter where you’re coming from you can start tomorrow or today doing something...that's
kind of what we’re going to try and do more of, make things more easily digestible, designed,
more printed materials” (Interview 01938). The aim is to produce designs and write the language
within the content  of products to  be accessible  to  anyone who chooses  for  themselves  their
engagement with the topic.
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There is one strand across a few projects where the staff come close to wanting to reach
and  teach  more  people,  without  necessarily  waiting  for  their  initial  engagement  and this  is
around the normalisation of tools which are often only used by activists. These tools, such as
encrypted email, the instant messaging service signal and TOR, which helps anonymise people
when they browse the internet, are often associated with extremist behaviour. The organisation
works with many minority groups and activists who come under danger for their actions online
and who also want to engage with these tools. 
The staff believe that by encouraging people to use the tools, the tools can become more
mainstream and have less stigma around them. As a manager in operations explains “you take
the niche out of the topic, and at the same time, you have a bit more of a scale and I think even in
the long-term, that leads to a less sensitive way of, or a less narrow way of dealing with some of
the issues that our first target audiences deal with or endangers them or puts them on the spot”
(Interview 29476). The manager goes on to give a specific example “I think encryption is a sort
of a good example, it's not super complicated, but it is sensitive in certain regions and if people
like my cousin or my mum use it, then its no longer associated with ‘oh if you’re using it you’ve
got  something  to  hide’”  (Interview 29476).  This  is  a  shift  in  their  theory  of  change  of  the
organisation - they have previously only worked with other CSOs and activists - experts within
their own fields - but now the organisation wants to broaden out their constituents to the general
public.  The  organisation  are  more  interested  than  in  their  other  projects,  in  educating  and
changing behaviours of the constituents. To do this, they still carry this out through the methods
described above, designing the communications of their products based on their principles and
creative intuition, rather than profiling the audience.  “we need a broad audience to achieve scale
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and wider impact...Unless you get broader support you won’t achieve long-term goals'' and “We
need public support to take the niche out of the topics” (Day 30 Observation). 
The second factor which guides Tactical Tech’s rejection of data, concerning their role as
a trustee, is the staff’s recognition of the risks associated with privacy. In this case, they echoed
the criticisms of Lyon (2015) and Clarke (2003) in the associated risks of data and surveillance.
In interviews and present in their work, they took a privacy-first approach, in which this was a
condition  to  any  product.  This  was  not  just  because  they  saw  a  risk  of  violating  privacy
themselves, but also because they saw that if they held the data, that would be responsible for its
security, and this is not always possible to do.
Privacy is an important principle across the work of the organisation and is a factor which
underpins their decisions. One of the operational managers said “I think privacy was built in
before we even talked about the audiences...it's the first principle...and it's not like oh shit, if we
forgot to anonymise” (Interview, 29476). The manager goes onto explain that by having this
principle first, they do not then worry about their decisions or use of data later, as they know it
was part of the process. This was both presented as a principle, privacy-first, and for the practical
safety of their constituents as they are aware that privacy is not something they can necessarily
guarantee if they do collect personal data. Several staff members discussed the audiences they
work with could be at risk from surveillance from other actors, both governmental, private or
other third parties and that they wanted their work to be able to support all of these people.
Seeing that, as an organisation, they could to choose whether to collect data or not from these,
they chose not to, prioritising the privacy and diversity of the audience. 
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The nature of privacy-first means that in practice it sets the requirements and limitations
of products and services. They specifically use tools and design processes with this principle in
mind. The organisation uses an analytics program to understand how their website is being used.
While many organisations use Google Analytics, a powerful and easily accessible platform to do
this, Tactical Tech uses Piwik (who have since changed their name to Matamo), open-source
software that gives the organisation full control and ownership over the data ensuring that no
third-parties can access this information. Further, they collect the minimal amount of data using
this based mostly on their requirements for accountability to their funders: the number of visits
and the geographic regions the visits have come from. Further, the staff ensure their products are
accessible through the aforementioned TOR systems, which constituents may be used to protect
their own privacy. While some websites lose their functionality when accessed through TOR,
Tactical Tech invests resources in ensuring their products are available through these systems. In
these cases, it is accepted by the staff that there will be no data that can be accessed about the
individual who accessed the site.
The staff also limit their engagement with any data technology that identifies constituents
such as cookies - a file held on the computer which allows a website to identify the user. One
staff member who works on digital products of the organisation explains their use for a project,
the Data Detox Kit, in which progress over several days as part of the service. He says there are
“you can’t log into [the Data Detox Kit], so you have to store the data somewhere...and if they
are  on  private  mode  on their  browser,  or  they  clear  their  cache  or  what,  they’ll  reset  their
progress,  and  there’s  nothing  we  can  do  about  that”  (Interview  15398).  In  this  case,  the
organisation accepts this  limitation of their  work, rather  than prioritising a better  use over a
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technique that might be more invasive to the data subjects privacy. 
Even in response to requests from funders, this principle is at the base of their functions
as she continues to describe what it is to work with funders and take this approach with data 
(Interview 29476):
we never share names in reports or participants lists and I think we try and sort of coach
the  data  sensitive  questions  before  they  come  up  so  the  pressure  doesn’t  exist,  and
sometimes funders are surprised, but we are quite upfront about what our principles are
and in most cases it’s respected, and in some cases, it comes as a bit of surprise and I
think when we take the time to explain why we have those principles then it’s not a
problem.
The relationship with funders is described in more detail in the next chapter as this is one
of the main cases in which data is found in the organisations. Here, I wish to draw attention to
how the principle guides their decisions, even against external pressures. 
Furthermore,  the  staff  apply  the  privacy-first  principle  to  all  aspects  of  their  work,
including  the protection  of  staff data.  A couple  of  different  staff members  responded to  my
questions  about  data  with  statements  about  how  they  protect  recruitment  data  such  as  an
operations manager who said: “I think because of our very very strict policies on data protection,
and you have to practice what you preach...we delete everyone’s application after six weeks after
we’ve completed the recruitment cycle and that means, for example, if eight weeks later you
think oh a person X would be great for this new position that’s come out, you can’t use that” 
(Interview 29476). She explains that this can be difficult, or prevent the speed of some of their
work, but does not at any point suggest that it is a possibility that they would not carry out a
privacy-first principle. In addition, the staff use encrypted email to communicate with each other
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and are usually expected to use encryption, and open-source software, around the production and
hosting of any documents related to their work. The staff at Tactical Tech also say this partly
because they know data and technology is the topic that they work on. For example, the staff
member working on the Data Detox Kit, described above, says “because of the nature of what
the data detox kit criticises we also keep a lot of share options stuff out of it” (Interview 15398).
Many of the staff members, when describing the privacy-first principles,  referenced the Data
Detox Kit and The Glassroom, as educational in their understanding of why they took a privacy-
first approach. 
Amnesty also works on the topic of technology and human rights. They have a team in
their international office dedicated to technology and human rights research and campaigns. They
have led critical  campaigns  on the use of data-driven technologies  to carry out surveillance,
including a lawsuit in 2013, with other charities, against the use of data-driven surveillance by
the UK government (2019). However, none of the staff in the strategy and evaluation teams, nor
fundraising, referenced this work when I spoke with them. The separation of their work on these
issues, and their internal work, was also confirmed by someone who worked in the technology
and human rights team who said: “I just found out our national offices have been buying lists of
data from the companies we are critical of” (Observation Day 15). Despite working on the topic
of external organisations undertaking these practices, she was unaware of Amnesty’s use of the
technologies. The lack of their use of this reasoning to their data-practices does not mean that it
is not a concern to them, but as shown above, their involvement with data is rejected in strategy
setting due to the risks around the delegate model, rather than those associated with the trustee
model. 
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Two staff members, one working on social media and the other on data-driven software
in the fundraising team, were the only two to show interest in discussing privacy. One person
working on the social media platforms made the first reference to privacy I heard from a staff
member a few weeks after I started the ethnography only briefly saying that they needed to think
about it more and when I prompted her to explain more she said: “technology is too fast-moving
to create a policy”. (Interview 1387) Later she also approached me to ask about whether I had
read the book Weapons of Maths Destruction and was keen to discuss the matters, but it was in
an informal manner, this was not discussed in other meetings or in reference to why they do not
engage with the practices to support their delegate role, which instead is rejected in the manner
shown above based on its issues for delegates
Trustees and Consent
There  is  one  situation  at  Amnesty,  their  campaigns  on  individuals  at  risk, where  the  staff
regularly  reference  concerns  regarding  privacy  in  which  they  collect  data  on  beneficiaries,
mostly kept  in a  database.  The project  identifies  individuals  under threat  and designs public
campaigns to support the activists. During 2016 they planned a new system to host the data for
2017, and during 2016 conducted a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA). The plans set out a more
secure system due to the sensitive nature of the data. In the PIA document, Amnesty also set out
a context for when they would not use consent, in which the individual is incarcerated or in
sudden need and it would be impossible to gain consent in time to run the campaign. The lack of
need for consent shows a strong line of where the staff see themselves go from delegate to trustee
- when an individual cannot speak for themselves and is in urgent danger. This is qualitative
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data, away from the methods of data-driven technologies. This is an important contribution to
understanding a line in which consent is considered something that can be bypassed, where the
organisation must have faith in themselves to know the best thing to do in the situation as a
trustee. This activity is carried out with the faith from others that Amnesty can carry out such a
role. 
This also shows a scenario in which Amnesty may have what can be considered security
or safety and a trustee role is preferred - such as those described by Jacobs and Shapiro (2000)
where a national government may see reasons to know they must take action over and above the
opinion of the audience, and Lyon’s (2015) documentation of the use of the word security as
something which can trump privacy. It is one done with much more caution than the case of
government surveillance, however, with a targeted approach rather than one involving scale and
with qualitative data rather than quantitative, therefore less in line with the principles of data
logic. The protection of individuals they work with who they consider to be at risk is seen in
their effort to create a more secure system, their use of their data for their benefit as needed.
Further, researchers use encrypted channels to work with this audience such as encrypted email,
seeing a need to protect them. They collect qualitative data from this audience and sometimes
make decisions on their behalf when necessary. They are most cautious about privacy with this
audience considering them at risk. While this does not show the principles of data logic, it is a
notable finding for reflecting on concerns around the development and understanding of privacy,
consent and personal data and is notably absent from their discussions around the audiences who
lead their strategy, perhaps as they are considered delegates and responsible for their own data so
the organisation takes a step back.
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New CSOs: Aspiration for Delegate Organisations
The  most  engagement  with  the  principles  of  data  logic  was  observed  at  Amnesty,  the
predominantly delegate organisation, for the implementation part of their operations in which
they often take a trustee role. At Amnesty, the tension between their role as delegate and trustee
was pronounced. The most apparent manifestation of these tensions is between the movement of
the audience and the institution of staff experts. An example of this tension was described in an
interview  with  my main  contact,  a  member  of  the  strategy  and  evaluation  team,  who  said:
“Amnesty is both campaigning and research so it will always be both about the experts here and
the campaigns with the people” (Interview 9887). When I spoke to her colleague from the same
team, she said “Amnesty has a “somewhat rare combination of activism base [and institution]”
and when I followed up about this she said “I have been thinking about this ‘are we an institution
or are we a movement?” (Interview 4771).  She elaborated on Amnesty’s history of starting
small and developing to a global level leading to a “somewhat rare combination of activism base
[and institution]”. This tension was mentioned briefly by staff in governance, campaigning and
fundraising but mostly discussed or present in discussions in the strategy and evaluation unit,
who regularly interact with both the national offices who manage most of the membership and
the research staff in the international office. A manager from the strategy and evaluation team
expanded that the reasons that both roles have importance as the “Movement gives breadth and
legitimacy but organisational structures give us credibility, rigour and structured direction and
both  seek  to  make  human  rights  happen”  (Interview  8443).  Amnesty  staff  also  compared
Amnesty to Human Rights Watch. Amnesty staff distinguished themselves from Human Rights
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Watch based on Amnesty’s role as a delegate organisation, with a membership structure and a
movement of support where people will act to campaign for the organisation’s goals. As the
fundraising manager said the membership is the “added value of Amnesty above say, Human
Rights Watch” (Interview 9309). Amnesty manage who can make decisions by only allowing
those who are invested already in the organisation's mission and aim to make decisions and then
managing  these  through the  qualitative  methods,  They play  a  trustee  role  to  those  who are
considered support audiences such as donors, activists and followers managed by different teams
I  believe  Amnesty  engage  with  data-driven  methods  to  increase  their  engagement
numbers due to a desire to compete with larger membership because the staff perceive this will
give them respect from the CSO community, the public and political authorities. Respect from
these actors will help them not only carry out their work but also to survive as a respectable
organisation.  Amnesty  International  aspire  to  grow their  membership  numbers  with  specific
references to the practices in the new CSOs, as shown to be demonstrative of an engagement
with  data  logic.  In  an  interview,  a  senior  manager  in  the  campaigns  and  communications
department said, “We need to learn from the Avaaz and Change.orgs of the world” (Interview
1582). The quote is from an interview with a senior manager at Amnesty. The senior manager
showed a  lot  of  interest  in  talking  to  me about  the  use  of  data-driven  technologies  for  the
organisation, excited for the opportunity to learn more, and was optimistic about the potential.
He showed respect for the new CSOs, and the statement was followed by an introduction to
Amnesty’s new membership definition that the organisation was developing. The new definition
allows some offices to decide that fees could be waived if it is a barrier for their country. This
meant suddenly many of the people who were only on email or phone data in India and Sri
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Lanka  are  now  considered  members.  Due  to  this  change,  Amnesty’s  overall  membership
numbers had jumped from three to seven million. The senior manager believes that seven million
is  still  a  small  number,  which is  what  prompted him to say Amnesty could learn  from, his
collectively  termed,  ‘Avaaz  and Change.orgs  of  the  world’.  This  demonstrates  not  only  the
appeal of the larger authority of these organisations, but the recognition that they are recognised
as a collective development, and movement, within the CSO landscape. 
A direct  comparative  reference  to  Avaaz was also expressed by a staff member  who
worked  with  international  membership.  She  had  a  tech  background,  spoke  about  data
comfortably and had confidence in her opinion on the direction for the organisation including a
better investment and trust in digital engagement with members. She said “If our numbers keep
dwindling,  is anyone going to listen?” followed by “even 7 million globally,  is that enough,
when Avaaz is 45 million?” (Interview 8473). This reference to the Avaaz is once again on the
fear of seven million not being enough. This is symbolic of the biggest pressure that the new
CSOs, and the data-driven technologies, applied at Amnesty: to grow and maintain a large-scale
membership,  where their  authority as an organisation is  represented by a number.  This is  in
contrast to various older methods of evaluating their success including through their impact on
changing  laws,  freeing  prisoners  and  creative  actions  explored  further  in  the  next  section. 
Amnesty has previously, and still, sets the standard for success for others, and this new aspiration
is both a shift in their practices and their sense of their role in the field. 
Fundraising staff at Amnesty do not carry out data-driven techniques with reference to
the  digital  membership  organisations,  such as  change.org  or  Avaaz,  such as  they  do in  the
campaigning team. The desire to grow their donations using data-driven techniques comes from
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the  staff  members  seeing  this  as  valuable  in  itself,  rather  than  in  comparison  to  other
organisations.  A  few  of  the  Amnesty  engagement  and  fundraising  staff  believed  in  the
importance of personal data to have an equal relationship: the collection of data is part of a
conversation. As one fundraiser put it: “Fundraising is like dating: you might have long-term
goals like marriage but you have to start with a few dates...Data is transactional. What you do
with the data creates the relationships” (Interview 2990). These activities may often come across
as a support-constituent role, but in cases where work is done to provide opportunities for those
constituents to do more if they choose to, they may become leading-constituents. 
Tactical Tech, as shown above, did not compare themselves to the new CSOs apart from
once, and did not aspire to be like them. Tactical Tech staff are more likely to compare their
work  with  other  technology  organisations  such as  Mozilla  and Electronic  Freedom Fighters
(EFF), for example, one project staff member said in an interview their project is “fairly similar
to surveillance self-defence from EFF in some ways…[a] distinction is we...have a few more
languages” (Interview 72948). One staff member who had worked in many CSOs previously,
and  helped  the  organisation  by  writing  grant  applications  and  writing  reports  to  funders
referenced the new organisations as a collective, “38 degrees and others like that” (interview
29576). She argued that they are reliant on methods that were focused on numerical goals, in a
way that Tactical Tech was not and did not want to be. She commented on how easy data is to
use, but how that should not be a reason to use it. It is important to her as leading accountability
to funders within the organisation to find measures that show how impactful the work has been.
She acted as a quality checker, and therefore gatekeeper to final grants and reports, which meant
this value is kept throughout the small organisation. 
203
As is shown in their approach to rejecting data above, their privacy-first approach is an
aspect they considered important and setting them apart, and about this one project manager said:
“There  is  an  element  of  this  I  really  like,  that  tactical  tech  has  a  sense  of  authority  to  it”
(Interview 15398). Tactical Tech has an authority to themselves that they seem themselves as
distinguished and leading a field in their own direction, whereas while Amnesty see that for their
research, they believe they need to be more like the new CSOs. 
4.6 Summary
I have presented findings to show how Amnesty and Tactical Tech reject data logic for their
dominant role of delegate or trustee respectively. Instead, to support a delegate role, Amnesty
used  traditional  qualitative  methods  and  deliberative  approaches.  To  support  a  trustee  role,
Tactical Tech used intuition and expertise to design their strategies. Both organisations rejected
data logic based on the criticism particular to their model, the risk of popularity-based campaigns
for the delegates and the protection of the audience’s privacy, and recognition of their expertise,
for trustees. Tactical Tech, when taking on a delegate role, used the same traditional methods as
Amnesty, though through less formalised processes. Amnesty, when taking on a trustee role,
substantially relies on new data-driven techniques. The results suggest that data is only used to
support a trustee model, as suggested by critical literature, but the recognition of the issues of
data for the delegate model does not suggest that the avoidance of the techniques is only because
of the risks of the trustee model, and more attention could be paid to the problems of audience-
led models in the literature. The findings show, that in these cases which were least likely to have
been influenced by data logic, despite the prevalence that is suggested in the literature, neither
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organisation  engages  with  it  substantially.  In  the  next  chapter,  I  will  examine  what  factors
contribute to situations in which the principles of data logic have not been as influential for either
role and why, when engaged with, these principles are mostly associated with performing the
trustee role.
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Chapter 5. The Principles of Data Logic
As described in Chapter 2, data logic is an ideal type consisting of four principles: quantification,
scale, standardised processes and algorithmic reasoning, which can be present at different levels
and in different  combinations  when people work with new data technologies.  Commentators
have  argued  that  these  distinct  ways  of  working  with  data  are  a  prevailing  approach  to
knowledge, and consequently, that decisions are made based on processes demonstrating these
principles (boyd and Crawford, 2012; Raley, 2013; Kitchin; 2014). By examining whether and to
what extent these principles  are present when organisations  work with data,  it  is possible to
identify the prevalence of the ideal type in the organisations’ approaches. For this research, I
chose two organisations which are the least likely cases for demonstrating engagement with data
logic.  Amnesty is  an older  organisation  and as  a  result,  I  expected  them to  face  friction  in
learning to balance the new approach inherent in data logic with its older and more established
operational logics. Tactical Tech’s organisational mission is to promote a critical engagement
with any new technology before adopting it, and as a result, I expected it to be critical before
deploying  methods  based on data  logic.  By examining  these  organisations,  it  is  possible  to
identify which values clash with, and which are compatible with, data logic.
In this chapter, I elaborate on the second research question addressing what are the main
factors  that  guide  the  decisions  made  by CSOs regarding  their  use of  data.  In  the  previous
chapter, I presented how the principles of data logic were only present to a substantial degree
when  these  organisations  performed  the  trustee  role,  and  even  then  is  still  not  consistently
present. In setting the strategy in either organisation, data logic is not as prevalent as presented in
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critical  literature  such  as  the  theory  of  surveillance  realism  (Dencik  et  al,  2016).  Both
organisations rejected the use of data based on the respective model’s criticisms. As the choice of
either model does not dictate the engagement or absence of data logic, this chapter considers the
characteristics of the contexts where data logic is adopted, and where it is rejected. 
There are three distinct contexts in which both organisations engage with the principles
of data logic, plus one that applies specifically to Amnesty. Firstly, the principles are enacted
when staff employ media that allow them to broadcast information, including online platforms
such as social media or websites, traditional media outlets, and speaking events. Secondly, the
principles  of  data  logic  are  found  in  contexts  where  the  organisations  conduct  fundraising.
Finally,  the  principles  of  data  logic  are  perceived  by  both  organisations  as  important  in
communication  with  external  authorities.  Solely  at  Amnesty,  the  principles  of  data  logic
surround  growth  goals  in  which  the  organisation  aims  to  expand  various  areas  including
membership, audiences and income. In contrast, the principles of data logic are absent in both
organisations when dealing with three contexts. Firstly, when decisions need to achieve long-
term rather  than  short-term goals,  both  organisations  tend  to  see  data  logic  as  ill-suited  to
measuring  anything  which  needs  to  reach  beyond  the  immediate  moment.  Secondly,  when
decisions  need to  involve  multiple  stakeholders,  both  organisations  have limited  trust  in  the
technical standardised processes that, in their view, can generate both false and reductionist data,
which would be detrimental to complex decision-making. Finally, when performing activities
related to monitoring and evaluation, both organisations often believe that the lack of context
around single data points renders them meaningless.
Overall,  the  findings  presented  in  this  chapter  help  understand  that  data  logic  is  not
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necessarily  overtaking  all  logics  within  these  two  different  organisations,  but  it  is  mainly
confined to certain areas and activities that are already amenable to the principles of data logic.
The only other context that data logic is engaged in is that in which the organisations’ perceive
pressure  to  present  their  success  in  that  format.  Secondly,  both  organisations  demonstrate
substantial  concerns  with  the  principles  of  data  logic  based  on  specific  needs  of  CSOs  to
incorporate many views when making decisions, especially those which reflect long-term needs.
These findings suggest the need for a more nuanced and in-depth understanding of not only the
uses of data but also the specific weaknesses in data logic that other approaches to knowledge
may be better positioned to address. 
5.1 Contexts in which Data Logic is Apparent
In both organisations, there are three scenarios in which the principles of the ideal type of data
logic are apparent: optimisation of communications on broadcasting platforms, for fundraising
and when communicating to stakeholders. At Amnesty, there is a further scenario in which they
engage with data logic - their growth goal. Other than the final scenario, the attributes of the
contexts are consistent across both organisations which indicates how to understand the factors
which align with an engagement with data logic. Firstly, where data logic aligns with an existing
logic  as  in  the  cases  of  platforms,  fundraising,  and also  with growth which  is  only seen  at
Amnesty. Secondly, the principles of data logic are visible when staff are presenting information
to people outside an expert subject area. 
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5.1.1 Communications Through Digital Platforms, Events and Traditional Media
Both organisations engage with principles of data logic when they engage with broadcasting
platforms. This is seen much more at Amnesty than it is at Tactical Tech, but in both cases, the
situations are the same: online platforms such as Facebook, Twitter or their website, as well as
for traditional media outputs and speaking events. The association is observed and made explicit
by staff, by referencing these issues when describing to me what they thought would be relevant
for my project for example, but with little justification or clear values as to why, as few people
went on to describe the specific utility of data for these circumstances. There was a sense that the
use of data logic justified itself in these situations, and I also propose that this is in part because
these cases already align with data logic: online platforms, media outreach, and events often
already come with numerical evaluations of their success and tools around data logic have only
extended these principles further.
As  shown  in  the  previous  chapter,  the  staff  at  Amnesty  engage  with  data  logic  by
conducting audience profiling and a/b testing in which they aim to prompt an increasing number
of  responses  from  constituents.  This  is  used  predominantly  to  change  and  adapt  their
communications on their social media platforms and their website. Corroborating the association
of data logic practices with online platforms, when I asked a member of a strategy and evaluation
team that did not engage with data logic if they would ever use the data derived from these
practices, she said they had considered using it to measure the use of their internal intranet page
(Interview 4771). Amnesty also have a Massive Open Online Course (MOOC) and a research
platform that asked people to take part in micro-actions to assist with research. The staff member
in charge of the MOOC expressed when I talked to her how we “now have 75,000 people and
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want to start working out what to do with that” (Interview 2990). Similarly seeing the numerical
representation of success for the platform of micro-actions the person in charge said: “it was a
success as 28000 people did 1146602 tasks” (Interview 1838). In the case of both platforms, the
number is expressed both with pride and excitement to share their work with someone who is
also working, albeit researching, data-driven practices. In neither case did the staff members see
any need to give more justification of what these numbers mean, or how this would relate to any
other parts of work. A large proportion of the engagement with data logic surrounded the use of
online  platforms,  and all  uses  of  online  platforms  contained references  to  principles  of  data
logic. 
Tactical Tech also engaged with the principles of data logic when working with online
platforms, and although much less than Amnesty, given that data logic is almost absent from
Tactical Tech, it is notable in the few spots the principles appear. The main use of data logic is in
the use of website analytics, in which staff evaluate the success of pages and review audience
engagement with their content, which they described in interviews and informal conversations.
One example given in an interview was the use of quantified website analytics to show where
most hits were coming from to evaluate what language to translate the web pages into. A staff
member managing one of the website projects was examining whether to translate online content
into French or Portuguese and decided to examine whether this was worthwhile according to the
website  statistics.  The  staff  member  discovered  that  “above  French  and  Portuguese  were
Vietnamese and Indonesian, or Bahasa'' (Interview 72948) and used this information to decide to
translate text into Bahasa. Tactical Tech also engaged with social media platforms, and while, as
shown in the previous chapter, one manager makes decisions from their own interests on what to
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post with frequency but not consistency, the manager would share the figures from Twitter to the
whole organisation through email, as they described, to share what people have been interested
in with the organisation (Interview 61394). They also had a Facebook account but did not engage
in the principles of data logic in their use or evaluation of the tool.
At Amnesty, there is also a presence of quantified metrics and scale in association with
media monitoring in which Amnesty measures the number of people in the audience they reach
through traditional and online news organisations. At Tactical Tech, this was not as true, as will
be shown further down, the organisations were more interested in which media organisation had
picked up their work rather than how far it reached. However, numbers are used to assess the
success of online and offline events at Tactical Tech. One staff member from the operations and
grants team listed all the types of data involved (Interview 29476):
visitors to the Glassroom [exhibition]...number of requests to host an experience
[of the exhibition]...numbers of subscribers to In The Loop [newsletter]...the numbers of
visits to the specific website, there is the number of trainings and training requests, the
number of people who are trained, these are all on the side of quantitative data that we
use and that we need for the reports.
Tactical Tech also used quantified metrics from different events they ran and attended.
Exhibitions,  training  and  events  they  have  attended  are  all  gathered  in  reports  called  event
reports. As the staff member who manages the communications or the organisation explains, all
staff must fill in an event matrix when they return from events they have organised or attended
which collects information such as “what they were doing there, how many people were there
and how many materials, quantifiable information” (Interview 01939). The reporting was done
separately across each team, and each team decided for themselves how and when to report as
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long as it is in line with the funder’s requirements.  These reports are not for the purpose of
optimising future events, but rather to demonstrate their impact which I will go on to explore in
the section on the use of data to communicate with stakeholders. In the first cases explored here,
Amnesty and Tactical Tech optimise and measure the success of their website, and Amnesty also
optimises social media and other online platforms. These practices utilise all the principles of
data logic. In the cases of traditional media and events, the principles of quantification and scale
are apparent but not the use of standardised processes or algorithmic reasoning. Audiences are
not necessarily profiled and content is not tested repeatedly.
5.1.2 Fundraising
When introducing my research to the staff at Amnesty to any new staff member, most people I
spoke to would immediately recommend I spoke to two specific staff members, both of whom
worked in the fundraising team. Fundraising was an area in which I found the most substantial
engagement with data logic was presented, both in practices and in the proclamations of staff in
interviews. As mentioned in the previous chapter, when I asked a senior manager in fundraising
if  they  use  data,  a  senior  manager  responded:  “Fundraising  is  all  data”  (Interview  9309).
Engagement with all four principles of data logic was seen in how Amnesty’s fundraising from
how the team structures its work, to how it achieves its goals. 
The fundraising team at Amnesty use numerical targets and benchmarks to manage their
strategy and evaluation. The staff use the same techniques as those in digital communication,
encouraging  the  national  offices  to  profile  their  audience  using  customer  relationship
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management  systems  and  experiment  with  different  levels  of  testing  and  experimentation.
Exemplary of this is one of the most recent projects undertaken by the team, the development of
software called ‘Kandle’. There is one staff member who works on various systems to try to
centralise data and analytics for the organisation. Amnesty’s home-made program, Kandle, is
one of the most complex data systems apparent that Amnesty uses. Kandle shows figures for
fundraising efforts from various channels, at different times of the year, with benchmarks and
aspirations from across the different national offices. The purpose of the software is to unpack
what the staff member refers to as the “black box” that surrounds how targets are reached by
national  offices  by  making  it  possible  to  measure  quantified  metrics  by  channel,  or
demographics, or any other categories they wish to program into the software (Interview 3322).
This is done in a quantified way, examining how different attributes which can be presented in
data  impact  on the  number  of  donations,  in  keeping with  algorithmic  reasoning where  it  is
believed that by managing the inputs and mechanisms the technocrat can have control over the
outputs. The data in the software does not yet cover all the national offices, only the ones the
international office staff member has chosen based on who showed interest and had the capacity
to run it themselves. 
This  practice  also  demonstrates  how  the  fundraising  team  also  uses  this  style  of  a
standardised process and algorithmic reasoning, with quantified large-scale numbers, at the level
of  their  operations,  strategy  and  planning.  The  staff  create  targets  for  each  communication
channel  such as face-to-face,  through the website and over the phone. The staff create these
targets based on how much money they want to deliver, what type of person they will aim to
receive money from and via what channel. They look at how much money other organisations
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are getting from their members through different channels. They evaluate the success of different
tactics to raise different levels of money, attain new donors and retain donors and to see which
donors are most likely to drop off again. These targets reveal the influence of the principles of
scale as success is indicated by increasing the number of responses.
Tactical Tech does not carry out fundraising in the same manner as Amnesty - they do
not rely on small donations from the public, nor do they have a team dedicated to fundraising.
Instead, they have two staff members whose work covers different operational aspects of the
work including grant funding. Despite these differences, fundraising was still one of the main
situations  in  which  the  principles  of  data  logic  were  seen.  In  several  interviews,  people
referenced funders regularly when I asked about data such as describing website analytics as
“completely for funding and occasionally someone will ask what is the most visited” (Interview
01938) and another  concluded the  description  saying “I  think that  a  lot  of  funders  are very
hopeful that this whole data environment and big data can be used to prove and improve impact
reporting on a large scale” (Interview 29476). I found this attitude in observations between staff
in meetings too, as a project staff member in a meeting to plan new projects said that they "need
something to drive visits because funders need outreach and want one hundred thousand visits,
not ten thousand" (Observation Day 10).  The staff would discuss tactics to increase their website
hits so as to improve their chances of receiving further grants. I found that these techniques are
never employed towards the goals of mass testing or optimising content, or via tools which do
this such as Facebook advertising.  Instead,  Tactical Tech would look to increase outreach to
partner with other organisations such as media outlets, libraries or CSOs with a public audience.
Therefore,  there  was  once  again  an  engagement  with  quantification  and scale,  but  not  with
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standardised processes or algorithmic reasoning, which is discussed later in this chapter. 
5.1.3 Data Logic for Abstract Growth Goals
The final context in which there was a consistent use of data logic is only found at Amnesty: the
use of all four principles of data logic surrounding their growth goal which was part of a single
goal. Only in the most recent international goals set by the organisation, described in the last
chapter, was there a dedication of a single goal, goal 5, to growth. Growth is defined, according
to documents describing the goal and in interviews, as a quantified increase in engagement from
their audience. This involves an increase in their membership from 8 million to 25 million, and
from 250 million euros to 400 euros. This was used in benchmarks, and achieving and testing
tactics,  measured  against  the  quantified  and  large-scale  goals  which  they  aimed  to  use  to
represent the level of support the organisation gained as well as to rely on to run their projects,
displaying the processes and levels of success. For example, the staff member who is creating the
database software, Kandle, described how this is for different fundraisers for the organisation
from  across  the  world  to  input  their  fundraising  goals  and  achievements  through  different
channels (Interview 3322). The staff members from across the national offices can choose based
on this system whether they want to set targets that are base, conservative or ambitious.
Those who are part of the goal 5 team talked about the importance of setting a high goal
to inspire ambition. For example, a senior fundraiser said the most exciting thing about goal 5 is
“scaling the ambition to be bigger and stronger, it’s not about achievable,  although it is, it’s
about trying” (Interview 9309). There is not only a recognition that the number is not necessarily
215
about any specific impact other than growth itself, but that it does not even have to be achievable
-  in  this  way  a  number  is  an  abstraction  of  success  that  they  find  useful  for  encouraging
engagement.  This  was  also  recognised  negatively  as  many  staff outside  of  the  goal  5  team
expressed how they also realised it is not a tangible goal and felt it had come out of nowhere.
One example was the staff member working on digital engagement channels for the international
office who is not part of goal 5 working group, but who is part of developing strategies for the
international office and assisting national offices in achieving this goal. This same staff member
said that she is not sure why they had chosen 25 million as it is not based on anything (Interview
1387). The same sentiment came from someone leading the diversity element of the goal 5 team
but who had not been at the project meetings (Interview 6311).
The caution surrounding the use of data logic was also seen in a rejection of qualitative
and non-standardised methods described around active participation.  Active participation is a
part  of goal 5 to not just increase the number in their  audiences,  but also the quality of the
audience’s contribution in decision making. However, active participation was rejected as part of
goal 5 initially by the working group as it didn’t have any “definition or measurement of exactly
what they will be so we can’t tell if we are doing it well and don’t want to take responsibility for
it” (Interview 9309). In one strategy meeting on goal 5, a member of the fundraising team talked
about the importance of avoiding “selecting change goals that are not going to be monitored” a
criticism which they levelled particularly at active participation (Observation day 30). The staff
member representing the incorporation of active participation in Goal 5 meetings rarely spoke
(Observation day 30). The rejection of qualitative goals within the growth goals also showed an
inability for data logic to coexist with alternative methods. 
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Tactical Tech does not have any goals or objectives based on growing their audience. The
staff have to report that they have reached certain numbers of people engaging in their products
for funders. However, the staff do not have internal goals which are solely based on growing the
number of funds or audience members. This may change over time though as their projects have
previously been focused at other experts who represent others - other CSOs or activists - but are
now directed to a public audience. The public projects may lead them to work more on quantities
of  constituents.  The communication  officer  notes:  “And things  like glassroom change things
because  it's  really  public-facing,  the  more  people  know  about  us,  so  changes  the  way  we
communicate”  (Interview 01938).  Tactical  Tech  does  not  currently  have  any strategic  goals
presented  to  the  team around the  concept  or  growth or  to  increase  the  number  of  funds or
audience without these being connected to the specific aims of a project.
5.1.4 Presenting Information to Others
Both  organisations  engage  with  quantified  metrics  and  scale  in  contexts  where  they  are
communicating with stakeholders such as for their accountability to funders and management
and as evidence of the audience’s support in order to have an impact with external authorities. At
Tactical  Tech,  as  described  above,  the  only  consistent  use  of  quantified  metrics  and  data
technologies  is  in  reports  to  funders.  As  was  said  in  an  interview  with  the  staff  member
managing communications funders  (Interview 01938) “each funder has a different kind of layout
but normally, it will say something like one of the deliverables will be to have so many new
visitors to the website”. The funders set formats for reports which dictate what the organisation
gathers data for and this includes a variety of platforms in which the broadcasting of information
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can be measured. However, as a manager said, the organisation is “often asked by funders to
deliver more data which we don’t have” (Interview 61394). Further, the staff push back when
funders request granulated personal data, providing the broadcast aggregate data. The staff “try
and sort of coach the data sensitive questions before they come up so the pressure doesn’t exist”
(Interview 29476). However, this remains a context in which Tactical Tech uses quantified and
large-scale metrics. 
Tactical Tech does seem to recognise that this perception needs to be challenged and at a
strategic  meeting  one  staff  member  said:  "the  board  just  don't  give  a  shit  about  numbers"
followed by "people are so used to giving numbers and reports are all numbers and statistics so
hard to get out of the mindset" (Observation Day 30). As one project officer says, recognising the
issue that the values around data are something that comes from a widespread belief (Interview
72948):
I don’t think it's that simple, I think funders experience their own pressures and funders
feel the need to say ‘oh we are improving and efficient and getting good value for our
money’, and I think there are a lot of larger challenges of narratives around efficiency and
evaluation of results.
Tactical Tech recognises that funders are under pressure too and that this pressure comes from
larger forces around accountability.  This attitude was not present at Amnesty, and as will be
explored in the second half of this chapter, the staff were more likely to feel that the external
stakeholders they had to communicate with believed in data logic and it was their job to push
back. 
At Amnesty, as was explored in the previous chapter, quantified metrics are considered
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important  for  the  ability  to  have  an  impact  on  authorities  outside  the  organisation  in  their
campaigning. To repeat a key example with this in mind, one fundraiser who had worked a lot
with the movement justified this belief in the power of quantified metrics by explaining how they
were “trying to get meetings with politicians and as soon as we hit 100,000 we were suddenly
getting  meetings  as  the  politicians  knew  we  held  power”  (Interview  2990).  Campaigners
believed  that  external  experts  such  as  intergovernmental  organisations  such  as  the  UN,
politicians  and government officials from different companies and large companies would be
more  likely  to  listen  to  them if  they  could demonstrate  wide public  support  in  a  quantified
format. Their need for authority using their large scale membership numbers is not always with a
specific target in mind; the staff believe they only have the mandate and authority to exist if they
have the large-scale audience which a large quantitative number would represent. For example,
in relation to the previously mentioned policy on the protection of the rights of sex workers, one
staff  membered  said:  “Human  Rights  Watch  had  worked  on  sex  workers  for  ages  but  the
democratic structure of amnesty is what made it get in the news and controversy, size of the
movement is important for that” (Interview 6311). There are many ways they have previously
displayed this authority, such as through the visual imagery from protests and media coverage of
the  presentation  of  petitions  to  authorities  as  spectacles.  These  are  still  used,  but  are  now
accompanied with - and seen by the staff as validated by - the numerical representation of their
constituent’s support for either that cause or for the organisation as a whole.
The use of data is not only used to persuade external authorities but also to prove the
success of data technologies to internal stakeholders. Amnesty staff in a digital communications
team are  in  charge  of  the  social  media  and website  of  the  international  offices  as  well  as,
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providing  ad  hoc  support  to  national  offices  and  specific  projects  for  their  online
communications.  The  staff collect  data  for  all  International  Secretariat  owned channels,  and
argue that  other people in the organisation have more respect  for their  work when they can
demonstrate its success, citing the numbers they might use such as those from website analytics
or social media. One of the team’s jobs is to carry out insights analysis. Insights analysis refers to
the reports they produce weekly on the number of visits to the website and the website traffic.
They send these reports to teams. When I asked about why they produce these, several of the
team commented that the purpose of these according to the team members is for weekly reports
for “justifying digital-based decisions in the organisation” (Interview 6358). They believe the
most  effective  way  to  do  this  is  to  demonstrate  their  success  through  reports  of  quantified
numbers, to managers across the office. This is the purpose of the previously mentioned joint
platform, Kandle. “The name of the game for Kandle is to allow more investment in digital and
data” (Interview 3322). Those working with data-driven technologies felt pressure to prove the
success of their tools and felt the best way to demonstrate this to others is through numerical
metrics. 
In all of these cases, staff in the organisations use numerical evidence, usually presenting
a large-scale level of engagement from an audience, to prove their success to someone other than
themselves. This is perhaps because of a commonly perceived value of data logic to others. In
this case, it is the belief that others hold data logic in high esteem that is widespread, as opposed
to  the  use  of  all  the  principles  within  their  own  decision-making  and  operations.  A  more
sympathetic view, and broad theory, is that numerical data is also easy to communicate, and can
act  as a  shared language.  The use of numbers  in  Tactical  Tech’s  reports  to  funders,  and in
220
Amnesty’s representation to authorities as well as internally between staff is because numbers
provide an opportunity to share a language to communicate the impact of their work. The staff
may work across  different  types  of  projects  with  different  types  of  goals,  but  everyone can
understand numerical goals and can see the progress next to them. This is important for a funder
to hold others to account, especially if they are not a specialist in the CSOs’ field. It is also
important in cross-team projects where they need to find shared goals together. However, this
only explains the use of quantified metrics and not the value placed in scale nor its association
with online platforms reliant on all four principles of data logic. 
5.1.5 Summary
Data  logic  is  seen  in  association  with  the  optimisation  of  online  platforms,  particularly  at
Amnesty.  The platforms are set  up and managed through algorithmic reasoning and provide
quantified  metrics  which  allows  external  authorities  to  measure  the  success  of  their
communication. Staff engage with data logic in the situation where the platforms are already set
up to do so.  Engagement with data logic is  also seen in fundraising,  whose logic is already
similar to that of the ideal type of data logic - quantified metrics and targets have traditionally
been used to represent the successful raising of funds, so it is not a new skill they must learn
when it is applied to people’s behaviours. Furthermore, the importance of data for the staff at
Amnesty is also for their use for targets for growth based on their ability to measure and improve
the  quantity  of  constituent  engagement  with  the  organisation  which  is  based on algorithmic
reasoning. Data is mostly used in situations where logics already align, such as fundraising and
online platforms. Metrics are also used to represent the success of the online platforms, as well as
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a broader set of platforms including media monitoring to track mentions in media outlets and
event attendance numbers. I argue this is due to the perception that others, such as funders or
managers, have faith in data logic. I also demonstrate numbers may act as a shared language
when communicating  between stakeholders  with different  expertise.  Further,  the use  of  data
when  communicating  with  others  could  be  because  there  is  a  desire  to  be  perceived  to  be
engaging with data logic or recognising respect for it from other experts. 
5.2 Context in which Data Logic is Rejected
In chapter 4, I described how both organisations use a variety of traditional methods, either as
delegates  or  trustees  including  personal  judgement,  written  feedback,  and  deliberative
approaches. The following section shows that data logic is rejected in favour of these methods
for three clear reasons. Firstly, data technologies prioritise real-time results which in turn favours
short-term wins rather than long-term difficult campaigns. Secondly, the lack of control over the
standardised processes leads to inputs which create false and context-free opinions which are
deemed by the staff to be unhelpful for decision-making which involves multiple stakeholders.
Finally, the nature of representing information as unique values disposes of the contextual and
narrative information which the staff believe is necessary for evaluating complex social change.
The issues with data logic are well established and rejected in the organisations, showing that it
is  not  prevalent  everywhere  and in  particular,  there  is  a  caution  to  such an  approach when
complex social change is needed, which requires personal judgement and inductive, qualitative
approaches rather than the deductive simplicity associated with the methods of data logic. 
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5.2.1 Long-Term Goals and Short-Term Data
During my research, I was invited by the staff member at Amnesty to attend a conference with
her, where she was presenting on how Amnesty chooses what to prioritise for its campaigns. As
she began her presentation she said with a laugh “I feel I should warn you, unlike the other two,
this is not a presentation of graphs” (Observation Day 36), referencing the graphs that had been
presented  in  the  last  two  presentations  from  an  environmental  NGO  and  an  international
development organisation showing how they prioritise their campaigns. Amnesty International
sent a representative from the strategy and evaluation unit to discuss priority setting from the
human  rights  perspective.  The  representative  from Amnesty  explains  that  the  organisation’s
decision-making does not lend itself to graphs like these, which require numerical analysis and,
through algorithmic style analysis, present order to the information. She goes onto describe the
priority  setting  explained  in  the  previous  chapter,  in  which  they  use  their  intuition  and
discussions with members and staff to decide priorities within the goals and allocate resources.
While most of the use of the traditional techniques is implicit, in that staff do not reference a
rejection of data logic when using alternative methods, in this presentation,  the staff member
from the strategy and evaluation team makes references to their rejection of data. 
Another staff member said in an informal conversation: “We are finding a lot of pressure
to be evidence-based” (Observation Day 36), referring to how they feel Amnesty needs to show
numerical data to their board or external groups to prove their success. In a follow-up interview,
the staff member expressed concern that there is pressure from the board to constantly document
numerical  results,  in  a  value,  she  placed  on  them  as  their  need  to  show  value  for  money
(Interview 9887). Her concern was based on the issue that the data could not represent the slow
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and long-term change associated with the speed in which popular opinion changes. An example
was given of one campaign in a country that is currently not getting very much media attention.
In this country, there are substantive issues they are working on with no clear way to make an
immediate impact, in this case, because the change in power in the Government has led to a
limitation of human rights in the country. A staff member who is part of the team campaigning
on this country also confirms that they need to be able to keep working on topics, even when
sometimes external factors mean that they cannot have an impact, and being accountable to real-
time  transparency  of  data  can  prevent  this  (Interview  2093).  The  data-driven  techniques
associated with data logic focus on campaigns that  have short-term popularity,  which is  not
effective for long-term change.
The staff member presenting to other organisations also references the use of data to
money and in the priority setting workshop she said, “Social change doesn’t happen according to
market forces  - if Nelson Mandela didn’t carry on even when there was little impact, nothing
would  happen…[the]  value  Amnesty  adds  can’t  be  calculated”  (Observation  Day  36).  The
organisation must continue to invest and work, even when the impact is either not measurable, or
where  the  data  reflects  that  opinions  suggest  otherwise,  and  the  current  impact  level  to  be
minimal or even non-existent at the time it is measured. The staff trust their judgements and
expertise to make a decision more than a figure that represents, say, their previous impact, or the
predicted impact. They also believe that data would have a pretence of transparency but in fact,
be responsive to short-term and easy wins rather than their difficult topics. While the staff who
are keen on data in fundraising and within goal 5 are keen to use more data, staff in strategy and
evaluation and research teams are cautious about this perception of transparency due to its short-
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term outlook. 
Tactical  Tech also  does  not  regularly  discuss  this  weakness  of  data.  However,  when
prompted, the staff express a similar concern based on the short-term nature of the data. One staff
member working on digital security projects expresses that there is (Interview 72948)
a lot of unintended consequences from what is considered fundable...I mean funders want
to be like ‘oh look we did 17 trainings’ and that’s crap, trainings don’t work like that...I’d
rather have year-long security trainer fellowships or multi-year long
Other  staff  in  meetings,  particularly  those  working  in  grants  and  reporting,  expressed  the
importance of avoiding setting targets which would focus on quick fixes and instead value the
acceptance of the complexity, and potentially more difficult to measure, changes they are trying
to achieve. Though not an explicit often rejection, the rejection of numbers to funders and the
appeal to small scale qualitative partnerships is seen in their practices instead. 
5.2.2 Technical Standardised Processes Lead to False Data
The  staff  at  both  organisations  present  the  belief  that  the  data  will  never  be  an  accurate
representation of the object or person it represents. The inaccuracy is not considered a problem
when the data can be useful as a tool, such as the abstract goals to aim towards, or to optimise a
platform.  However,  the  inaccuracy  in  the  data  is  considered  by  both  organisations  as
counterproductive  to  capturing  people’s  opinions,  whether  their  reasons  for  engaging  with
certain  materials  or  to  be  able  to  make  decisions  with  multiple  stakeholders.  Instead,  when
making  decisions,  the  staff  in  both  organisations  prefer  spaces  in  which  there  is  space  for
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deliberation and information is qualitative.  There is both an active rejection for data in these
cases, as well as an affirmation from staff that 
This rejection of data analytics is not explicit at Tactical Tech: the staff do not explain to
each other why they will not be using data. Instead, the criticisms are given only when prompted
by myself, or by funders requesting the data. During interviews with staff members, I asked why
they did not use website traffic in decision-making, to which several staff members dismissed the
accuracy  of  this  data  of  representing  engagement.  Two staff  members  mentioned  how they
believe some of the highest peaks are likely from bots (Interview 72948; Interview 36724). As
mentioned  previously Tactical  Tech also pushed back to  funders  who asked for  statistics  to
explain  the  importance  instead  of  measuring  their  work  by  the  small-scale  but  meaningful
impact. The collection of information to understand what people would like or want is instead
gathered in smaller-scale and qualitative formats. In one project, a staff member needed to test
the product to make decisions for form and language. To do so, she asked staff members and
people in her own contacts to go through the product and tell her how they felt as they used it - in
line  with  design  principles  around products.  Although,  as  shown above,  the  staff used data
showing the use of the website to decide on the language to translate the content into, for the
most part, content and many of the translations were chosen by the staff or through requests from
other organisations, showing a preference for small-scale and expert-led, rather than data-led,
decisions. When discussing creating impact and assessment reports in a skillshare for the office,
someone said: “surely we could make up qualitative statements” but it was laughed off when
someone said, “why would anyone do that” (Observation day 2). The nature of qualitative data,
which may be less standardised, is that it is also a more accurate representation of events.
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The  staff  at  Amnesty  also  recognise  the  problems  with  standardised  processes  in
collecting data, and the issues with considering data to be objective or accurate. The strategy and
evaluation team gather information through standard action reports which measure impact for the
national offices, and they removed the spaces in the reports for reporting Facebook and Twitter
stats. When I asked about this decision to a member of the team, they said it was because they
believe these online metrics could be fake or made up (Interview 1387). Further,  one of the
reasons the strategy and evaluation team said they did not listen to the results of the large public
survey they carried out, explored in detail in the previous chapter, is because they knew how
fickle the data from the survey could be. By changing the ordering of questions they noticed a
change in the topics which were considered priorities, and so while the data might be informative
in some respects, it was not a concrete fact which they would want to use to lead their decisions
(Interview 8443). 
One of  the main contexts  in which concern over  the validity  of  data  is  expressed at
Amnesty  is  around their  federated  structure.  At Amnesty,  there  are 70 different  entities  and
various  teams  within  the  international  offices.  Each  carrying  their  own  data  collection  and
consultations. By having both an international office that oversees strategy and evaluation and
national  offices  that  manage  the  relationship  with  their  respective  national  constituents,  the
international office has a difficult task in creating data collection systems that work worldwide.
As a campaign manager explains to me  (Interview 0164), 
we’re a long-standing institution, we are federated in our structure, and that means our
data is also very fragmented, so data is held by each of our national sections, some of that
is held here at the global level, but...they have all grown up independent of each other and
it is very difficult to actually have any meaningful oversight of what is out there.
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Every country has its own way of collecting, coding and managing data making it very labour
intensive to merge into a single database. As the campaign manager continues to explain to me 
“Amnesty is very fragmented and very diverse and each of our national offices in a slightly
different way, looking at where we need a consistent definition for what we are actually tracking,
but that is much easier said than done” (Interview 0164). As every office has their own system
the  data  is  not  always  in  a  consistent  format,  which  is  necessary  for  the  processes  to  be
standardised. There are different resources, skills and job roles which manage the data. As proof
of this, at the question and answer session between the strategy and evaluation team and national
offices, a wide variety of different roles turned up from many directors to campaign coordinator,
to organisational development, to Donor Relationship. (Observation Day 11). This also leads to
different resources affecting what software is used to manage the data, such as excel spreadsheets
or customer relationship management systems, which affects the consistency of the format of the
data when it is reported to the international office.
Furthermore, some sections have relationships with their constituents based on face to
face interactions that do not depend on contact data, or whose addresses are based on a less
centralised national system (for example, the first cream house on the right up the hill to the
mountain).  As the campaign manager, also in charge of goal 5, said: “collecting that contact
information  might  be challenging for some sections  as it  might  not  be standard of practice”
(Interview 0164). In a meeting in which national offices could phone in to ask questions about
reporting,  an East  African  country  national  office asked “how about  people  without  contact
details?”  (Observation  Day  11).  This  is  not  just  an  issue  of  different  formats,  but  different
methods for contacting people which by their nature necessitate that the data logic principle of
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standardisation  cannot  take  place.  This  leads  the  national  office  to  rely  instead  on  non-
standardised  processes  for  gathering  information.  For  example,  in  the  documentation  of  the
standard action reports they describe “If you currently have no way to provide the exact number
of your entity’s members (e.g. due to national legislation or the way your office is set up), please
leave this category blank, providing comments in the ‘comments’ column.” (Amnesty, 2016b).
The staff in the national office created data collection and hosting systems that protect the quality
and quantity of responses from a diverse set of national offices, and subsequently, there is a lack
of consistency present that is required by the data logic principles of quantification and technical
standardised processes.
5.2.3 Context-Free Data 
The third context in which there is a clear rejection of data in both organisations is in evaluating
complex change as data that can be stored in a database lacks informative context. Amnesty’s
evaluation system presents questions to prompt people to evaluate their theory of change through
storytelling, in which staff fill in text boxes with a few in-depth descriptive examples, rather than
aiming for scale. While there is a column for evaluating the change in behaviour on a rating of 1-
4, this is accompanied with text boxes for describing in detail a few scenarios in which they
witnessed a change. This is all coded in a manner in keeping with more qualitative methods of
coding: drawing out of significant themes based on the staff member’s intuitions while reading
the reports and highlighting key examples rather than any quantitative measures, which I was
trusted to do while I was in the position of participant as observer, and taking part in the work.
Amnesty,  instead  of  using data  logic  methods  to  evaluate  success,  used qualitative  methods
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associated with narrative, allowing for context and nuance. 
The aspects measured in the standard action reports are human rights impact, growth,
stakeholder  participation  and  diversity  and  for  human  rights  impact  and  stakeholder
participation, the forms involved text boxes for free text qualitative answers. The forms they sent
around  for  monitoring  and evaluating  many aspects  of  their  work  gave  plenty  of  space  for
qualitative and personalised responses and they embrace storytelling as a form of reporting. They
only sometimes used drop-down menus even for short answers. An example from their annual
project review form which was followed by open text boxes (Amnesty International, 2016):
Analyse up to three important outcomes from this reporting period outlined above, either
because they are the most significant steps towards one or more of your objectives OR
where your project was particularly key in achieving them.
The staff are dedicated to the quality of response from the national offices, at the expense of the
ease which a data logic approach could offer in the standardisation of data through reducing it to
a unique value. They found no survey software adapted to their questions and instead of adapting
their questions they instead used an excel spreadsheet and a word document. The staff accepted
that  this  presented  an  issue  of  information  it  would  be  useful  to  standardise,  for  example
reporting on the Americas could be written Americas, AMRs, AMR, or mistyped such as Amricas
as it was free text.
Staff  members  who  engage  with  data  logic  substantially,  working  in  digital
communications teams and fundraising, also see the importance of context, instead of finding
ways to do this within methods based on data logic. A staff member complaining about the use of
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data from the team working with analytics from social media said: “There is a huge buzz around
metrics in this organisation and we have to push back” (Interview 1387) and arguing that “it’s
not metrics for metric’s sake” (Interview 1387). Instead, these staff members want to produce
reports in which they have already carried out analysis and generated what they refer to using the
term common within data science roles in the organisation: insights. The same person who said
that fundraising is all data also commented that she did not think campaigns should be, because
850 petition signatures cannot “be considered a success without comparing it to what and to
who?” (Interview 9309). The lack of benchmark or target renders it meaningless. Numbers are
tangible only if given their context with other numbers, which is how those engaging with data
logic give the numbers meaning.
Many staff at Tactical Tech also demonstrated a belief that quantified data did not have
enough information or context to be informative or demonstrative of the organisation’s impact. A
manager who works on evaluation in the organisation says that the metrics do not “say anything
about our impact or the outcomes of it” (Interview 29476). They do not believe data can show
the  complexity  necessary  to  capture  social  change.  The  staff  member  who  delivers  training
explains  how the numbers  around training  do not  give  anything away “we can’t  know how
successful something is  by how many trainings there are,  maybe one is  enough -  it’s  really
tough” (Interview 72948). She continues, reaffirming her point by saying that targets are “proof
that we did stuff but how many trainings we do depends on a whole bunch of different things so
it’s not like we can internally use those numbers for very much” (Interview 72948). She goes
onto explain that there are many factors that go into how many trainings they carry out for
example, whether they have the resources, whether they want a one-off training or they want
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something that is embedded in a regular format in their work and whether they have new staff
regularly. She also describes how training does not necessarily lead to success which can be
based on a whole variety of factors limiting the use of the information of how many training
events the run.
Several staff members connected this rejection of the usefulness with the lack of context.
As a manager said at an organisational wide planning meeting "we need to be more outcome-
based  and  less  output  base,  the  board  don't  know  why  we  have  given  out  8000  boxes”
(Observation  day 12).  This  is  confirmed  by the  people  at  the  reporting  level  too.  The  staff
member who manages grants and funding describes the use of numbers form their newsletter or
website saying (Interview 29476)
that says they’ve done that and that you’ve reached a number, but it doesn’t say anything
about whether your website is any good or your newsletter is any good or if they read it
or if they took an action or spoke to a friend after reading the newsletter,  so it’s not
meaningful in an impact or outcome point of view.
The staff can measure these numbers but they do not answer the question of impact alone, and as
they are often alone, they are not used at all. As a project officer on one project said: “there are
legitimately  times  that  2+2  =  5  and  that's  really  hard  if  you  don’t  come  at  it  with  that
understanding mindset” (Interview 72948). The manager of grants and reporting said: “you could
work for ten years on changing the law, and then nothing happens, then you don’t have to worry
about attribution” (Interview  29476). The recognition of the difficulty of measuring the social
change in reductionist numerical form is recognised across by many Tactical Tech staff. The staff
member, even with this recognition, continue with the criticisms, however (Interview 52398) 
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I  do  find  web  stats  kind  of  frustrating  because  you  don’t  know… what  people  are
thinking behind it, so say you had a thousand visits to the website, it’s like okay that’s
great, but how long you know, you can kind of see from the stats how long they stayed on
there but did they actually look at it or did they just have it open, I feel it’s kind of
frustrating cause you don’t get the context behind it, 
This staff member explains that she believes in this value because her work is about people.
Instead, she asked groups to provide information in open text form surveys after workshops or
through journals. In gathering information, these qualitative forms were trusted over and above
data, which is explored further in the next section. 
Instead, Tactical Tech relies on focus groups, verbal feedback at events, and feedback
forms which are “not that scientifically representative but...a way to gauge some of the feedback
that we got” (Interview 29476). Another staff member who mentioned above how much she
wanted to know the context of why people are engaged also expressed the joy of qualitative
feedback instead. She describes how in (Interview 52398) “you really get an insight into how
people really feel about [the workshops]...I love doing sections of workshops where I get a lot of
written ideas from people, post-it notes...because you get a lot more insight”. She also explained
that she enjoys receiving stories, anecdotes, images and videos from people who run events with
Tactical Tech’s contents as she feels “you could be there” (Interview 52398). This sense of being
there is important to her in evaluating the success of the project, over the number in attendance
or the number of events. The staff collect information on their impact through feedback forms,
engagement through conversations, emails and chats, objects and information taken away from
events as well as anecdotes, quotes and examples (Observations Day 12). This sense of context is
important  for all  the staff in evaluating their  impact,  rather than, what they consider to be a
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meaningless value of a number representing their activities. 
The staff at Tactical Tech also believe that data needs to be given context if it is going to
be used, through other data.  As an operations manager brought up website metrics at a staff
meeting regarding impact assessment and said “[if reporting] visits to Data Detox Kit online
doubled...  for  this  sort  of  thing  you  need  a  baseline”  (Observation  Day  12).  Another  staff
member who works on a few different projects that both involve trainings and online content said
(Interview 52398) 
it's good to know, for example, if you have a 70% bounce rate, and you feel really bad
about that, knowing that maybe all the other sites have that sort of bounce rate than you
are like ‘oh okay I guess that's how people on the internet are’, so in that sense it's good
to know what the other sites are doing and how your site compares to other websites that
tactical tech runs
However, this recognition of the need for baselines or analysis to make sense of data did not
mean that data-driven methods were engaged with. Staff continued to reject methods associated
with data logic when conducting impact assessments and evaluation because they desired to see
more context that they believe images and qualitative data could capture better.
5.2.4 Conclusion
Quantitative  data  is  considered  to  be  reductionist  and  limited  to  demonstration  short-term
opinions,  weighted  towards  representing  opinions  that  are  not  conducive  to  long-term
campaigns. The algorithmic reasoning of data logic is considered to produce inaccurate results
which  prevent  them  from  being  useful  for  deliberative  decision-making  involving  multiple
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stakeholders. The standardised processes lead to quantified data which is context-free which is
not  useful  for  understanding why or  how change happens which  is  context  necessary  when
evaluating social change campaigns. This belief reflects the issue raised by Karpf (2017) that
measuring social change is far more complex than measuring the success of an election outcome
which is  based on a percentage of the vote.  Karpf (2017) suggests that  this  is  the analytics
frontier, that which is currently not measurable but with the development of techniques and scale
of data may be challenged. However, this may not address the short-term nature of data-driven
methods,  nor the need for context  asserted by staff in both organisations.  In particular,  both
organisations, and many CSOs, work on unpopular campaigns and there are so many external
factors that go into changing policies, behaviours and laws. The limits of data may not be fixed
by the further application of the principles  of data logic -  increasing the quantity of data or
developing more robust standardised processes - but recognising when they can help achieve a
goal, and when they cannot. 
5.3 Summary
Both Amnesty and Tactical Tech engage with data logic in the optimisation of online platforms.
Amnesty  also  used  data  to  improve  their  tactics  for  fundraising,  and  Tactical  Tech  in  its
communications with funders to demonstrate the effectiveness of its activities. Amnesty used the
data-driven methods to  increase  the number  of  constituents  they  address  and the number  of
actions they undertake to support the organisation. Both organisations also valued the use of
quantified goals and evaluation metrics as a way of communicating to authorities outside of their
discipline. In these cases, the principles of standardised processes and algorithmic reasoning of
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data logic were not necessarily present in their operations, but only in their communication of
success. In this case, there is either a different logic in how people communicate, or there is a
perception that data logic would be approved of by external authorities and this is how best to
communicate success even if they are not engaging with it in their practices. 
Both organisations relied instead on qualitative methods, their intuition and expertise, and
deliberation with members or experts to build their strategy and evaluate their impact. These
traditional  methods,  that  do  not  display  any  of  the  principles  of  data  logic,  are  regularly
associated with the organizations’ desire to focus on complex, and at times unpopular, issues, as
well as long-term change in social and political rights, which require something other than the
short-term metrics that data logic provides. The evidence that there is recognition of the issues
surrounding  data  logic,  as  well  as  the  adoption  or  continuation  of  the  use  of  alternative
approaches, challenges the perception that practitioners are unquestioningly engaging with data-
driven  practices.  Further,  the  communication  of  information  which  demonstrates  data  logic,
without engagement in their own decision making, is based on the perception that data logic is
persuasive to others and presents evidence for better research and argument for the utility of
qualitative, inductive and deliberative methods in CSOs practices.
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Chapter 6. The Technocrats, Software and Data Doubles
Research so far has focused on the impact of trust in data logic leading to entrusting three agents,
technocrats,  software  and  the  data  double,  to  make  decisions  on  behalf  of  the  political
representatives or the constituents; when data logic is followed the agents are treated as neutral
and therefore are seen as not having any notable impact on the outcome of a process. This is
despite widespread evidence that these agents can be biased and error-prone. The trustee and
delegate  models  traditionally  envision  two  main  agents  in  decision-making  -  the  political
representatives and their constituents. The agents in the data-driven technologies disrupt three
parts of this traditional decision-making process: the role of technocrats, the use of the software,
and the faith in the data double. How the agents function and operate in practice can affect the
outcomes of the data practices, and therefore the staff’s performance of their desired role vis-à-
vis constituents, as trustee or delegate, and their ability to manage their engagement with data
logic  in  generating  knowledge.  This  chapter  examines  the  findings  from  the  third  research
question which emerged from this review: In what ways do the organisations engage with the
roles of the technocrats, the software and the data double when making decisions?
The findings show that Amnesty engages far more than Tactical Tech with data logic
across all areas in which it is used, described in chapter 5. This is reflected in the different ways
in which the organisations treat technocrats. The findings show that the staff at Amnesty have a
categorical  concept  of  technocrats  –  defined  as  staff  members  with  specific  job  titles  and
responsibilities  relating  to  the operation  of data-driven technologies.  By contrast,  at  Tactical
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Tech there is no distinct concept of a technocrat,  technical expertise is integrated into each staff
member’s role. I argue the degree to which the organisations distinguish the role of technocrats
correlates  with  the  degree  to  which  it  adopts  data  logic.  In  both  cases,  the  organisations’
engagement with technocrats is separate to the engagement with data logic, though impacts the
ability to make choices in the engagement of or not. The literature often subsumes the trust in the
processes of data logic and the trust in technocrats. For instance, van Dijck (2014, p.204) argues
that  “Dataism  presumes  trust  in  the  objectivity  of  quantified  methods  as  well  as  in  the
independence  and  integrity  of  institutions  deploying  these  methods.”  However,  the  findings
presented  in  this  chapter  highlight  that  organisations  establish  relationships  with  technocrats
separately from their relationship with data logic so that they occur independently. In addition, in
both organisations, the role of software is dictated by the staff’s principles which is consistent
across Tactical Tech and divided between the technocrats and non-technocrats at Amnesty. The
data double is treated separate to these agents, and, as will be shown in this chapter, are treated in
relation to the organisations’ views of data logic described in chapter 5.  
6.1 Technocrats: Integrated or Isolated
Technocrats  have technical  expertise  in using data technologies.  The organisational  positions
they may hold include data scientists, programmers, digital engagement experts and social media
managers. As we saw in chapter 2, the processes surrounding data practices place the technocrats
in positions where they can influence decision-making. Technocrats  can choose what data to
collect and how to analyse and present the data. In the case of digital engagement experts, they
operate data-driven platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Website and Emails. They may also
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choose how to present this data to others, including what data to visualise and what data is left
out.  Amnesty  distinguished  the  technocrats  within  the  organisation,  giving  them  full
responsibility for the data-driven technologies and rarely integrating them into decisions outside
of the technologies they operate such as strategy, campaigns and research. At Tactical Tech,
there is little distinction between people who have knowledge about technology and those who
do not. The staff are confident in discussing technology and have control over the influence on
decision-making. Decisions are made at Tactical Tech with mixed groups of experts with little
distinction between those who are experts in the use of technology and those who are not.
6.1.1 Isolated Skills of Technocrats
Amnesty’s technocrats are clearly distinguishable within the organisation by both their job titles
and the attitude towards them and their work. When I introduced my work to staff at Amnesty
almost every person I talked to would helpfully recommend other people they believed I should
talk to, and consistently it would be the same set of people: the digital engagement team and a
few singular roles in fundraising, membership, and research. The digital communications team
and singular actors across the other teams are isolated. The role of all of these technocrats is
demonstrated to relate to perceptions of the values of staff surrounding data technologies. I will
separately explore the role of IT after who are often not mentioned by staff, but also demonstrate
how the organisation overall does not integrate data-driven practices. The distinction of staff in
technocrat roles in their job roles is, as will be shown, an indicator of the separation of their work
from other parts of the organisation, such as strategy, research and campaigns. 
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The isolation of the technocrats in their job titles and roles was also visible in their work.
The staff in the technocrat roles generally worked alone, with full responsibility for decisions on
the operations and evaluation of the platforms. For example, The digital engagement team are
considered technocrats in the organisation. The team expressed that they had full control over.
The technocrats are only involved in making decisions when the operations of one of the data-
driven tools are needed. The technocrats are not in charge of the content. The staff receive the
content from other teams which they then upload to social media and the website. The digital
engagement team are not in charge of the success of the campaign but are in charge of the
success on the website or social media. 
The two other singular roles in data in other teams including fundraising and research
expressed in interviews the same frustration at needing to set their deciding on the software they
choose, one of the staff members expresses to me that she thinks if they had a data expert in their
team it would have been a better decision  (Observation Day 8). However, these same two staff
members  in the strategy and evaluation team in a few informal discussions talked about the
different types of software they can use and have tried for collecting and hosting the data. The
staff in this team also discuss the limitations of the different methods for approaching data and
talk with confidence in interviews when asked about their work. However, when a tool such as
Google Analytics, or online data is described, they would still point me towards the technocrats
(Observation  Day  8).  Despite  being  someone  who  works  on  the  databases  that  hold  the
qualitative and quantitative data for the strategy and evaluation teams they did not think they
could talk informatively about the organisation's use of data. 
Amnesty treats technocrats as those who are knowledgeable in the operations of data-
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driven processes. One manager in campaigning, when I asked in an interview about what data
the  organisation  uses,  said:  “Weare  getting  better  competency on this,  so it  sits  with a  few
different  places  now,  some  in  campaigns,  some  in  comms,  some  in  fundraising,  and  the
international membership team” (Interview 0164). When introducing my research at Amnesty,
there were two types of responses from the staff who were not in technocrat roles, either an
excitement where the staff would want to hear more about my research and how it can help their
work  or  dismissal  of  relevance  in  which  case  they  would  point  me  towards  someone  they
perceived to be a technocrat. In the first case, I discovered it was because, by introducing my
research topic, I was categorised as a technocrat to these staff. In the follow up with these staff
they would, often in a confessional manner, say that they do not know anything about data-
driven technologies and they were hoping I could help them learn more, as a technocrat. One
staff member, after expressing her own inability to engage with the topic said to me “it’s good
you find it so interesting” (Observation Day 3). She believes that the organisation has to work
with data-driven technologies but did not feel she had the expertise or the enthusiasm to do what
she  believes  it  would  take  to  be  an  expert.  Others  expressed  similar  sentiments  that  the
knowledge and use of data-driven technologies was not part of their role, but instead the role of
the staff who they perceive do have this expertise, any one or more of the technocrats listed
above.  One  campaign  manager  who  discusses  how  she  sees  the  individuals  doing  data  as
different, says “I do think you need people with specialist skills who understand how to pull
high-quality analytics and read them accurately and...a bit of neutrality can be a bit helpful, we
don’t have a stake in this, but this thing ain’t flying, and this is” (Interview 0164). The manager
specifically wants someone who is not invested in the outcomes of the work to provide a neutral
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assessment of how well communication is doing. 
At Amnesty, sometimes the digital engagement technocrats would act as gatekeepers to
the data, keeping hold of their status as technocrats. One member of the team describes how she
had to sort out who would have access to google analytics. When she began 189 people had
access to google analytics. She wanted to change that because “they weren't doing things like
excluding crawlers  and people were going in  to  pull  in  one data point,  but  it’s  not  the full
pictures so it changes the image...I wanted to control that” (Interview 1387).  Instead, she created
weekly reports which she sent to teams with the information she deemed relevant to them. She
only gave access to a couple of people who knew how to. This created more work for them but it
is, to them, better than someone who is not an expert, or technocrat, creating the information
themselves.  The  person  who  worked  on  social  media  argues  that  people  do  not  “see  the
difference between analysis and insight”  (Interview 6358). The most important bit for her is the
latter. To this manager, the difference between analysis and insight is that the former is a context-
free number discussed in the last chapter and insight is being able to say what this means. The
staff member who described having to manage up said that the senior managers “love numbers
but I don’t think they really understand them” (Interview 6358). She also described how people
get really excited about big numbers but no idea what it means. Both these staff members want to
control  the  interpretation  of  the  data,  not  believing  management  or  other  staff  to  have  the
technocrat skills to manage to correct themselves. 
At Amnesty, there is one anomaly in the staff, who is managing to integrate many of the
staff  members  and  their  work  together,  and  who  everyone  assumed  I’d  be  talking  to 
(Observation Day 9). This single force is a technical staff member in the fundraising department,
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who has created a working group with senior management support collecting together people
with data and insights in their job titles or with that expertise. The aim of the group is to collect
information from the national office staff and international staff and external organisations to put
suggestions forward for investment from senior management for some form of support for the
data and insights capacities of the organisation.  In line with the values outlined above, he is
trusted by managers to have the freedom to spend time on the project, without much oversight.
This group is unique as it  has produced interest  and conversation across teams -  albeit  only
between other technocrats. The staff member may have been successful as he is very charismatic,
talking to people around the office regularly, interacting with different teams and signed off one
email  relating  to  the  working  group,  “hugs  to  all”  (Observation  Day  38).  He  also  has  a
background in technology companies, and, in keeping with their standards around alternatively
designed offices,  he  is  the  only  one to  use the  new standing desks  in  the  organisation.  His
comfortable separation from others in terms of expertise and distinct nature associated with tech
start-ups contribute to his ability to create a cross-disciplinary group on data-driven methods. 
At Amnesty, the IT team are considered service teams who provide to the other teams to
support the internal operations of the organisation. This not only gives them the same isolated
technical status as the other technocrats but also means they are only incorporated into plans
which are necessary for internal systems such as hardware and software for staff, rather than any
external-facing project work. This is despite their expertise and enthusiasm to be involved. At
Amnesty one week into my research, as mentioned, I had been introduced to many of the people
considered technocrats listed above. During this first week, I had been sitting near someone who
I had not been introduced to. In the fifth day, he introduced himself and the conversation went as
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follows (Observation Day 5):
Staff member: I don’t think we’ve been introduced actually, what is your role?
Me [standard response]: I am doing research looking at how the organisation is using
data, specifically data around social media metrics and website traffic
Staff member: Okay. 
Me: How about you?
Staff member: I am a consultant looking at documenting all the data the organisation is
using.
During his time he assessed which data existed across what teams and how it might be
connected  in  a  central  database.  While  our  aims  were  different,  our  objectives  had a  lot  of
overlap. The other staff I had spoken to had been happy to point me in the direction of different
staff, and knew of this staff member on a personal level, talking to him regularly in the office, but
nobody had considered this IT consultant important as a contact for my work.
This story turned out to be a foreshadowing of how organisation’s attitude towards IT:
they are barely  visible,  called  upon only when there are failures  in  systems they have been
expected to set up in the background supporting internal operations.  There are four people I
spoke to in the IT department who all feel they cannot make a difference in the organisation
around data management. Three of them expressed frustration that they are disempowered by the
organisation  or  teams  to  provide  the  support  that  they  felt  could  be  possible  by  teams  not
involving them in planning meetings or project meetings. Two of these staff members had even
spent  time as part  of  their  job investigating  different  systems for  comparing data  across  the
organisation, including communications data, but had found no way to work with other teams to
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implement their research. The consultant who I had sat next to ended up developing as much as
he could, but the documentation of his work is not integrated into any of the major planning
documents  that  I  saw.  A manager  within  IT said  he would be  passing it  onto another  staff
member but there is no sign of when this might happen, and the new person would be able to do
what they want with the work so it might not be carried on at all. 
 The chief information officer, who is interested in being more involved with data, and
had hired the consultant above, feels he is not involved in data, despite feeling it is his role.
Again, this is despite his enthusiasm. When I was in the office, he had worked with me before,
and we briefly caught up and I explained my research. He was excited to hear about the research
and asked “do you have ten minutes now?” (Observation Day 12) expressing a desire to show me
what he has been working on. He went on to show me various pieces he had been working on,
including  through  software  which  showed  the  analytics  of  the  website.  He  had  also  been
researching tools for social listening and described his findings from this research to me. He did
not,  however,  understand  how to  get  other  teams  interested  in  this  work.  His  only  contact
through to other teams, he believes, is through the management but this had not been fruitful. He
had also spoken to some of the other technocrats but their conversation had not led to productive
outputs. I argue that this is because the staff of the organisation viewed the IT professionals as
internal support rather than helping with the software relating to their external communications,
and the technocrats in other teams already felt they had to be solely responsible for the work, as
shown above. 
One staff member in the strategy and evaluation team was looking to collect data from
the national offices and wanted to decide what software to use. She carried out a lot of research
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herself,  and roughly a week before they had to send the software to the national  offices she
passed by the chief information officer in the corridor. They had a brief discussion about what
the advantages and disadvantages of the survey choice would be, which confirmed what she had
already researched. The IT staff member said to her to come to find him and they could talk
more, but she decided it was too late in the end. After the survey had been sent, no action was
taken to try to develop the software for the next year. 
6.1.2 Expertise Integrated into Teams and Roles
At Tactical Tech, however, there is no distinct concept of the technocrat. Although some staff
may be responsible for the oversight of a part of the data-driven practices, such as the website or
analytics, all team members are expected to be responsible for the parts which are relevant to
their work. Furthermore, those who are responsible for technical projects such as the website and
their  outreach in  communications  are  often  involved across  projects  too.  Many of  the  team
members have backgrounds in technology or data science, and even when they aren’t everyone is
interested in technology in some way and willing to discuss different parts of the technologies.
The staff are all in some way skilled in technical expertise, or willing to learn, and do not hold a
view that there are separate technocrats who control the data-driven products. 
Several staff members are accountable for the oversight of the data technologies, mostly
also held other responsibilities relating to the content and outputs of the organisation - not just
the operations. For example, one staff member describes their role as the person who works on
the research and content production of several projects but also works on their online content as
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he is “the cross-project lead for the design team or the production team” (Interview 15398). One
of the senior managers in the organisation describes the three parts of his work as “...I produce
content”, “the technology side of the organisation, the part that is connected to programs how we
developed  applications,  websites,  systems  and  so  forth…”,  and  communication  which  is
“representation on the one hand and on the other hand banal things like running twitter for the
organisation” (Interview 61394). Everyone is involved in planning meetings including those in
design, and those planning the outputs, and often these are the same people. Rather than isolated,
those  with  more  technical  expertise  are  respected  and  involved  in  organisational  processes
including meetings and decision-making, and those with less technical  expertise  are also not
outside of planning or decision-making on technology, instead involved in those decisions. 
Tactical Tech human resources and management are interested in hiring people who are
interested in being involved in decision making and responsible for their own technology use -
rather than operators or facilitators of decisions. In practice, relating to either of these cases in
which a staff member may not feel they could carry out their responsibility or did not have the
knowledge to discuss a data-driven technology, would then do research or ask for help to learn
from another staff member. At a voluntary training around the use of technology for personal use
held  at  the  office  many  staff  members  attended  and  expressed  various  levels  of  different
knowledge of different technologies, comfortably sharing with each other the things they know
about technology and the things they do not (Observation day 25). This comfort was present
across  the  organisation  and  meant  that  staff  were  often  able  to  then  address  gaps  in  their
knowledge and maintain control over the processes they are involved in. 
At Tactical Tech, though many of the digital projects have oversight from an individual
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staff  member,  there  is  an  expectation  that  everyone  is  responsible  for  their  own  use  of
technology. Project staff manage the analysis and reporting of their projects, so the staff member
in control of the project will decide to interact with analytics at different points, or whether to use
qualitative  data.  Further,  if  they  do decide  to  use analytics,  they are  expected  to  access  the
analytics  themselves.  There  are  sometimes  issues  when people  would  like  to  use  a  website
analytics system but do not have access or knowledge, sometimes they decide not to take the
time to engage with it when time is limited for learning the skill. In addition, as access is not
centralised, sometimes it is not clear how to access a specific third party tool that requires log-in
details. Several times people would ask around to find the login details for different data-driven
technology accounts as and when they needed access such as to Flickr and Vimeo (Observation
Day 8; Observation Day 12), and they would never know the exact person to ask so this would
be done through staff-wide emails. This lack of process may have been partly due to the lack of
oversight,  partly  due  to  the  personal  responsibility  placed  on each  staff  member  and partly
because of the general lack of enthusiasm for engaging with the metrics anyway.
Further, content and research staff, while given support, are responsible for their own data
security.  Staff are expected  to  use encrypted  email  and messaging software to  communicate
internally,  and where  possible  externally.  The staff are  expected  to  also  make decisions  for
themselves as to what is the most appropriate channel for communication each time. The staff are
expected to choose and learn for themselves open-source software to carry out their work. In
addition, staff encrypt their own data in emails or saved on their laptops. All of this is done with
the support from other staff members if and when needed. In these cases, the other staff members
may be the one whose job role indicates that they support the organisation in this way, but it may
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also be someone they are sat next to who knows how to. It is expected that each staff member
learns from these discussions so as not to need to be always assisted in this way.  
At Tactical Tech, the IT support team is made up of a couple of roles who are solely
programmers carrying out projects, but they are involved in decision-making meetings early on,
and a few people who work in IT or security who also work on projects. As shown above, a
senior manager works on projects and manages the digital production team (Interview 61394).
Another staff member who works on digital security projects as well as digital security within the
organisation (Interview 72948). This may be partly because the organisation is smaller, so it is
easier to integrate roles and people have to take up work when there are not enough resources to
have a separate person. This may also be because the managers have an interest in technology
from the start and set the tone for the organisation. 
The integration of technical expertise in roles and their engagement meant that decision
making was carried out as a group. When deciding, for examples, a platform for one of their
projects  on  gender  and  technology,  the  whole  office  was  asked  to  contribute  ideas  for  the
website.  The  planning  was  done  with  the  staff  member  running the  project  and  the  person
running the IT products team at the time. These are also developed with the values of security in
mind, guiding decisions not to use tracking cookies, as a value of the projects integrating into
how the product is built.
6.1.3 Technocrats and Logics That Do and Do Not Match
Amnesty’s technocrats  are distinct and isolated from the organisations’ project work, and are
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only, and solely, responsible for the operation of specific technologies. The technocrats and other
staff members had different values that dictated their  ways of working - different logics that
could not work together. The technocrats in the digital engagement team and the single roles in
other project teams engage with data logic, while the strategy and evaluation staff, campaigns
staff and research  staff work with principles  that  are incompatible  with data  logic  based  on
context-based and negotiable qualitative, deliberative and intuition-based methods. In Tactical
Tech, however, by having the skills and responsibility to operate the technology alongside the
knowledge of the project within a single person, any inconsistency between the logic had to be
negotiated directly. Through this, the staff could make decisions in a more clear way relating to
their desired outcomes. 
As we saw in the previous two chapters, in some contexts Amnesty does not engage at all
with data logic: strategy and planning, evaluation of impact from their research and campaigns,
and some projects involving active participation. Amnesty also has projects in which they do
engage with data logic: namely fundraising and digital  engagement projects  involving online
platforms.  Projects  that  data logic is  part  of,  and that  technocrats  work on, and the projects
involving other methods do not often overlap. One of the technocrats in another team said that
she is not “sure on what strategy and evaluation really do or why I [the researcher] would be
there” (Interview 1838). She divided her work into data, and my research on data, from the work
of the strategy and evaluation team. In the Goal 5 project team, there are staff members from
fundraising, digital engagement, active participation and diversity but the latter two do not feel
represented, or that their work is so different to the numerical growth goals, and they do not
attend some meetings or speak much when they attend. It follows from these cases that data logic
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is  seen  as  mutually  exclusive  from the  type  of  qualitative  work  done in  other  parts  of  the
organisation.  The technocrats  aligned values could be seen in their  ability  to  work together.
While isolated from much of the organisation, as mentioned, the IT team did talk to the finance
team who also happily supplied data for the business analysis. The working group set up by a
technocrat  in  fundraising  is  formed  of  a  cross-disciplinary  team of  technocrats  from across
departments.  These  staff  also  shared  ideas  in  social  settings  including  in  the  pub,  informal
meetings in the office and over lunch I was also invited to (Observation day 6).
The incompatibility of the approaches also presented itself in attempts to bring the data
from different  parts  of  the  organisation  together.  The  aforementioned  IT  consultant  who  is
gathering data from all the parts of the organisation to create overview dashboards said: “It’s a
nightmare” because there is “no synergy across the departments” (Observation day 5). He had
managed to get finance data and HR data, but no more than that and found it hard to work with
any of the teams or bring the things they work on together. In interview he expanded (Interview
7858)
Generally, people are not discussing things across departments, everyone uses different
systems,  everyone works  in  silos  and it  is  very difficult  to  share  anything.  Research
reports  do  not  get  shared  or  measured  alongside  finance.  This  can  be  an  advantage
because no team is held back but mostly it makes it very difficult.
When the consultant talked to the law department they admitted they do not even know how to
use excel (Interview 7848). The staff who do not see themselves as technocrats also reject any
engagement with those tools. 
There is a desire by those in technocrats roles to work with more people with similar
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values.  One staff member  in  the  digital  engagement  team says  she  believes  a  technocrat  in
fundraising “has it  easier” (Interview 6358) describing how their  management  supports  their
work, and they can talk to their team about the projects they are working on. The value placed in
data logic, and distinction of values, is aligned with the professional background of staff. Most of
the technocrats in the digital engagement team and the single roles across the organisation come
from commercial marketing backgrounds. A manager in charge of hiring said in an interview,
“we don’t  have  a  lot  of  digital  marketing  experience,  it’s  much  better,  [staff  member]  has
brought a lot of expertise but he is one person, we are hiring, but it’s difficult” (Interview 8473).
In the cases of fundraising and marketing, the values align with those of the digital engagement
staff member - including the principles of data logic.
The IT staff I spoke to mostly had a commercial background, including from banks and
management  consultancy.  The  team  did  not  have  a  role  which  impacted  outcomes  of  the
communications of the organisation, which is why I have not explored their relationship with
data logic in the previous chapters, however the times I did talk to them they expressed a value in
the principles of data logic. One new staff member in IT who had come on board to examine data
said  she  had  excitedly  been  talking  to  someone  in  the  finance team about  estimating  reach
through  measuring  different  proxy  numbers  such  as  references  in  articles  or  circulation  of
newspapers (Observation Day 37). Two different staff members working on collecting data in the
organisation expressed that they were interested in creating a business analysis system in which
they would gather numerical metrics from the organisation to manage and optimise processes. A
manager in the IT team said: “I believe you can optimise anything by numbers, data can optimise
the chain, but people don’t like optimisation word here, or any business language” (Interview
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3452). The same manager described the work of Amnesty as creating a product that is “a nice
warm feeling,  you pay your membership  fee and in  transaction  you get  to  feel  better  about
yourself, this is my worldview” (Interview 3452). This business approach aligned with the values
of data logic, and again, not with others in the organisation, such as the staff in the law team or
those in strategy and evaluation which may be why it was difficult to include them in decision-
making.
In  Tactical  Tech,  as  described  above,  there  is  no  distinction  between  those  who are
technocrats  and those who are not.  This means that  whatever  values  they have,  they do not
manifest  as  distinct  different  ways of  using the  data-driven technologies.  Overall,  there  is  a
consistency in the values which are still based on the principles of the organisation - those shown
throughout that they wish to trust their intuition, and that they value their audience in a way that
makes them cautious to use any data-driven tools that could affect privacy in any way. Their use
of data-driven technologies is then consistent across staff members. This is perhaps because they
are a technology-era organisation.  Many of the staff either had technology background, such as
in a tech-startup or data science, or they came from roles in CSOs or activist groups. In cases
where  they  do  not  have  a  technology  background,  they  have  an  interest  in  the  topic  of
technology. In addition,  the hiring that takes place in the small  organisation is controlled by
management ensuring only those with values that align, while at work, are employed. 
6.2 Software Choices Managed by Logic
The second element  of  data  processes  which  can gain  agency is  software.  This  may be the
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algorithms which are used to analyse personal data to create profiles of types of constituents,
such as lookalike audiences on Facebook, or predicting the support of individuals.  This also
includes software for hosting data such as CRMs which dictate the format of the data or type of
data that can be collected, hosted and analysed. At Amnesty, the strategy and evaluation team,
who do not trust the principles of data logic, use flexible and well-established tools such as excel
and  word  and  collecting  data  through  email.  The  digital  engagement  and  fundraising  team,
however, trust third-party software or design their  own software. Tactical Tech, on the other
hand, are interested in their software to be open-source and protect the privacy of users. This
meant they used only a few software programs consistent across the organisation, which were
vetted by their in-house experts.
At  Amnesty,  the  Strategy  and  Evaluation  Unit  set  up  a  system  to  gather  data  for
evaluating campaigns from all  the teams in the international office and the different national
offices. The teams gather the data mentioned in the previous chapter, a collection of qualitative
stories around outcome mapping and quantitative metrics around membership to evaluate the
success  of  projects.  While  I  was there,  one  staff member  was  tasked with  finding the  right
software. Firstly, she began by doing desk research and asking anyone she knew in the team and
a brief in corridor discussion with IT as well as her own internet research. From her assessment,
they decided to go with word and excel, prioritising their values of the qualitative data, and the
ease with which people in national offices could all access it and fill them out. This is despite the
awkward nature of sending two documents to seventy different offices. The excel spreadsheet
contains a few drop-down menu options around the number of members, supporters, fundraisers
and activists as well as governance and finance information. Then there is a word document for
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collecting qualitative information on the outcomes and actors they influenced. The form also had
space for storytelling of individual stories. In any of the sections on quantitative measures they
almost always had options for adding comments. This is then sent to all sections individually
who then passed the form around the relevant  staff in their  office to fill  in different sections
before  sending  it  back.  The  team admit  that  these  are  outdated,  as  one  staff  member  says
“Personally,  I  think  there  are  constraints  because  of  the  technologies  we use.  We only  just
updated to the new Word and Excel,  we need sophisticated systems… [web surveys] are not
personalised enough for the organisational needs.” (Interview 4681). The staff are unwilling to
compromise on their values and seek software that will achieve their aims, however, as they do
not have the skills or resources, they find themselves limited to the software they are used to
provided by IT. 
On the other hand, there are more complex and modern database software systems used
in other parts of the organisation which do engage with data logic. Between fundraising, digital
engagement  and  membership  the  organisation  uses  Engagement  Networks  for  a  customer
relationship  management  system,  Krimson  for  social  listening,  Sprinklr  for  social  media
management, and google analytics. These are third party database systems which both dictate the
format for the collection of data as well as have set algorithms for processing and creating new
personal data. There is also software built in-house by technocrats. The IT staff, though not able
to engage with many of the project staff, are creating a business intelligence system. The staff
who use these tools are also those who engage with data logic. The values align, and they feel
they can have control over the software they use. 
Tactical Tech also chose software based on their values but as they are aligned then there
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are not separate choices between those who follow data logic and those who do not. Instead, all
the software are Tactical Tech follows the same values which follow the principles of open-
source technology which is available for all to access the code which ensures they can check the
security  of the software - as well  as to adapt it  to their  needs.  This guarantees transparency
around the processes that surround the data. Further, their decisions are based on principles as an
organisation shown in the first chapter, based on their relationship to their role with the audience
in which they wish to ensure their privacy comes first. These principles dictated their use of the
software. As they did not have such a division between the technocrats and non-technocrats, they
did not have the division of control over the choice of software that is seen at Amnesty.
While Tactical Tech did not use social media metrics software; the organisation did use
social media channels but the staff member would take screenshots of the posts after a week and
send them to the team. Further, they use the analytics system Piwik instead of Google Analytics.
Piwik is considered to have better standards for privacy as they give the organisation control
over the data and is open-source. Even within the tool of Piwik, they use minimal settings that
are needed. They use mailing list software, again they use open-source software. They also use
the  open-source  software,  LibreOffice,  to  keep  track  of  the  mailing  list  numbers  (Interview
01938). As many of the teams spoke to their audiences through encrypted channels such as PGP
or secure messaging, they found it is most secure to have their contact details kept by the person
who is communicating with them.
Further, Tactical Tech produces versions of their products and services with the safety of
data in mind. One staff member describes the creation of part of their product with an audience in
mind who want to protect their data “...we have a special address you can go to visit another
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copy of the website, that can only be accessed by a TOR” (Interview 72948), referring to The
Onion  Router  which  is  used  to  access  the  internet  while  keeping  the  identity  of  the  user
anonymised. The staff believe that the benefit of using these tools may mean more work for
them: one staff member describes how one of their  projects which people carry out different
stages has “no online, or service component, we’ve had to create alternative ways of storing data
as you complete the [stages]” (Interview 15398). The limitations of choosing technical software,
and having to develop their own, is recognised as hard work but not as impossible or unrelated to
their job role. The integration of the concept of technocrats within roles allows an alignment of
both values and skills across the whole organisation.
6.3 Data double: False but Useful
The data double is the representation of a person or a group in the format of quantified data. In
the  literature  review,  I  described examples  for  CSOs such as  membership  numbers,  petition
numbers,  CRM data,  lookalike profiles and supporter profiles. Both at  Amnesty and Tactical
Tech, the data double is considered not to be an accurate representation of their constituents. For
Amnesty, the staff are still happy with an estimate as long as it works as abstract goals to achieve
growth, to optimise platforms to gain more responses and to provide to external authorities to
prove success. Tactical Tech, do not want to engage with the data for decision-making but are
happy to share the estimates with funders. There is an important distinction between the data
double at Amnesty and Tactical Tech; Amnesty is interested in collecting personal contact data
to identify the constituents whereas Tactical Tech only gathers and uses data at an aggregate
level, with minimal detail. 
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At Amnesty, there are two types of data double. Firstly, there is a data double of the
actions  taking place  on social  media  and interactions  with  the  website.  These  are  classified
according to their reporting systems described in chapter 5, as ‘followers’ who are not counted in
their impact assessments. These data doubles are used in reporting to internal stakeholders to
show the success of the tools. There are then people who take action, sign up to mailing lists or
donate  -  actions  which support  the  implementation  of  the pre-decided strategies.  These also
include those who are part of Goal 5, the growth strategy, which at the moment aims to grow
membership to ensure the organisation’s authority and, as shown, has limited space for the active
participation of these constituents. These data doubles are used to demonstrate their success or
support to external experts. At Amnesty, the data double are support-constituents whose actions-
as-data are used in different ways to affect the change that Amnesty’s members and staff have
decided  through  ways  which  are  far  from  data-led  but  instead  qualitative,  intuitive  and
deliberative.
Across these data doubles, one of the major values in their relationship to this concept of
the data double is their desire to have contact details. The number of individuals has become
more important than the number of actions. This has been particularly substantiated with the new
goal 5. As one staff member says in a meeting, there is a new set of definitions, those set out in
chapter 5, which define how Amnesty register different audiences. The followers, who engage
with the organisation through online platforms but that they do not have contact details for are
not requested in the overall reporting. On the other hand, the aim to have 25 million members as
part of goal 5 requires a contact detail for every one of these members. The campaign manager
explained how this is new to the organisation, “it is turning our whole methodology of what we
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are counting and the data we are tracking at the global level of its head.” (Interview 0164), going
on to explain that they are going from counting actions to counting people. The value of counting
people over actions is becoming a conventional value at Amnesty. In interviews staff members
spoke of the importance. One staff member in the governance team explained how important this
shift is explaining they “have 300,000 letters written but not sure at international level if that is
by 10 or 100 people” (Interview 1582). Another staff member, in fundraising and who I have
demonstrated to engage with the principles of data logic, complained about the previous tactics
“Taiwan had 300,000 actions  and only got  450 contacts  for  their  last  campaign”  (Interview
9309). 
Staff argue the importance of a data point of a contact detail in forming a relationship. In
a questions and answers session in which the staff who have developed the new definition talk to
staff from other national offices, this change in how they count people is necessary as “goal 5
isn’t just about growth but about sustainable growth so we need to know we can reconnect and
develop”  (Observation  Day  11).  As  one  staff  member  explained,  “Before  it  was  measuring
actions to mean success. Now it is about measuring supporters, which is why the contact detail is
important, it is the sign of a relationship.” (Interview 9309). The staff wish to gather the contact
details so they can have a relationship with the constituents - engaging with them initially as
support-constituents  but  developing  a  relationship  with  them  so  they  can  become  leading-
constituents. The new data-driven technologies promise not only a way to contact people, but to
gather  contact  details  over  and  above  activity  data,  ensuring  that  their  constituents  can  be
identified which is now considered important to an organisation arguing to have strength based
on their people-powered nature, which I explore more in the analysis in the conclusion. 
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One staff member at Amnesty who worked regularly with data logic talked a lot about
their philosophy of working with data, and within that said that the “no longer are your numbers
correct but is your estimate correct, it's a better question” (Interview 3322). In both the strategy
and evaluation team and the fundraising reports which they gather from the national offices, they
only ask for estimates, stating in the documentation for example: “We understand that not all of
you will be able to provide exact numbers so we ask you to please give an informed estimate.”
(Amnesty, 2016b). The estimations are used, as shown, to promote projects to work towards a
scale of engagement, or to optimise their platforms, in which cases the staff were not interested
in the data representing reality, but having a useful effect on their work 
Tactical  Tech,  conversely,  are  more interested  in  broad aggregate  data that  describes
actions over people. As described, there are far fewer scenarios in which Tactical Tech engage
with a data double at all. Other than small amounts of optimisation on their website, the main use
of data is in reporting to funders. For this, they use a data double representing the activity of
people  on  their  website,  of  attendance  at  events  and  sometimes  social  media  engagement
analytics and mailing list numbers. The staff are keen to maintain a limited broadness to the data,
to  demonstrate  the  success  of  the  tool.  Sometimes  this  is  accompanied  with  broad  regional
information for visits to their websites, and gender information of attendants for their events. In
these cases, they see there is an importance to understanding a profile of their audience to ensure
a reach to the audiences they hope to reach. However, they actively reject any more detail than
this, not using the more detailed features of their website analytics program, Piwik, or reporting
on detailed demographics of people who attend their events. 
In  contrast  with  their  lack  of  detailed  information  on constituents,  several  people  at
260
Tactical Tech’s initial reaction, when I asked about what data they use, was to list personal and
identifiable data around events or HR including people’s email addresses, flights, travel details,
CVs and recruitment data. For example, one staff member said: “Logistics for camps, passport
details  and participant  information” (Interview 01928).  Another  staff member said,  “a lot  of
personal  information  I  do  use  is  passport  numbers,  people’s  really  personal  information
because...I’ve done a lot of travel logistics for events...and also medical things and allergies,
these kinds of things” (Interview 52398). This was important to note because the data double, at
Tactical Tech, started with any personal data of their constituents and data that is connected to
sensitive  and  personal  information.  The  staff  data  is  considered  part  of  the  data  the  staff
presented as part of their work when I asked about data. Furthermore, even the staff members
who considered themselves not to be at risk from violations of privacy saw the importance of
privacy for themselves.  
In Tactical Tech there is an open recognition that estimates are used instead of an exact
number. As one staff member asked another about whether they got statistics on the attendance
of an event the response is “no, we estimated something things, it was something like 20,000”
(Observation  Day 24).  This  estimate  is  accepted  as  a  good enough response  from the  staff
member and the conversation in the meeting carries on. Another person spoke about a different
event saying they do not have a door counter, but they guess numbers from regular spot checks
(Observation day 15) concluding they had somewhere around 4,000 visitors over a few days.
Their website statistics, the staff are aware, can be affected by bots but also all sorts of different
errors in the process. One staff member describes her attitude towards the use of website traffic
numbers  “When  you  see  numbers  like  1  million  you  have  to  estimate  and  make  it  up”
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(Observation Day 11). The figures are still used to represent their success to funders. As one staff
member says in an “of course we still use this for funders” (Interview 72948). All the figures
from  the  website  statistics  are  considered  estimates,  rather  than  accurate  representations  of
activity, which is why the staff say they do not use them in their decision-making but do use
them to symbolise their success. 
In either organisation, the estimations and quantitative data double are only used with the
large-scale principles of data logic. In an interview with someone working on the standard action
reports at Amnesty, the staff member admitted that people currently make stuff up because they
are  worried  the  numbers  are  too  small  (Interview 2990).  At  Tactical  Tech,  a  staff member
discussed why they are not interested in how many people took part in one particular activity,
saying "if it was 500 then it'd be worth noting" (Observation Day 12). In another meeting, the
manager began paying more attention to one project when they noted that the numbers had risen
from 200 on weekdays to 800 at weekends, being impressed by the scale (Observation Day 24).
This may also be why, at Tactical Tech, there is a measure of website traffic, event numbers and
the mailing list in funding reports, but even there very little from their social media which shows
a numerical representation that is small relative to other organisations on these platforms. This is
not something they are keen to change, as shown, they do not engage with data logic and do not
seek scale. But it is notable that if the numbers were bigger, they may begin to start to use these
numbers and in this way, the scale makes numbers notable, encouraging staff to engage with
them.  This  is  one of  the  few places  it  could  be  seen  that  the  data  double  has  control  over
decision-making, rather than the staff having control over their engagement with the data double.
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6.4 Summary
At Amnesty, the members of staff engaging with data logic are distinguished as technocrats and
work completely separately from those in the campaign, research and strategy roles. These two
different groups also engage with different software, the technocrats prioritise principles of data
logic in their software and the others engage with software that allows for non-standardised and
qualitative information.  Tactical Tech integrates the skills and expertise of technocrats  in the
roles  and  therefore  decisions  are  made  collaboratively  and  without  any  obvious  conflict  in
relation to the principles of data logic. Consequently,  across the organisation,  their choice of
software consistently prioritises their principles of privacy and open-source software. The data
double is not considered real in either organisation and estimates are accepted in either place to
be used as a tool. Amnesty is also interested in collecting contact data, whereas Tactical Tech is
mainly  concerned with aggregate  and anonymised personal  data.  Tactical  Tech is  also more
concerned with the risks associated with the collection and analysis of personal data for all their
constituents - including their own staff. Amnesty, on the other hand, adopts a more differentiated
approach, in which beneficiaries receive high levels of privacy on their data double but different




The  development  of  data-driven  technologies  since  the  1960s  has  led  to  their  increasing
prevalence in political organisations, which have in turn developed distinct tactics and methods
that form a consistent and recognisable way of working with these technologies. To identify this
way of working, I propose an ideal type, which I term “data logic”. In chapter 2, I described the
four principles that form the ideal type of data logic: quantification, scale, standardised technical
processes, and algorithmic thinking. I also demonstrated how these principles manifest in the
practices of CSOs such as in the development of large memberships, presentation of petition
numbers  and  social  media  followers  on  the  homepages  of  their  websites,  or  a/b  testing  to
increase the effectiveness of their communications. These data-driven practices have become a
focus of interest for both practitioners and scholars due to their substantial adoption across every
sector.  Data  practices  have  either  been  praised  as  “an  essential  enrichment  in  human
comprehension” (Mayer-Schoenberger and Cukier, 2013: p. 96) or criticised for unquestioned
use of inaccurate and biased information (boyd and Crawford 2012; Couldry, 2014). Either way,
commentators agree that these practices influence how we create and share knowledge. Some
scholars  argue  that  data-driven  practices  have  become  ubiquitous,  even  where  there  is  an
awareness  of  the  risks,  as  they  are  adopted  with  a  resigned  acceptance  of  their  prevalence
(Zuboff,  2015;  Dencik  and  Cable,  2017).  This  thesis  investigates,  and  evaluates,  how  the
pervasive change in the way knowledge is created and shared due to data logic has impacted
political communication in Civil Society Organisations (CSOs).
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The social and political impact of the practices of data logic has been addressed in the
literature based on theories of data ethics, data activism and data justice (Johnson, 2016). I build
on the theory of data justice to consider the impact of the use of data-driven practices by CSOs to
understand whether there is a gap between the values which CSOs would like society to function
by and the values encouraged by data logic. Two contradictory perspectives in the literature on
the values of data-driven methods in political communication mirror two different models for
political actors to represent their constituents.  On the one hand, the data practices have been
praised for their ability to support audience-led models, demonstrated in their use by a growing
set of ‘people-powered’ CSOs (Karpf, 2017). On the other hand, the data practices have been
criticised  as  leading  to  the  exercise  of  control  over  data  subjects  and are  therefore  seen  as
methods which political representatives use to maintain and expand expert-led models (Tufecki,
2014). I frame these two sides by drawing on the established theory of the trustee and delegate
models  of political  representation,  which I  adapt  and apply to CSOs that are expert-led and
audience-led respectively.  The theory of the two models of representation by Wahlke, Eulau,
Buchanan,  and Ferguson (1962) is  useful  because  it  stresses  that  an organisation  will  never
exclusively be one or the other, but there is a time and place for both roles. The theory supports a
justification for use of data-driven in expert-led models and gives reason to be cautious to over-
emphasise the role of personal data in audience-led models.
While some literature argues that the use of data logic is inevitable and assumes that it
inherently supports an expert-led model, engagement with the methods of data logic is praised
and encouraged by many organisations and a few scholars for their ability to support audience-
led models  as well.  This thesis  examines  whether  and under what  conditions  data logic can
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support  expert-led  or  audience-led  models,  or  both.  To  answer  this  question,  I  created  a
framework  to  record  CSOs  engagement  with  data  logic  against  those  different  models  of
representation. By recording practices on this framework, it is possible to understand how data
logic,  as well as traditional methods, are used to support either model of representation and,
consequently,  evaluate the implications of CSOs’ practices for their  desired relationship with
their audience. I developed my two research questions to test and build upon this framework: Are
both the expert-led and the audience-led models in CSOs supported by data-driven practices?
And  what  are  the  main  factors  that  guide  the  decisions  made  by  CSOs  regarding  their
engagement with data practices to support either the expert-led or audience-led models?  The
review of the literature also demonstrated a third area of criticisms which pertain to how feasible
it is to have control over decision-making in data processes, in particular due to the fact that data
practices require to devolve some of the political representatives’ and constituents’ agency to
technocrats,  software,  or a  data double.  From these considerations,  a third research question
emerged: Is decision-making regarding data practices devolved to agents other than the staff or
constituents within either the expert-led or audience-led models?
I  carried  out  two  ethnographic  case  studies  to  determine  from  the  organisations’
perspective on how they decide when and how to engage with methods which pertain to the ideal
type  of  data  logic.  I  chose two cases:  Amnesty,  a  predominantly  delegate  organisation,  and
Tactical Tech, a predominantly trustee organisation. By choosing one organisation representing
each model, I was able to compare the ways in which the two different models lead organisations
to engage with practices of data logic, and how the practices may influence organisations’ ability
to engage with those roles. Both cases are also likely to have some friction, or even aversion, to
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the adoption of data logic.  Amnesty is  a  traditional  organisation with established logics and
currently runs campaigns against  the practices  of mass surveillance.  Tactical  Tech’s mission
explicitly aims to critically address the impact of technology on society. This choice of least
likely cases allowed me to understand what values may lead to the engagement with data logic
and where the logic faces tensions with alternative logics.
In this concluding chapter, I analyse how my main findings contribute to the literature I
built upon to develop my questions, my framework, and my project. Both organisations have
concerns with the accuracy and nuance of the results of data logic. Consequently, neither the
trustee nor the delegate organisation engages with data logic to decide on their current strategies,
such as which topic they will work on or whether one campaign will be prioritised over another.
The findings  challenge the assumption  that  organisations  inevitably  and substantially  engage
with  data  logic  in  all  contexts,  in  particular  by  showing  that  these  organisations  do  not
uncritically  accept  and  implement  these  techniques.  The  reasons  members  of  staff  in  both
organisations  gave for their  caution around methods based on data logic correlated  with the
specific concerns related to the particular models of representation they embody. Thus, members
of  staff  at  Tactical  Tech  were  concerned  that  as  an  expert-led  organisation  they  had  to  be
cautious  of  anything  that  might  be  manipulative  or  violate  privacy.  By  the  same  token,
employees at Amnesty were worried that as an audience-led organisation it was important not to
trust  short-term  popularity  metrics  nor  follow  a  non-representative  audience.  The  concerns
regarding the delegate model are particularly important due to the lack of attention this particular
model has received in the literature regarding the impact of the use of data-driven technologies in
political communication, which mainly focuses on violation of privacy or manipulative aspects
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of expert-led models (Tufecki, 2014; Lyon, 2015). Both organisations, particularly Amnesty, do
engage with the principles of data logic in certain contexts, but only when performing a trustee
role. This finding corroborates the theories that connect data-driven practices with surveillance
practices used to monitor and manage populations. However, both CSOs defend the use of an
expert-led  model  for  certain  functions  of  their  work,  such  as  to  build  relationships  with  a
currently non-engaged audience, to normalise non-popular or niche issues, and to demonstrate
support either through action or funding from constituents and audiences.
The  staff  I  observed  and  interviewed  did  not  provide  reasons  why  data  logic  is
appropriate  for  trustees  in  these  specific  contexts,  but  not  overall.  However,  an  in-depth
examination of the situations in which organisations employed data practices helps unpick how
the features of data logic correlate with different contexts in the organisation. Data logic was
useful for optimising and managing goals which had similar logics, such as the management of
platforms in which the organisations broadcast information (leading to a deductive and expert-
led model to optimize the effectiveness of communication), fundraising (in which the aims are to
raise money rather than involve the audience members), and growth (in which the organisation
also aims to increase numbers rather than to engage with the constituents at a  deeper level).
Further, in some cases organisations engaged with principles of data logic at a face-value level,
when using numbers derived from the data double to communicate information to managers or
funders, but this use of data was entirely separated from what information they would use for
making decisions. The staff perceive that these figures are meaningful to others, demonstrating
their awareness of an external prevalence of the values of data logic. Methods commonly used by
both  organisations  for  decision-making  are  non-standardised,  qualitative  and  small-scale,  far
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from the principles of data logic. Further research, and recognition, of these methods could be
beneficial for championing their use in both decision-making and communication. The use of
data logic is also far more common at Amnesty than at Tactical Tech. At Amnesty, the teams
working  on  online  platforms  and  growth  are  separated  from  those  working  on  strategy,
evaluation,  research  and active  participation  in  campaigns.  This  leads  to  a  separation  in  the
values of these teams. Trust in data logic is not widespread enough in the organisation to lead to
a seamless integration of technocrats. Instead, the technocrats believe in data logic and adopt it in
their teams, but the teams who do not value this logic keep a distance from the work of the
technocrat-led teams and vice versa, to the point that each group chooses software that matches
their values. Members of staff at Tactical Tech, however, do not distinguish between separate
technical experts. Consequently, there are not separated logics and the organisation finds ways to
incorporate  different  values  and  collaboratively  make  decisions  across  technical  and  non-
technical work.
7.1 Trustee and Delegate Models and Data logic
To  examine  data  justice  in  the  context  of  CSOs’  political  communication,  I  analysed  the
practices against the trustee and delegate models. The models reflect the two different ways data-
driven  methods  have  been  presented  in  the  literature.  The  delegate  model  represents  the
audience-led models. Scholars and practitioners have praised the use of data-driven methods for
increasing membership and involving more people in running their  own campaigns has been
praised (Karpf 2017, OPEN 2019), but the delegate model is not without criticism as scholars
have raised concerns based on the ability of an audience to make educated decisions on a topic
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(Burke, 1949). The trustee model represents the expert-led models where the use of data has
been criticised  for encouraging practices  which manipulate  the behaviours  of constituents  to
support the political representative, but data logic may also be useful in times when expert-made
decisions  are  needed.  To  examine  the  use  of  data  to  support  these  models,  I  chose  an
organisation of each model, Amnesty who are structured to conform to the delegate model, and
Tactical Tech who function according to the trustee model. Neither Amnesty nor Tactical Tech
engage with data logic when designing, creating and prioritising their strategy including when
evaluating their work to address what they will change, and trust their audience in the case of
Amnesty, or their experts in the case of Tactical Tech, over data. There are a few moments in
which  both  organisations  engage with  data  in  implementing  their  campaigns,  solely  to  gain
support  from  their  audience.  The  ethnographic  approach  of  this  research  allowed  me  to
understand the characteristics of contexts in which data logic is rejected and build on the concept
of data justice from the perspective of how staff in CSOs value their  own, and data logic’s,
function. 
Staff rejected the engagement with data-driven methods based on the consequences for
their respective models. Amnesty International, a predominantly delegate organisation, rejected
data logic due to the problems of taking input from the data double created from social media
engagement or website analytics when working on long-term or unpopular campaigns. The staff
gave  examples  such as  the  abolition  of  the  death  penalty  or  carrying  out  ongoing work in
countries where external factors can hinder the progress of their campaigns and which do not
receive large amounts of public and media attention. The staff, therefore, do not include the data
double made of those responding to their online communications within decision-making. The
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staff’s concerns demonstrate an awareness of the problems of the delegate model in which there
are certain moments a political representative may not want to be responsive either because the
group are not representative of minority constituents (Wahlke et al., 1962) or the constituents
have shallow views based on what is popular and the representatives do not want to end up
‘pandering’  to the public (Jacobs and Shapiro,  2000).  The delegate model is a useful  theory
because  these  consequences  are  important  to  the  CSOs  and  their  values  when  navigating
decisions  around  their  own  function.  The  concerns  around  audience-led  models  are  rarely
recognised by those documenting the impacts of technology, who instead often show how data-
driven technologies are used to support these models (Karpf, 2017) or, if critical, whether the
technologies have failed or succeeded to deliver these models (Dennis, 2018). The assumption
within most of the critical literature is that the concerns with data should be raised concerning
their  support  of  expert-led  models.  There  are  concerns  with  the  delegate  model  which  are
important to recognise and explore in relation to their effect on, and how they are affected by,
practices of data logic. After starting this research, more of these organisations went out their
way to suggest that staff still had the final say over the campaigns chosen, one describing at a
conference that this has come about especially after a rise of right-wing uses of the platform.
Furthermore, the Mouvement des Gilets Jaunes in France were challenged by their opposition for
being too populist based on their use of Facebook numbers to drive their content. The evidence
provided by data logic is becoming a weaker representation of organisations’ support. 
Tactical Tech, who are predominantly a trustee organisation, reject data logic due to the
risks associated with the trustee model. The staff were concerned with avoiding any methods
which could be considered manipulative. The staff believe their audience may not have expertise
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in the area of their work, but that overall the audience is competent, able to educate themselves,
and are  likely  to  be experts  in  other  fields.  The organisation's  function,  as  expert-led,  is  to
provide information about an area in which they expertise, to constituents who do not have this
information but not to manipulate or decide for the constituents what they want.  The staff at
Tactical  Tech  also  prioritised  any  practices  which  would  put  privacy  first  from  accepting
limitations  to  their  products  and  data  gathering  by  creating  TOR  friendly  and  cookie-free
websites to gathering only aggregate communications about the use of their website rather than
to profile their audience. Tactical Tech do not attempt to assert control over this audience by not
using targeted advertising, but instead engaging only with the publication elements of online
platforms, and are careful of their responsibility to maintain transparency through open-source
software  and  ensure  they  do  not  violate  any  constituent’s  privacy.  The  staff  demonstrate
knowledge of the criticisms of the trustee model in which a narrow view of the audience limits
them and in which experts may take advantage of techniques to bypass public opinion (Wahlke
et al., 1962). These are the same concerns described by those who synonymise surveillance and
mass collection and analysis of data. Similar concerns are raised by the use of data such as by
Tufecki  (2012)  in  computational  politics  in  which  data  is  used  to  support  the  decisions  of
political representatives for their benefit over that of the constituents’. While these concerns are
recognised by Tactical Tech, the issue is not with an expert-led model, but rather lies in the risks
of using data to support the model. Instead, the organisation uses design expertise and intuition
to support staff-led decision making over data-driven decisions. 
Tactical Tech does engage with aspects of data logic at times to support their role, and
these contexts share characteristics with the moments in which Amnesty engage with data logic,
272
in which Amnesty also engage with an expert-led model. At Amnesty, they engage substantially
more than Tactical Tech with data logic in these parts of their role. Methods of data logic are
used in both organisations, not in creating the strategy, but in the implementation of projects in
which the staff wish to communicate with constituents to educate them and mobilise them on
pre-decided strategic decisions. The methods are used particularly to optimise online platforms,
carrying  out  fundraising  case  communications  of  campaigns  and  carrying  out  fundraising
strategies.  Amnesty’s  digital  engagement  teams  use  the  principles  of  data  logic  for  the
optimisation  of  online  platforms,  which  work  already  based  on  these  logics  and  by  the
fundraising team to support the increase of donors and funds. Tactical Tech only substantially
engages with data logic around their communication to funders for accountability. In these cases,
the  report  numbers  from various  broadcast  platforms  including  online  platforms,  traditional
media and events where they disseminate their work. In both organisations, the data double is
used to endorse the decisions of either the staff or the members.  The use of data to optimize the
audience engagement with platforms or to donate confirms the opinion in the critical literature
which conflates the data practices with the behaviour management of constituents (Clarke 2003;
Tufecki,  2012;  Lyon,  2015).  The  practices  of  data  logic  are  used  to  manage  and  maintain
audiences,  measuring  the  behaviours  to  alter  their  opinions  towards  those  the  political
representatives would prefer. At Tactical Tech and Amnesty, there is also the use of quantitative
data to demonstrate their success as experts and in these situations the audience are tokenist,
rather than involved in decisions. 
Further, the staff at Amnesty engage with the principles of the ideal type of data logic in a
specific program around membership growth, which Tactical Tech does not. I propose this is
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where there is the influence of data logic, due to the pressure of the new CSOs who use the tools
to support their audience-led models. Amnesty feel a need to compare themselves with these
organisations, even if it only superficially represents themselves through the engagement of a
large  audience  rather  than  to  include these  audience  members  within  the  strategic  decision-
making. This is accompanied by a need to measure the number of people in their constituency,
rather than the number of actions. The staff believe that by collecting the contact details they can
begin a relationship with people to involve them in more decision-making. Therefore, there is an
appeal  to  use  data  practices,  and to  engage with  them,  but  only  if  they  might  improve  the
audience-led model. As shown, some concerns should be raised with this issue, given that the
organisations  rely  on  traditional  methods  when  they  want  to  engage  audiences  in  decision
making. The models examined reflect proposed models of data for governance (Lyon, 2015),
news organisations (Anderson, 2012) and for-profit companies (Martin, 2012) and these findings
may be expanded to help understand those contexts too. 
7.2 The Adoption of Data Logic and Alternatives
The inevitable  and pervasive influence of the methods of data logic is  presented by various
scholars such as boyd and Crawford (2012), Couldry (2014) and Zuboff (2015). I present an
ideal type, which I term data logic, to identify the new data practices. I use the term logic to draw
attention to the strong influence of the practices over the formation of organisational knowledge.
I chose to examine two cases which were likely to have friction or to challenge the adoption of
data-driven  practices.  The  lack  of  substantial  engagement  with  data  logic  is  therefore  not
completely  unexpected,  but  the  findings  demonstrate  that  the  adoption  of  data  logic  is  not
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ubiquitous, pushing back against the theories that the use of data is inevitable, such as the use of
the term realism by Dencik and Cable (2017, p. 764) to draw attention to how the adoption of
data-driven methods is seen to be the “only viable” option. There are certain contexts where data
logic takes place, either where the logics already align such as with platforms and fundraising or
when the organisations need to demonstrate their support and to show to others that they use data
logic. Taking an ethnographic approach allowed me to both see where practices took places, and
follow up with interviews and questions and examine the values which interviewees used to
defend their choice of engagement. 
The staff in both organisations reject the principles of data logic in contexts in which
opinions  will  guide  strategy  decisions  or  evaluate  their  success  in  campaigns.  In  both  case
studies,  staff  describe  elements  of  data  logic  as  counterproductive  to  their  need  to  include
multiple-stakeholders in decision-making and plan for difficult and long-term change. The staff
demonstrate knowledge of the criticisms of algorithmic reasoning. These concerns have been
raised, by scholars such as Raley (2013), Lyon (2015), and O’Neill (2016), highlighting that
data-driven methods are deductive, based only on actions that have taken place in the past which
should limit their use for predicting the future or creating ideas to base new activities on. Lyon
(2015) in particular connects this to surveillance and the profiling of individuals, and O’Neill
(2016) also presents dangerous risks for those who are trapped in cycles in which their current
situation dictates their future situation such as being out of education or out of credit or targeting
the 'usual suspects' in predictive policing (Meijer and Wessels, 2019). The CSOs work on issues
which require a vision in order to change, so they work with a ‘theory of change’, and reject the
use of data-driven methods to help them understand how to produce a change in these situations.
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Further, the data-double created from these automated and standardised methods is too limited,
as it is based on their previous actions, and shows a representation of public opinion derived
from what  the  audience  has  wanted  or  did  in  the  past,  not  what  they  want  for  the  future,
demonstrating the issues raised by Pariser (2012) and Karpf (2017).
The staff also reject the use of standardised processes, which are an element of data logic
as shown by Kitchin (2014) and boyd and Crawford (2012), for making strategy decisions. The
organisation  prefers  deliberative  situations  in  which  decisions  would  be  made  by  different
constellations of groups of people either members, partners, or staff. There was rarely a defined
number or group of roles required to be present for those decisions, nor was there a defined set of
instructions on what should be taken into account when making a decision. In some cases, there
were  guidelines,  but  staff were  left  to  navigate  these  from their  personal  judgement  and in
negotiation with others. In this way, any decision may lead to different results each time, based
on who is present. When evaluating the success of their decisions the organisations also reject
standardised methods as well  as quantified metrics  describing how they couldn’t  get enough
context from the numbers. As Jenkins (2013) describes when referring to the new data-driven
practices “the value of the arts, the quality of a play or a painting, is not measurable. You could
put all sorts of data into a machine: dates, colours, images, box office receipts, and none of it
could explain what the artwork is, what it means, and why it is powerful.” The staff preferred
qualitative methods such as story-telling or journals kept by constituents to evaluate the impact
of their work. 
The staff not only engage with practices that are contradictory to the principles of data
logic,  but  also  verbalise  concerns  of  data-driven  methods  in  interviews,  presentations  and
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informal  conversations,  showing that  the  organisations  do  have  a  sense  of  the  influence,  or
pressure,  to  engage  with  data  logic.  The  situations  in  which  the  staff  reject  data  logic  are
important  as they show there is a sense of pressure to demonstrate  their  justification for the
rejection of data logic from the staff. A better understanding and more evidence is needed of the
benefits of the alternative methods for creating and sharing knowledge, such as the utility of
qualitative,  deliberative  and  subjective  judgement-based  methods  in  the  organisations.  The
benefits of these methods should receive more attention in order to demonstrate how they are
used and support better justifications and arguments that align with the values of the practitioners
for  engaging  with  these  methods.  This  can  help  demonstrate  the  need for  practices  such as
‘human in the loop’ in which a human reviews the results produced by algorithms as well as
giving confidence in the use of inductive or qualitative methods in practitioners' work.
The evidence on the lack of utility of data-driven practices in some contexts is also used
by those who may feel the need to demonstrate they are engaging with the practices. As shown at
Amnesty and Tactical Tech, one area where the elements of data logic were present was not in
their decision-making practices, but how they present information to others. Amnesty presented
quantified  results  as  symbols  of  success  to  me  when  describing  their  work  in  interviews,
described how they used the numbers to show the success of their projects to their managers, and
used membership  and petition  numbers,  the  data  double  of  their  constituents,  to  show their
success to significant political authorities. Tactical Tech only engaged with the figures produced
through data logic when communicating with funders to demonstrate their success. This not only
challenges the belief that these data-driven practices are prevalent but suggests there is danger in
perpetuating the theory further when the staff in the CSOs do not consider the methods useful for
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evaluation.  This may also be a reason that Amnesty engages with data logic in their  growth
program in which they feel the pressure not necessarily to engage with data logic but to compete
with the digital membership organisations who do engage with it. While data-driven practices
might not be influential everywhere, Karpf’s (2017) assessment that analytic activism has shifted
the landscape is true in part as these organisations have changed what they think demonstrating
success  to  others  looks  like,  even  if  they  have  not  necessarily  changed  all  the  tactics  for
achieving it. 
Methods based on the principles of data logic are present in a few circumstances. All four
principles of scale, quantification, cause and effect and standardised processes are found in two
main activities. Staff working on fundraising use profiling as well as a series of benchmarks and
targets  to operationalise their  goals,  and already work on similar  principles  to data logic,  in
which  they  aim to  achieve  high  numbers  through  managing  processes  to  generate  the  most
response from their constituents. The principles are also used in relation to the measurement of
engagement and at times optimisation of audience engagement with not just online platforms
such as Facebook and their website but also traditional broadcasting platforms such as traditional
media and speaking events. In particular, profiling and optimisation, methods which are based on
the principles of data logic, are used to encourage people to engage with their online platforms.
Data  logic  is  influential  only  in  scenarios  where  the  principles  align  already  -  rather  than
replacing older traditional logics, it is accompanying the ones which are new or similar. Data
logic  engages  with  other  logics,  rather  than  being  a  dominant  influence,  as  presented  in
surveillance realism, capitalist surveillance or deterministic accounts of data-driven technologies
(Zuboff,  2015;  Dencik  and Cable,  2017). Further,  while  many staff had rejected  data-driven
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methods for producing results that were not representative of what they needed to measure, even
those staff using large quantities of personal data agreed it was not ‘real’ but a practical tool, and
were more interested in what works than a pure sense of truth. This confirms the theories of those
who propose that data-driven methods are no longer about the question of ‘why’ but ‘how’:
measuring objects to get results. The findings help clarify how data logic fits in amongst different
types of knowledge - not as that which is a paradigm or ontological privilege (Raley, 2013), but
instead show contribute to a type of empiricism, with methods for arriving at information that
may  impact  certain  results  in  specific  contexts  but  are  not  considered  cartesian  ‘pure’
knowledge. 
The difference  in  levels  of engagement  with data  logic is  matched with a  significant
difference between the two organisations regarding the treatment of technocrats. Amnesty has a
distinct set of technocrats who are given the responsibility and ownership of practices involving
data-driven technologies. These technocrats are isolated,  fully responsible for their own work
without input from other teams, and unable to input into the work of other teams. At Tactical
Tech there is no distinct concept or job role of a technocrat, and the knowledge of how to use
technologies is considered to be part of all job roles. There is a sense of comfort amongst staff
across different levels of knowledge, where they analyse what they do or do not know, and find it
within their responsibility to both assess this and go about changing it if needed for their work. 
This, in turn, is reflected in their choice of software, in which Tactical Tech has a single set of
principles which guide software choices across the organisation. In contrast, at Amnesty, there is
a  clear  divide  between  those  who  are  technocrats,  who  are  using  software  built  on,  and
presenting, the principles of data logic and those who are not technocrats who piece together
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different software solutions to cover their desired qualitative and non-standardised approach.
Scholars  argue that  the  faith  in  data-driven practices  also means trust  in  technocrats,
(boyd and Crawford,  2012;  Kitchin,  2014).  However  the  situation  is  a  little  more  complex:
Amnesty trusts technocrats, but only with the tools they are working on, restricting their input on
anything else within the organisation such as the creation of content or decisions on the top-level
strategy. In these contexts, data logic and technocrats are both present in the same context, but it
is the technocrats who trust data logic, rather than staff who trust these technocrats to deliver on
the use of online platforms. Neither the trust in data logic nor in technocrats may clearly precede
the other. The staff in these teams are also not managed, and in this way they are trusted in
delivering these tools, but the lack of faith the organisational staff already have in the use of the
data double means that the potential bias or subjective nature of these tools is not an issue they
come up against in their strategy. Amnesty does, however, have one relationship with one set of
their constituents who they engage with through online platforms or are communicated to by the
fundraising  team,  differing  from  their  relationship  with  constituents  that  the  strategy  and
evaluation team and campaign teams work with.  Tactical Tech does not recognise the role of
technocrat to be distinct or separate, and as such there are no ‘technocrats’, Without identified
distinct  technocrats  Tactical  Tech involve everyone in decision-making across what software
they will use and how they will work with the data double, and as such the approach to data
logic, and their constituents, is consistent across the organisation. 
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7.3 Limitations and Further Research
Carrying out this research addresses a timely need for an understanding of what are considered
acceptable data practices at a time where there is little detail and at times contradiction in attempt
to address the  difference  between good and bad practice.  The literature  presents  data-driven
practices as a useful tool for supporting audience-led models, but also argues that their use will
lead  to  inevitable  surveillance.  By examining  data  logic  at  the  level  of  the  perceptions  and
actions of the staff in CSOs, through an ethnographic approach, this research builds on the theory
of data justice to provide an understanding which can help navigate the decisions around data
from the perspective of what the CSOs aim to achieve. The ethnographic approach allowed me to
examine  a  topic  that  is  under  scrutiny  and subsequently  hard  to  always  assess  the  tensions
between what people wish to be seen to be doing, what they wish to be doing and what they are
doing. 
    I  propose the trustee  and delegate  models  for  understanding the  different  ways in
which  political  communication  and data  practices  can  function  together.  The  case  studies  I
examined were useful for testing the theory because they predominantly reflected one model
each, but still engaged with the other at times and helped demonstrate the different values a CSO
has  in  relation  to  their  audience.  The  evidence  that  neither  organisation  used  data-driven
practices to support a delegate model calls into question how and whether digital membership
organisations manage to do this. Further research into the decision-making processes of these
organisations could either demonstrate how they balance the weaknesses raised by using data for
these models or their justifications for engaging with these risks. Such research may also show
that the audience’s data double ultimately isn’t the deciding factor for an organisation’s strategy,
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as has become evident from the change in rhetoric in these digital membership organisations,
such as Change.org and Campact,  in which staff now remain in charge of final decisions of
topics. 
The methods of these new CSOs has had an effect on practices at Amnesty, who also
wish to  present  themselves  as  a  delegate  organisation,  but  yet  do not  engage with  the  data
practices in the process of creating their strategy, still trusting their constituents in face-to-face
deliberative meetings. This research does not present an understanding of whether the digital
membership organisations are more influential to external authorities or the public, or overall if
the  increase  in  numbers  of  these  CSOs  has  diminished  funds  and  resources  to  older
organisations. However, it does show that the older organisations themselves do not see that the
tactics are worth engaging within all  aspects of their  work. This raises questions around the
claims of new civil society organisations who ground their claim to be people-powered, and to be
taking a role as a delegate, through the use of data-driven ways of working: do the organisations
perform a delegate role and fall foul to the associated risks, or do they use the tools and perform
a trustee role or do they carry out data practices in another way altogether? Further research
should also take a more balanced approach to include the advantages of expert-led approaches
and to find ways to distinguish between those criticised such as surveillance, and methods in
which an organisation can take the role of an expert given the desire for organisations to perform
this role for long-term and unpopular campaigns. 
The ethnographic approach limited the time I could spend on understanding the roles
across more organisations. Further quantitative research or interviews could be done across a
wider variety of political representative organisations in the civil society space including unions,
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news organisations, international aid or tech for good corporations. The time taken to discover
the  context-specific details  in  ethnographies  limits  the  number  of  case studies  and scenarios
which can be examined. The case studies may have compared trustee and delegate, but did not
account for various other factors, such as type of campaigns, size of the organisation or other
types  of  memberships.  Further,  the age  separation  between the organisations  allowed for  an
understanding of different ways to relate to technology but did not allow for an understanding of
how a newer organisations’ practices will always be still forming, rather than set in place, and
their relationship with the staff will be more flexible. Further research could help corroborate,
challenge,  or  add to  the  findings  of  this  research  by  using larger-scale  research  methods  to
examine various categories of CSOs split different ways such as type of outputs (International
aid,  provision  of  services,  environmental  behaviour  change  and  political  rights)  or  different
arrangements and structures (such as relationships with corporations like FairTrade, local groups
instead of membership, unions). 
The  case  studies  were  also  chosen  as  least  likely  cases  to  engage  with  data  logic.
Amnesty is a traditional organisation and Tactical Tech’s campaigns are based on how to be
critical when engaging with technology. This made it possible to examine where data logic is
influential  even  when  organisations  may  be  critical.  An  overview  of  when  data  logic  is
consistently used and rejected reveals which principles are important to organisations within data
logic, namely a rejection of its lack of context and flexibility, and an acceptance of its use as a
tool, either to optimise or to communicate to others. Due to the finding that data logic is not
prevalent, based on the recognition of the weaknesses of the principles, an examination into the
actual prevalence rather than the perceived prevalence of data logic would be helpful. Further
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investigation, in particular, into strengths of alternatives rather than just the weaknesses of data
logic would be beneficial, alternatives which could include story-telling, intuition or personal
judgement, and non-standardised deliberation to come to decisions. 
The research contributed to the understanding of the role of technocrats in data practices.
The  separation  of  technocrats  from  non-technocrats  creates  a  scenario  in  which  each  team
controlled  their  outputs  but  also,  despite  the  clash  in  logics,  allowed  the  organisation  to
undertake practices which were based on data logic. However, at Amnesty, there is no unity in
the relationship with the audience or the tools to perform their role across the organisation. The
integration of technocrats leads to more control over the outcomes. Further questions could help
understand the role of technocrats, and how they can be most effective for CSOs, including: Do
the new CSOs, as technology-era organisations,  integrate technocrats  and therefore also have
better ability to use technology to achieve their desired role with the audience across teams? And
can older organisations engage with new data-technologies without creating distinct roles which
are separated from the rest of their work?
7.4 Conclusion and The Contribution of This Research
The use of data logic within political communication is considered to be both inevitable, and
views  on  its  impact  are  contradictory.  This  thesis  began  by  examining  whether  we  can
reformulate  our  understanding  of  data  practices  to  resolve  this  contradiction.  This  research
examines the conflict of political representative relationships with their constituents, presented in
chapter 5. The findings answer the question as to whether either model of representation can be
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supported by data logic, through the examination of the practices in comparative organisations.
In doing so, this research has contributed to the ability to address the seemingly incompatible
outcomes of data practices, between support new CSOs who champion data practices to support
audience-led  decision-making  and  the  critical  scholars  who  conflate  data  practices  with
surveillance so as to show how the practices amplify the decision-making power of political
representatives in expert-led models. The findings show that the data practices are perceived to
be able to support both delegate or trustee roles, but are associated with the negative aspects of
each. This finding indicates that the criticisms of the effect of data practices on delegate roles are
missing from the rhetoric of new CSOs and literature on their practices. Further, the practices are
mostly used for the trustee role, showing that there is a parallel between data logic and the values
of expert-led models.
Chapter 6 presents how data logic is not as rife in practices as scholars, such as boyd and
Crawford (2012) and Couldry (2014) suggest. Data logic is found in scenarios where the logic is
already  aligned,  such  as  with  platforms  and  fundraising.  However,  there  are  also  various
practices based on principles which are incompatible with the principles of data logic such as
qualitative  story-telling  evaluation  methods  and non-standardised  deliberative  and  subjective
decision making. The findings present the need for further research not just on the concerns of
data-driven  practices,  but  on  the  qualities  the  alternatives  might  hold  and  their  utility  for
constituent relationships.  Finally, in chapter 7, I present how the distinction of technocrats is
aligned with a rejection of data logic, as the staff who do not engage with data logic, also do not
engage with the practices or technologies, and entrust technocrats to carry out this work. The
removal of the distinct role of technocrat can help integrate the values of an organisation keeping
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them consistent between teams and audiences. The adoption of data logic is not straightforward
and remains cautiously undertaken, with the majority of cases occurring when the staff present
their work to others. This is an important time to research alternatives as we build policies which
must deal not just with data-driven methods, but also machine learning and artificial intelligence
which move away from any human involvement, and must increasingly ask questions about how,
when and why to include humans in decision-making. 
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Appendix A: Supporting Information for Interviews 
Numbers and summarised job descriptions are used to protect the anonymity of staff as much as
possible,  while  simultaneously  giving  the  contextual  information  needed  to  recognise  its
significance.
Amnesty International
Interview Number Job Role
0164 Campaigns Manager
1387 Digital Engagement Team Manager
1582 Campaigns Senior Manager
1838 Project Researcher and Campaigner
2093 Project researcher and Campaigner
2372 IT and Data Services Team Member
2428 Campaign Manager
2990 Fundraising Manager
3322 Fundraising and Data Team Member
3452 IT and Data Services Team Manager
4681 Strategy and Evaluation Team Member
4771 Strategy and Evaluation Team Member
5190 Governance Team Manager
6311 Diversity Project Researcher and Campaigner
6358 Digital Engagement Team Member
7858 IT and Data Services Team Consultant
8365 Strategy and Evaluation Team Member
8443 Strategy and Evaluation Team Manager
8473 Membership Team Manager
9309 Fundraising Senior Manager




Interview Number Job Role
01938 Communications Staff Member
15398 Project Staff and Digital Product Manager
29476 Grants and Operations Manager
36724 Grants and Operations Staff Member
47860 Project Staff and Digital Product Staff Member
52398 Project Staff Member
61394 Senior Manager




A descriptive guide, though not exhaustive list, of the indicators used to gather data 
Object of the
Research
Indicators for collection and analysis
(developed throughout the
ethnography)




Mention of audiences such as
members, supporters, donors
Who is involved in strategic
decision-making processes
At what point are different actors
involved in decision-making
The role of the audience with
reference to Arnstien’s ladder of
participation (1969)
How would you describe the
mission of the organisation?
What audiences do you work
with?
What do you hope to gain from
the audience?
What do you think the audience
wants to gain from your work?
Data Logic For quantification, the use of
numerical representations of the
audience
For scale, methods for the sole
purpose of collecting more data, and
a tendency to always want a higher
number, or a rejection of the need
for more
For technical standardised processes,
a trust in technocrats and software to
make decisions, or a lack of it
For algorithmic reasoning, types of
testing and measuring outputs, and
changing their communications to
manage them
What data do you use?
What do you most enjoy, or
what is your favourite project
using data?
How does it contribute to your
job’s goals?
How does data improve, or not,
your project in relation to the
goals of the organisation?  
The agents Use of and attitudes towards What data do you use?
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quantified versions of the audience
for the data double





Attitudes towards and justifications
for level and style of engagement
with data-driven software
What software do you use?
Who is responsible for the data
you use?
Do you believe the organisation
has the necessary skills to use
data?
How do you use audience
metrics?
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Appendix C: Ethical Considerations
This  project  received  ethical  approval  from  the  Research  Committee  at  the  Department  of
Politics  and  International  Relations  at  Royal  Holloway.  Any  staff  and  members  of  the
organisations who I engaged with as a researcher were aware of my status as such. I provided
interview consent forms for all those involved in interviews directly which clearly outlined the
focus of the research and how any data collected would be stored and used. These forms are
available on request. All information provided has been anonymised.   
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